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Summary
This thesis analyses the role of workplace heterogeneity in determining pay differentials
between workers, employing a range of reduced-form tools and using detailed matched
employer-employee administrative data.
The first chapter, co-authored with Alessandra Casarico, studies the contribution of
differences in firm pay policy to the gender wage gap in Italy, decomposing them into a
between-firm component of sorting of women in low-pay firms and a within-firm component
related to differences in bargaining power between gender. Building on Card et al. (2016), we
investigate the contribution of firms to the gender gap in earnings at different deciles of the
earnings distribution, by age and cohort, and over time. Using a linked employer-employee
dataset for Italy, covering the universe of workers in the private sector, we show that the
gap in firm pay policy explains on average 30 percent of the gender pay gap in the period
1995-2015. When we decompose differences in firm pay policy into sorting and bargaining,
we find that sorting of women in low pay firms dominates on average and at the bottom of
the distribution, whereas bargaining prevails at the top and has increased in importance over
time. We explore gendered mobility patterns towards firms with more generous pay policy
as a driver of sorting and exploit exogenous variation in the gender composition of board
of directors to study the impact of firm environment on gender differences in bargaining
power. We find that women are less likely to move towards more generous firms, especially
in the event of firm closures, and that exogenous changes in the gender balance in leadership
positions reduce the gender gap in bargaining power, indicating that the latter is partly
malleable to institutional changes.
The second chapter, co-authored with Long Hong, studies the contribution of coworkers
on future wage growth. Using linked employer-employee data for the Veneto region in
Italy, we explore coworkers’ effect on wage growth in two directions. First, using a novel
estimation method and accounting for the endogenous sorting of workers into peer groups
and firms, we estimate the impact of average peer quality on future wages. We find that
a 10 percent rise in peer quality increases one’s wage in the next year by 1.8 percent. The
effect decreases gradually over time and becomes about 0.7 percent after five years. Second,
we delve deeper into the channels that identify the peer effect and, using an event-study
specification around mobility episodes, we study how the entry and leave of high-quality
and low-quality workers affect wages of movers and coworkers. We find that hiring a
high-quality worker is an important driver of wage growth, as well as separating from a
v
low-quality worker. Movers experience an immediate gain when moving into high-quality
peers. Knowledge spillover and peer pressure are likely important mechanisms in explaining
our findings.
The third chapter studies the worker-, firm- and sector-level adjustment to robots. Com-
bining detailed matched employer-employee data for Italy over the period 1994-2018 with
robot counts by industry in the manufacturing sector, we show that automation adoption
expands employment opportunities and reduces labour market transitions. At the worker
level, those who are either high-skilled, white-collar, or employed in more productive firms
experience employment and earnings gains. Meanwhile at the firm-level, sales and value
added increase, while employment outcomes are highly heterogeneous between ex-ante
more and less productive firms; with the former increasing employment of all workers,
irrespective of their skill level, and the latter reducing it. These changes in labour demand
are further inspected at the sector-level, where an event study approach following spikes in
automation adoption reveals a negative effect of automation on labour market sorting. Over-
all, this chapter provides evidence on the impact of automation on a country with a strong
manufacturing sector and a relatively rigid labour market. When exploring heterogeneous
effects across workers and firms, there is a clear distinction between “winners” and “losers”,
with less skilled workers facing bigger losses from technology adoption.
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Chapter 1
What Firms Do: Gender Inequality in
Linked Employer-Employee Data
Abstract This chapter studies the impact of firm pay policy on gender inequality in the
labour market. Building on Card et al. (2016), we investigate the contribution of firms to the
gender gap in earnings at different deciles of the earnings distribution, by age and cohort,
and over time. Using a linked employer-employee dataset for Italy, covering the universe of
workers in the private sector, we show that the gap in firm pay policy explains on average
30 per cent of the gender pay gap in the period 1995-2015. When we decompose differences
in firm pay policy into sorting and bargaining, we find that sorting of women in low pay
firms dominates on average and at the bottom of the distribution, whereas bargaining
prevails at the top and has increased in importance over time. We explore gendered mobility
patterns towards firms with more generous pay policy as a driver of sorting and exploit
exogenous variation in the gender composition of board of directors to study the impact of
firm environment on gender differences in bargaining power. We find that women are less
likely to move towards more generous firms, especially in the event of firm closures, and
that exogenous changes in the gender balance in leadership positions reduce the gender gap
in bargaining power, indicating that the latter is partly malleable to institutional changes.1
Keywords: Bargaining, Sorting, Linked Employer-Employee Data, Mobility gap, Gender
quotas
JEL codes: J16, J31, J71
1This chapter is based on joint work with Alessandra Casarico, Bocconi University.
2 What Firms Do: Gender Inequality in Linked Employer-Employee Data
1.1 Introduction
The gender wage gap has decreased remarkably starting from the 1960s but its decline has
stalled. The median gender wage gap in OECD countries was 13.9 per cent in 2016 against a
value above 30 per cent in 1975, but only 1.7 percentage points below its value in 2005,2 with
large cross-country differences and with smaller reductions at the top of the distribution. A
large literature documents the extent of gender wage gaps and their evolution over time,3
and offers explanations for their presence. Demand-side factors, such as taste or statistical
discrimination, and supply-side factors, such as productivity differences due to human
capital accumulation and work effort of women relative to men, are among the explanations
surveyed in Altonji and Blank (1999). Recent explanations of the persistent gap in pay focus
on the role of social norms and differences in psychological traits (Azmat and Petrongolo,
2014; Bertrand, 2011; Flinn et al., 2018), and on the important role of child penalties (Cortés
and Pan, 2020; Kleven et al., 2019). Clearly, gendered outcomes depend not only on the
characteristics and behaviour of workers, but also on those of the firms which employ them.
Firm-related gender wage differences can show up through labour market segmentation of
women into firms with lower pay rates (Bayard et al., 2003; Card et al., 2016; Cardoso et al.,
2016; Groshen, 1991; Ludsteck, 2014; Morchio and Moser, 2019).4 In addition, women may
show lower bargaining power compared to men working at the same firm: women may
negotiate less aggressively (Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al., 2007, 2005; Rozada and Yeyati,
2018) and this can result in gender pay gaps and different standards of promotion, even
when wages tend to be equal within the same occupations (Blau, 2012; Petersen and Morgan,
1995). From the policy side, the choice of some countries to impose disclosure policies that
require firms to report, among other things, the pay level of men and women (e.g. Equality
Act in the UK or the Decree Law 254/2016 on Non-financial reporting in Italy) speaks to the
emerging role of firms as key actors.
The goal of this paper is to complement this literature by documenting the role of firm
pay policy in hindering or reinforcing gender inequality in the labour market. Building
on Card et al. (2016), we study the contribution of firms to the gender gap in earnings
at different deciles of the earnings distribution, by age and cohort, and over time. After
accounting for individual permanent productivity, we decompose gender differences in
firm fixed effects and distinguish between gender differences in sorting across firms and
2Source: OECD (2018), LFS - Decile ratios of gross earnings, and OECD Family Database (2017).
3For cross-country evidence see, for example, Blau and Kahn (2003), Gregory (2009), Ponthieux and Meurs
(2015), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016); for a focus on the US, Blau and Kahn (1997, 2000, 2006).
4Reasons for why women sort into firms with lower pay include preferences for jobs and/or firms that allow
more flexibility and a better work-life balance. For instance, there is evidence that the presence of women is
lower in firms more open to trade and more subject to competitive pressure, where work flexibility is harder
to achieve (Black and Brainerd, 2004; Bøler et al., 2018; Heyman et al., 2013). Changes in the sorting of men
and women across high- and low-pay establishments also add to the increase in the gender pay gap over the
life-cycle, as shown by Barth et al. (2017).
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in bargaining within firms. The latter captures both allocation of men and women across
different hyerarchical levels within firms and gender differences in the ability to bargain
over wages. The statistical decomposition reveals that sorting accounts for two thirds of the
gender gap in firm pay policy, while bargaining accounts for the remaining third. To provide
more direct evidence on the determinants of sorting and bargaining, we explore gendered
mobility patterns towards firms with more generous pay policy as a driver of sorting and
exploit exogenous variation in the gender composition of board of directors to study the
impact of firm environment on gender differences in bargaining power. Our analysis is
based on a large linked employer-employee dataset that records the work and pay history
of the universe of Italian workers in the non-agricultural private sector between 1995 and
2015. The dataset is provided by the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS, Istituto
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale) via the “VisitINPS” program and it contains more than 22
million workers employed by approximately 1.6 million firms.
We first show that differences in firm-specific premia5 account for approximately 30 per
cent of the Italian gender pay gap at the mean, with sorting accounting for two thirds of
the firm contribution compared to bargaining, and for one fifth of the overall gender gap
in earnings. This is in line with the existing evidence on Portugal, France and Germany
(Bruns, 2019; Card et al., 2016; Coudin et al., 2018). The dominant role of sorting compared to
bargaining is persistent across age and cohorts and it is more evident for older women. The
decomposition analysis within deciles of the pay distribution shows that bargaining is the
main factor driving the firm contribution at the top: even when women work for high-pay
firms, their earnings are lower than those of men because of their worse bargaining power.
The role of bargaining has increased over time: when we estimate the firm contribution and
its decomposition into sorting and bargaining in four overlapping time intervals between
1995 and 2015, we find that gender differences in firm fixed effects are practically unchanged
over time, but the contribution of each component has varied considerably, with gender
differences in bargaining sharply gaining importance. We argue that this may reflect the
spreading of decentralised wage setting in the Italian labour market, and highlight that it has
differentially affected men and women, to the detriment of the latter. When investigating
mobility patterns, we find that a gender mobility gap is present, with women displaying a
lower likelihood of moving to better paying firms only if mobility is associated with firm
closures. We also find that women tend not to move towards firms with high (unexplained)
earnings dispersion, indicating that gender differences in risk aversion or attitudes towards
competition may be at play. Note also that gender differences in mobility can explain
not only sorting, but also the lower bargaining power of women. As to the latter, in the
experimental part of the analysis, we find that the reform introducing gender quotas in
boards reduces the gender gap in bargaining power, especially in firms with lower female
5Throughout the paper we use the terms firm pay policy and firm-specific premia as synonyms of the
gender-specific firm fixed effect in the earning equation.
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presence in the board before the reform and for stayers, employed as white-collar workers
and executives, suggesting that the lower bargaining power of women compared to men is
partly institution-driven.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is four-fold. First, we show that the
impact of firms on the gender pay gap is non-negligible and remains fairly constant over
time, with differences in bargaining power increasing in importance in recent years. The
almost unchanged gender gap in firm pay policy, coupled with a declining gender pay gap,
suggests that the firm contribution is gaining importance and the policy focus on firms is
appropriate.6 Second, we show that there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of firms
along the earnings distribution, with sorting playing a major role in the bottom and middle
part of the distribution, and bargaining dominating at the top. This evidence suggests that
the relative absence of women from the top of the earnings distribution documented by the
literature7 can partly be explained by gender differences in bargaining power. The increasing
importance of bargaining power over time can also provide an explanation for the smaller
decrease over time of the male-female earnings gap at the top.8 Third, we propose a novel
measure of the gender mobility gap, and point out the lower probability of women to move
towards firms adopting more generous pay policy only when moves are associated with
firm closures. Last, we are the first to investigate the impact of an exogenous increase in
the share of female members in the board of directors of listed companies on the relative
bargaining power of female employees.9 The evidence that gender quotas affect the gender
gap in bargaining power reveals that some trickle down effects from boards to workers
are present; it also points to the importance of strengthening gender balance at the top of
the firm hierarchy and pinpoints a specific channel – that of bargaining – through which
legislation may influence gender gaps in earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 1.2 describes the dataset
and provides evidence on the gender gap in earnings in Italy; section 1.3 explains the
methodology to measure the firm contribution to the gender pay gap and its decomposition
6Note that this evidence, which also includes the aftermath of the Great Recession, differs from the one on
West Germany provided by Bruns (2019) for the period 1995-2008: there, the gender gap in firm pay policy has
increased, rather than having been constant, providing an explanation for the stall in the decline of the gender
wage gap.
7A rich literature investigates the gender pay gap across the wage distribution and shows the presence of
larger gaps at the top – providing evidence of a glass ceiling (Albrecht et al., 2003, 2015; Arulampalam et al.,
2007). Evidence on the relative absence of women at the top of the US earnings distribution is provided also by
Guvenen et al. (2014) and Piketty et al. (2018).
8See Blau and Kahn (2017) and Goldin (2014). For 8 countries, including Italy, Atkinson et al. (2018) document
that female presence has increased less at the very top of the income distribution compared to other percentiles.
9The research focusing on the impact of gender quotas on worker outcomes, and in particular on female
wages and employment, finds little to no effect. Examining the introduction of gender quotas in boards in
Norway, Bertrand et al. (2019) find a positive impact on the qualification level of appointed female board
members, but no robust evidence of trickle-down effects on female employees. Similarly, Maida and Weber
(2019) find no significant impact of the introduction of gender quotas in Italy on female wages or on women’s
progression towards the top echelons of the firms’ hierarchy.
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into sorting and bargaining; section 1.4 presents the results on the decomposition on average,
across the distribution of earnings and over time; section 1.5 investigates firm-related
mobility; section 1.6 discusses the impact of the gender quota law on the relative bargaining
power of female employees; section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis is based on data provided by the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS,
Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale) that record the work and pay history of the universe
of employees in the private non-agricultural sector. The main source of information for
these data is the form that employers have to fill in to pay pension contributions to their
employees. We focus on the period 1995-2015.10 The data provide information on gross
annual earnings,11 the number of days and weeks worked in a given year, the type of
contract (whether full-time or part-time), the province of work, the position held at the
firm (apprentice, blue-collar, white-collar, middle-manager from 1996, and executive), the
gender and the year of birth. We also know the first year of work, which allows us to build
a measure of labour market experience. For each worker in the dataset we have a firm
identifier. In a separate record, INPS provides information on location, industry,12 and date
of opening and closure of all firms in the data. Firms may comprise multiple establishments.
We link firms to balance sheet information, coming from the AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk dataset,
that collects information for all companies obliged to file their accounts within the Italian
Business Register. Specifically, we use information on sales and value added.
1.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
We build a panel dataset that comprises one observation per worker per year. Since workers
who hold multiple jobs are recorded in the data more than once within a year, we select
the observation corresponding to the main job, that is, the one associated with the highest
number of weeks worked. In case two or more observations are characterised by the same
number of weeks, we keep the observation with the highest weekly earnings. In addition,
10Even though digitised records for workers’ histories are available since 1983, we focus on the period 1995-
2015 for a number of reasons. First, before 1995 information on firms is less accurate (especially sectoral codes,
which are fundamental for our purposes, as we will explain later). Second, the computational burden of our
estimation procedure is particularly high: 21 years should represent a significant portion of the evolution of the
Italian labour market. Third, in July 1993, there was a major reform of the system of collective bargaining in
Italy, which restructured the links between sector and firm level bargaining. We therefore choose to start our
analysis one year and half after this reform in order to capture all the relevant changes that it brought about.
11Full net annual earnings, plus all kinds of pecuniary compensation, grossed up with labour income taxes
and social security contributions on the employee.
12Sectors are classified according to Nace Rev. 2 codes (whose Italian counterpart is Ateco 2007). All sectors
are available in the data, except the public sector, agriculture and domestic workers.
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Table 1.1 Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Dual connected
Male Female Male Female
Age 39.59 38.17 39.79 38.34
Tenure 5.17 5.00 5.25 5.02
Experience 19.35 17.33 19.53 17.50
Adjusted weeks 43.62 37.42 44.14 37.85
Weekly earnings 561.34 439.29 583.68 448.12
Number of workers per firm 8.33 5.34 10.39 6.67
Share blue-collar 63.54 44.31 61.19 44.52
Share white-collar 28.33 50.43 30.30 50.46
Share executive 1.72 0.36 1.92 0.40
Share middle manager 3.91 1.94 4.43 2.14
Share apprentice 2.50 2.95 2.16 2.48
Share part-time 6.14 31.18 5.69 29.95
Observations 129,048,272 79,620,898 112,721,072 70,341,016
Number of workers 13,330,473 9,060,341 12,248,104 8,315,143
Number of firms 1,618,072 1,618,072 1,205,878 1,205,878
Notes. The Table reports, in columns (1) and (2), summary statistics for male and female workers in the entire
sample over the period 1995-2015; in columns (3) and (4), it reports summary statistics for the sample used in the
analysis in section 1.4.2, which comprises firms that belong to the dual connected set, i.e. the intersection of male
and female largest connected sets (see sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 for details). Tenure is computed as the number of
years the worker is with the same firm. Experience is the labour market experience of workers, computed as the
difference between the current year and the first year of work. Adjusted weeks are the number of weeks worked
in a year, standardised to account for part-time work (see text for details). Weekly earnings are expressed in real
(2010 = 100) euros. The number of workers per firm is computed as the average of the yearly male and female
workforce at each firm.
we keep only workers who have been employed for at least 4 weeks during the year.13 We
further restrict our analysis to workers with age between 19 and 65, and with at least two
years of labour market experience.
From the firms’ side, we drop single gender firms, that is, firms that employ individuals
of the same sex for the entire period under analysis. This means that our final sample covers
firms that have employed at least two workers of different genders.14
Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics. We first look at columns (1) and (2). We have 129
million person-year observations for the male sample and 80 million person-year observa-
tions for the female sample. The number of male workers is 13.3 million and that of female
13If, after these restrictions, some individuals are still observed more than once within a single year, we retain
only one observation. Doing so, we drop 91,511 observations, around 0.04 per cent of the total.
14Overall, after data cleaning we drop 126,491,382 observations in total, approximately 38 per cent of the
original population.
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workers is 9.1 million. Firms are 1.6 million. Mean age is slightly higher for men than for
women, and so is the average job tenure.15 The average real weekly earnings – the measure
of pay we focus on – are larger for men, with a 22 per cent gender gap. The average number
of male workers in a firm is 8 and of female workers is 5, both reflecting the small average
firm size of Italian firms. The share of blue-collar workers is higher for males (64 per cent
versus 44 per cent), whereas that of white-collar workers is higher for females (50 per cent
versus 28 per cent). The percentage of executives and middle managers is higher for male
workers (1.8 per cent and 3.9 per cent) than for female workers (0.4 per cent and 1.9 per
cent). The share of apprentices is higher for women. Around 6 per cent of male workers has
a part-time job, with the figure for women being 5 times larger. We keep part-time workers
in the analysis, since the number of weeks worked is standardised in the data to make them
comparable to those of full-time workers. In particular, for full-time workers we have the
number of weeks worked during the year; for part-time workers we have the number of
full-time equivalent weeks, which make weekly earnings of full-time and part-time workers
comparable. The measure of full-time equivalent weeks is provided directly by INPS, which
exploits the information on the actual number of hours worked in a month (available to
them, but not to researchers) and computes full-time equivalent weeks by multiplying the
number of actual weeks worked by the ratio between the number of hours worked in a
month and the number of contractual hours for the full-time equivalent position. In this
way, differences in hours for part-timers are controlled for and the gender gap in weekly
earnings is very close to that in hourly wages.16
1.2.2 Evidence on the Gender Earnings Gap in Italy
Figure 1.1 reports the evolution of the gender gap in log average real weekly earnings over
the period 1995-2015. Overall, the raw gap has decreased over time, though at a lower pace
between 1995 and 1999 and between 2005 and 2008. The raw average gender pay gap was
approximately 22.5 log points in 1995 and 15.5 log points in 2015.
We ask how far the gender pay gap is related to firm-specific factors. A first evidence
is provided in Table 1.2, where we report coefficients from log wage regressions. The first
column of the Table is the unadjusted gender gap in average log weekly earnings, which
indicates that female earnings are 19.2 log points lower than male ones over the period
considered. Column (2) controls for a set of observable individual characteristics (cubic
polynomials in age, experience and tenure, a dummy for full-time contract, the number of
weeks worked) and a full set of year, occupation and province dummies. The inclusion
15Job tenure is a left-censored variable. Thus, true average job tenure may be higher.
16For full-time workers weekly earnings may be an imperfect measure of hourly wages in the presence of
overtime hours, on which the data provides no information. Reassuringly, however, the gender pay gap in
weekly earnings of 22% that we find over 1995-2015 is not too different from that reported by Eurostat for
the private sector based on hourly wages, which oscillates between 17.5% and 19.9% over 2009-2015 (source:
Eurostat, Gender pay gap in unadjusted form by type of ownership of the economic activity).
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1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year
Raw Including controls
Including sector effects Including firm effects
Notes. The Figure plots coefficients of a dummy for male workers from log wage regressions, run for each year in
four different specifications: without controls (“Raw”); controlling for observable characteristics of workers, i.e.
cubic polynomials in age, experience and tenure, a dummy for full-time contract, the number of weeks worked,
occupation and province of work fixed effects (“Including controls”); controlling for observable characteristics
and, additionally, for sector fixed effects (“Including sector effects”); controlling for observable characteristics
and, additionally, for firm fixed effects (“Including firm effects”).
of these controls leaves the main coefficient of interest on the male dummy practically
unchanged. Column (3) includes 2-digit sector fixed effects. Their inclusion reduces the
coefficient on the male dummy by 1.6 log points with respect to column (2), indicating that
women tend to sort into low-pay sectors. Women tend to work for low-pay firms, too, as
shown by the specification in Column (4), which includes firm fixed effects (and excludes
sector fixed effects, as they would be absorbed by firm fixed effects). The coefficient on
the male dummy decreases by 3.2 log points relative to column (3) and by 5 log points
with respect to the unconditional estimate. This provides evidence that women tend to sort
into firms that pay lower earnings on average. Controlling for firm heterogeneity across
individuals and over time reduces the gender pay gap significantly. It is important to
stress that we are not controlling here for non-random assignment of workers into firms
via individual fixed effects. In addition, we are considering firm effects that do not vary by
gender, assuming away within-firm differences in the ability of men and women to bargain
over their pay or occupation. Hence, we can account only for the part of the gender pay gap
explained by sorting of women into low-pay firms. Later in the paper we explicitly allow for
firm effects to vary by gender and we control for non-random sorting of workers into firms
via the inclusion of individual fixed effects.
Firm characteristics are relevant determinants of the gender pay gap over the entire
period of analysis: in Figure 1.1, besides the raw gender gap in earnings, we plot the
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Table 1.2 Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.174*** 0.142***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes
Province effects No Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects No No Yes No
Firm effects No No No Yes
R-squared 0.040 0.514 0.546 0.708
Observations 208,669,170 208,669,170 207,788,391 207,788,391
Notes. The Table reports the coefficients of a dummy variable for male workers from OLS regressions where log
weekly earnings are the dependent variable. Covariates include cubic polynomials in age, experience and tenure
(linear term in age excluded), number of adjusted weeks worked in a year, a dummy for full-time workers,
occupation dummies (blue-collar, white-collar, executive and middle manager; excluded category: apprentice).
Sectors are taken from 2-digit Nace Rev. 2. Robust standard error, clustered at firm level, in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
coefficients of the male dummy from regressions that control for individual observable
characteristics (as in column (2) of Table 1.2), for sector fixed effects (as in column (3) of Table
1.2) and for firm fixed effects, in addition to individual observables (as in column (4) of Table
1.2). Figure 1.1 confirms that firm characteristics represent an important determinant of the
gender gap in earnings: the coefficient of the male dummy is lower in magnitude in each
year when we control for firm effects.
The influence of the firm may vary across the distribution of earnings. In Figure A.7
in the Appendix we plot the gender pay gap across quantiles of the earnings distribution
for 2015. Each dot represents the coefficient on a male dummy from a quantile regression
that includes no controls (solid line), a set of observable individual characteristics (dashed
line), sector fixed effects (dotted line), and firm fixed effects (dashed-dotted line).17 The
figure shows the presence of a strong glass ceiling effect: at the 99th percentile, the raw gap
between male and female weekly earnings is approximately 47 log points against a value
slightly above 13 at the median. When firm effects are included, the gender gap in earnings
decreases, especially in the middle and top portions of the distribution. The impact of firms
at the very top (above top 1 per cent) is smaller, though, highlighting that a large part of
gender earnings inequality for high earners originates within rather than between firms.
17Following Canay (2011), we estimate fixed effects quantile regressions in two steps. In the first step, we run
an OLS regression, including observable characteristics and firm effects. In the second step, we take the residual
of earnings from firm effects and estimate a canonical conditional quantile regression.
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1.3 Empirical Strategy
We build on Card et al. (2016) and their decomposition method to estimate the impact of firm
pay policy, sorting and bargaining along the earnings distribution, by age and cohort, and
over time, thus providing novel evidence on the contribution of firms to gender inequality
in the labour market. In this section, we describe the details of such decompositions and the
regression model used to retrieve the quantities of interest.
1.3.1 Two-way Fixed Effects Model
We estimate log wage regressions separately by gender with the inclusion of both individual
and firm effects to recover gender-specific firm fixed effects. In other terms, we estimate a
two-way fixed effects model à la Abowd et al. (1999):





g + ε ijt, (1.1)
where wijt is the natural logarithm of real weekly earnings, for worker i in firm j at time
t, with i ∈ {1, ..., N}, j ∈ {1, ..., J}, and t ∈ {1, ..., T}; θi are the individual fixed effects, ψ
g
j
are the gender-specific firm fixed effects in firm j for gender g ∈ {M, F}, X′itβg are the time-
varying observable determinants of earnings multiplied by gender-specific coefficients and
ε ijt represents the residual unexplained component.
We interpret firm effects as quantities capturing the extent of gender-specific rent-sharing





where S̄j is the actual average surplus at firm j over the period of analysis and γg is the
gender specific share associated to this measure of surplus. In other terms, firm effects
capture the firm pay policy, which we allow to vary by gender.18
To estimate (1.1), we construct connected sets of firms and workers separately by gender
and focus on the largest connected set for female and male workers.19
18In Appendix A.1, we provide the modelling framework behind equation (1.1).
19Abowd et al. (2002) show that identification of equation (1.1) is achieved within connected groups of firms
and workers. Connected groups contain all the individuals that have ever been employed at one of the firms
in the group and all the firms that have ever hired one of the workers in the group. Thus, two groups are not
connected if one person of the second group has never been employed by a firm of the first group and a firm in
the first group has never employed a person of the second group (or viceversa). Since fixed effects are identified
up to a normalising constant, different connected groups give fixed effects estimates that are not comparable
across each other. Thus, we perform the analysis on the largest connected group.
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1.3.2 Normalisation of Firm Effects
Since male and female fixed effects are estimated separately, to compare their levels we
need to normalise them with respect to a common criterion. For this purpose, we consider a
double connected set of workers and firms, by selecting the firms that appear in both largest
connected sets of male and female samples. The structure of this set of workers and firms
allows us to compare female and male firm effects and to measure counterfactual moments
of the distribution of both female and male premia.
Hence, we focus on the double connected set of workers and firms. Columns (3) and (4)
of Table 1.1 report summary statistics for men and women in the double connected set. The
number of person-year observations drops to approximately 113 million for males and 70
million for females, with 12.2 million male individuals and 8.3 million female individuals,
employed by 1.2 million firms. Age, tenure and the distribution of occupations across
genders is roughly comparable to the original dataset. Weekly earnings slightly increase for
both men and women, as well as the number of workers per firm.
Ideally, given equation (1.1), firm fixed effects should be zero when firms do not share
rents with their workers. Thus, we normalise firm fixed effects with respect to the average
firm effect in the accommodation and food industry, which is usually identified in the
literature as a low-surplus sector (Card et al., 2016; Coudin et al., 2018). The normalisation









j | Accommodation and food
)
, (1.3)
where ψgj are the normalised firm effects, which are consistent with equation (1.2), ψ̂
g
j are
the estimated firm effects from model (1.1), and the conditioning event means that we are
computing the average firm effect in the accommodation and food sector.20
1.3.3 Decomposition
Decomposition at the mean Once we obtain the normalised firm effects ψgj , we evaluate
the impact of firms on the gender pay gap by measuring the fraction of the gender pay
gap that is explained by gender differences in firm pay policy. Following Card et al. (2016),
we decompose the difference in firm premia into sorting and bargaining implementing the
20We report an alternative normalisation procedure in Appendix A.3, where we empirically identify the set of
firms that pay zero rents to their workers. Results do not change and we leave to Appendix A.3 a more thorough
discussion of this alternative normalisation procedure.
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Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) as follows:
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The left hand side of equation (1.4) takes the difference between the mean male firm pre-
mium across men, E
[
ψMj | g = M
]
, and the mean female firm premium across women,
E
[
ψFj | g = F
]
. This difference captures the “firm contribution” to the gender pay gap.21
This difference can be decomposed in sorting and bargaining in two ways. In equation
(1.4), the first term on the right hand side, E
[
ψMj − ψFj | g = M
]
, represents the difference in
firm premia between men and women, averaged across men. That is, it detects differences
in firm premia, fixing the distribution of male jobs. This is a measure of the bargaining
channel. It tells by how much the gender pay gap would change if women were given
the same firm effects as men, weighted by the male distribution of jobs. The second block,
E
[




ψFj | g = F
]
, represents the difference between the average female firm
premia evaluated across men and the average female firm premia across women. This
difference tells by how much the gender pay gap would change if women were employed in
the same firms as men, weighted by the female firm effect.
Similarly, equation (1.5) splits the firm contribution into bargaining, evaluated using
the female rather than the male distribution, and sorting, evaluated using male rather than
female premia.22
We often choose to report the results as averages of sorting and bargaining computed























21The two quantities are computed taking the average of the normalised firm effects across men and women.
So, E
[
ψMj | g = M
]
is the male premium averaged across male observations, whereas E
[
ψFj | g = F
]
is the
female premium averaged across female observations. The conditioning event {g = M} or {g = F} indicates the
set we are averaging in.




j | g = F
]
, evaluates the average difference in premia fixing the
female distribution of jobs. A positive difference signals a different bargaining power within firm. The second
block of equation (1.5), E
[




ψMj | g = F
]
, evaluates the difference in average male premia
across male and female distribution of jobs. A positive difference signals the under-representation of women in
high-pay firms.
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Decomposition across the earnings distribution We know that lower and higher quan-
tiles show a wider gender pay gap (see Figure A.7). Hence, we investigate the impact of the
firm contribution on the gender pay gap at various quantiles of the distribution of earnings.
Specifically, we select groups in both the male and female samples corresponding to different
deciles of the male and female earnings distribution over the whole sample period 1995-2015.
In each decile group we drop single-gender firms, in order to avoid contamination of the
sorting effect from compositional effects related to the distribution of firms in each group. We
then compute, for each gender-specific decile group, the mean male and female firm effects
and perform the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. In particular, for each gender-specific decile
group dgk , k = 1, ...,10, we compute:
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ψMj | g = F, i ∈ dFk
]
. (1.8)
In both equations (1.7) and (1.8), the first term on the right hand side is the bargaining
effect, whereas the difference between the second and the third term is the sorting effect.
When reporting the results, we average sorting and bargaining as resulting from the two
alternative decompositions of equations (1.7) and (1.8), akin to what we do in (1.6).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Estimation of Two-way Models
We estimate (1.1) separately for the largest connected groups of female and male workers. We
include as controls cubic polynomials in age,23 tenure and experience, occupation dummies
(blue-collar, white-collar, executive, middle manager and apprentice) and a full set of year
dummies. Panel A of Table 1.3 reports sample sizes of the largest connected sets in both the
female and male samples. We retain 99.1 per cent and 97.5 per cent of the total person-year
observations in the male and female samples, respectively. Men are 98.5 per cent and women
are 96.4 per cent of those in the original data. Coverage of firms is 90 per cent and 84.6 per
cent in the male and female samples, respectively, compared to the original population.
Panel B of Table 1.3 reports statistics about the fit of the model in equation (1.1) to our
data for both samples of female and male workers and it shows that the adjusted R-squared
is 0.87 in the male sample and 0.74 in the female one and all the parameters are jointly
23We normalise the age profile to be flat at age 40 and we exclude the linear term in age to avoid potential
collinearity with experience and year effects. See Card et al. (2018).
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significant.24 Worker and firm effects display negative or no correlation (−0.04 and 0 in
the male and female sample, respectively). This implies that the Italian labour market is
characterised, if anything, by negative assortative matching. This result is consistent with
Flabbi et al. (2019).25
Finally, it is important to stress that the validity of the two-way fixed effects model in
equation (1.1) relies upon the assumption of conditional random mobility of workers. We
test this assumption in Appendix A.2. Overall, we conclude that it holds for both the female
and the male sample.
1.4.2 Firm Contribution to the Gender Gap in Earnings and Decomposition into
Sorting and Bargaining
To relate our results to those in the existing literature, we start by focusing on the average
decomposition in the overall sample. We then move to the age and cohort analysis and to
the decomposition across the earnings distribution. Finally, we look at the evolution of the
firm contribution over time.
Average Decomposition
Overall sample Focusing on the double connected set of workers and firms, we normalise
firm effects as detailed in section 1.3.2 and decompose the difference in firm pay premia
as in equations (1.4) and (1.5). Results are in Table 1.4, which shows the overall firm
contribution to the gender gap in earnings and its decomposition. In the double connected
sample, the mean raw gender pay gap is 21.3 log points, compared to 19.2 in the overall
sample. We can explain 30.4 per cent of this gap as coming from the difference in premia
recognised to men and women, since the gap in firm effects is approximately 6.5 log points.
This contribution is mainly determined by sorting, irrespective of whether one uses the
decomposition framework of equation (1.4) or (1.5). In both scenarios, sorting accounts for
more than 20 per cent of the overall gender pay gap, while bargaining accounts for a smaller
share (between 7.6 per cent and 9.8 per cent). This result is similar to the one found by Card
et al. (2016) for Portugal, Jewell et al. (2020) for UK and by Coudin et al. (2018) for France.
24The standard deviation of the estimated worker effects is in both samples three times higher than the
standard deviation of the firm effects. Thus, if we were to decompose the variance of earnings in its primary
determinants, a greater part of such decomposition would be explained by individual, rather than firm variability.
25A well known problem with the estimation of AKM models is that the sampling errors of worker and
firm effects are negatively correlated, implying a downward bias in the covariance between them. This bias is
higher the lower the number of movers per firm, as highlighted in Andrews et al. (2008). Recent contributions
have proposed different estimation methods for retrieving worker and firm heterogeneity in wage equations
(Bonhomme et al., 2019; Kline et al., 2019). It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify the bias in the
estimation of firm and worker effects. Moreover, our decomposition approach focuses on changes in between-
group averages involving millions of observations for which, as highlighted in Card et al. (2013), sampling error
biases become irrelevant.
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Table 1.3 Summary statistics for largest connected sets and AKM estimation
(1) (2)
Male Female
Panel A: Largest connected sets
Number of person-year observations 127,908,136 77,622,344
% of entire data 99.12% 97.49%
Number of workers 13,123,321 8,735,880
% of entire data 98.45% 96.42%
Number of firms 1,456,374 1,369,594
% of entire data 90.01% 84.60%
Panel B: AKM estimation
F-stat 60.180 23.020
Adjusted R-squared 0.871 0.741
RMSE 0.164 0.197
Mean log weekly earnings 6.189 5.997
Standard deviation earnings 0.486 0.415
Standard deviation worker effects 0.661 0.568
Standard deviation firm effects 0.209 0.195
Standard deviation xb 0.709 0.564
Standard deviation residual 0.164 0.197
Corr(worker effects, firm effects) -0.043 0.000
Notes. The Table reports summary statistics for the largest connected sets used for the estimation of the AKM
two-way models. Panel A reports sample sizes for the largest connected sets of male and female workers. Panel
B reports summary statistics from the estimation of equation (1.1), separately for men and women.
Thus, sorting is the main factor behind the different premia men and women receive on
average.
Decompositions by occupations and by sectors are reported in Appendix A.4.
One caveat with our findings is that we are unable to properly account for hours worked
in our data. The literature finds that differences in hours worked and in the willingness to
work long hours account for a sizeable fraction of the gender wage gap (Bertrand et al., 2010;
Goldin, 2014). Our data does not record the number of hours worked by an employee in a
year, but luckily it provides an adjusted number of weeks that accounts for differences in
hours worked between employees with part-time and full-time contracts, allowing compar-
isons of weekly wages between them (see section 1.2.1 for further details). Therefore, we are
able to keep both full-time and part-time workers in our sample. However, it could still be
the case that firm wage premia and part-time status are correlated if, for example, firms that
offer high pay policy also allow for less work-time flexibility or require long hours of work.
In this case, we would be attributing to the sorting channel part of the differences in wages
between gender that are due to different preferences for flexibility. Without further details
on hours worked, we cannot really test for how much this potential bias could affect our
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Table 1.4 Gender pay gap, firm effects, sorting and bargaining
(1) (2)
Log points Percent of the gender pay
gap
Gender pay gap 0.213
Male firm effect across males 0.113
Female firm effect across females 0.049
Firm effects gap 0.065 30.4%
Decomposition:
Sorting
Using male coefficients 0.049 22.8%
Using female coefficients 0.044 20.6%
Bargaining
Using male distribution 0.021 9.8%
Using female distribution 0.016 7.6%
Observations 183,062,102
Notes. The Table reports results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of equations (1.4) and (1.5). Firm effects
are normalised with respect to the average gender-specific firm effects in the food and accommodation sector.
Column (1) shows results for all workers. Column (2) shows the ratio between the quantities reported in column
(1) and the gender pay gap.
results. We have therefore attempted to perform the decomposition of the gap in firm pay
policy in sorting and bargaining on the sample of full-time workers. Such decomposition
suggests that, indeed, the sorting channel becomes slightly less important, as it amounts to
18.1-18.6 per cent of the gender wage gap, whereas differences in bargaining power account
for 10.9-11.4 per cent. However, there might still be correlation between hours and firm wage
premia also restricting to full-time workers only, as firms may require long hours of work
in exchange of higher compensation. The evidence provided in Card et al. (2016) seems to
suggest that this correlation should not be concerning, though. In their paper, they provide
correlations between the estimated firm wage premia and hours worked (both regular and
overtime) and show that, for both men and women, hours are not a significant predictor
of firm pay policy. Given that the Portuguese labour market, on which their analysis is
based, shares many features with the Italian labour market – especially in terms of the wage
setting mechanism,26 we are confident that the same results would apply to Italy as well,
although we cannot fully rule out possible confounding effects in the Italian context that are
not present in the Portuguese one.
26Similarly to Italy, in Portugal wage setting is based on sector-level agreements between employers’ organiza-
tions and unions, and top-up agreements at the firm-level which determine flexibility packages specific to each
workplace
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Age and cohorts Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the gender pay gap (panel A), firm
effects gap (panel B), sorting (panel C) and bargaining (panel D), by age and cohorts. We
identify four cohorts: 1940-49, 1950-59, 1960-69, 1970-79. We construct this Figure by first
defining the age by cohort cells. To do so, we compute the mean age of each cohort in each
year in our data and round it to the next integer. We then compute the gap in firm effects
and its decomposition into sorting and bargaining in each age by cohort cell. The Figure
shows the presence of sizeable cohort effects in the evolution of the gender pay gap over
the life cycle. Older cohorts display higher gender gaps in earnings than younger cohorts,
even at the same age. The same holds for the gap in firm effects and sorting, whereas the
bargaining power effect remains fairly stable across cohorts and over the life cycle until age
60, when it suddenly drops to values close to 0. Moreover, the gap in firm effects remains
stable over time for the youngest cohort (1970-79), but tends to increase within cohort for
each of the other cohorts (except for ages close to retirement). The same pattern characterises
the evolution of sorting, which is flat for the youngest cohort, but increasing in age for the
other cohorts. This result shows that the rising importance of the firm contribution over the
life cycle, highlighted also by Card et al. (2016) and Bruns (2019), is not only an age effect, as
they argue, but it is the outcome of both a cohort effect and an age effect within cohort.
Decomposition Across the Earnings Distribution
As a first evidence on the magnitude of firm effects along the earnings distribution, we plot
in Figure 1.3 the within-decile mean male firm effect across the male distribution and the
within-decile mean female firm effect across the female distribution over the period 1995-
2015. The relationship is positive and monotonic for both men and women, suggesting that
firm effects are a more important component of earnings for high-wage workers, irrespective
of gender. The gender gap in firm effects is basically zero in the first decile – most likely for
the presence of sector-specific minimum wages –, but it starts to widen in the middle part of
the distribution. At higher deciles the gap closes, especially in the last one. The closing of
the gap at the top of the pay distribution can be due to an increased presence of high-pay
female workers in high-pay firms (thus, a better sorting) or to a rise in bargaining power
within firm of women relative to men.
We investigate which effect prevails by looking at Figure 1.4, that shows the gender
difference in firm effects and its decomposition in sorting and bargaining, as a share of the
gender pay gap at each decile. The firm contribution is fairly stable in the central part of the
earnings distribution, and smaller at the lowest and highest deciles. As to the determinants
of this contribution, sorting is more relevant at the bottom and middle of the distribution.
Its importance declines as we move along the distribution. On the contrary, bargaining is
the most relevant factor at the 10th decile.
18 What Firms Do: Gender Inequality in Linked Employer-Employee Data



















































































Notes. The Figure plots the gender pay gap (panel A), the gender gap in firm effects (panel B), sorting (panel C)
and bargaining (panel D), averaged by age and cohort. The horizontal axis reports age by cohort cells, defined
as the mean age for each cohort across the years 1995-2015. Sorting and bargaining are average values, as in
equation (1.6).
Summarising, for low earnings a substantial portion of the gender pay gap is explained
by where women work, whereas for high earnings a larger share of the gender pay gap is
due to women’s lower bargaining power within the firm.
Evolution of Firm Contribution, Sorting and Bargaining over Time
Up to now, we have assumed that firm effects, individual ability and the returns to observable
worker characteristics are fixed over time. However, these wage components may evolve
over time and contribute to rising or declining wage inequality (Alvarez et al., 2018; Barth
et al., 2016; Card et al., 2013; Engbom and Moser, 2020; Song et al., 2018) and could impact
differently men and women. For example, firm effects may evolve over time due to changes
in the productivity of firms or more productive firms increasingly sharing a higher portion
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile
Male FE, male distr. Female FE, female distr.
Notes. The Figure shows the average male firm effects across decile bins of the male distribution of earnings and
the average female firm effects across decile bins of the female distribution of earnings over the period 1995-2015.
We keep only firms that employ at least a man and a woman in each decile group.
of their rents with workers. On the other hand, individual unobserved ability may decrease
over time, due to ageing (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008), or increase thanks to
components of individual productivity that are slowly revealed over time or triggered by
changes in the composition of peers (Mas and Moretti, 2009).
We allow here for additional flexibility in the evolution of individual and firm unobserv-
able heterogeneity over time. The availability of a long panel enables us to recover individual
fixed effects and gender-specific estimates of the firm fixed effects in sub-intervals between
1995 and 2015. Specifically, we run separate AKM regressions in four overlapping intervals
of six years each: 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010, 2010-2015.27 For each subinterval we
build a double connected sample as we do for the main analysis. We normalise firm effects
with respect to the food and accommodation sector and analyse the evolution of the gap in
firm effects and its decomposition into sorting and bargaining for each subinterval.
Results are summarised in Figure 1.5, where we plot the average gender pay gap, the
firm effect gap, sorting and bargaining in each of the four sub-intervals. As explained in
section 1.3.3, we present results averaging sorting and bargaining as in equation (1.6). The
gap in firm effects remains unchanged, but since the gender pay gap declines over time, as a
share of the latter the firm effects gap increases in importance.28 This evidence, which also
includes the aftermath of the Great Recession, differs from that on West Germany in Bruns
27We have checked that the conditional random mobility assumption holds in each of the sub-intervals.
Results are available upon request.
28Table A.3 in the Appendix reports the values used to produce Figure 1.5. It shows that both male and female
firm effects increase especially after 2005, but they grow at the same pace, leaving the difference unaltered.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile
Firm contr. Bargaining Sorting
Notes. The Figure shows differences between male and female firm effects and their decompositions into sorting
and bargaining across decile bins of the distribution of earnings over the period 1995-2015. We keep only firms
that employ at least a man and a woman in each decile group. Sorting and bargaining are average values, as in
equation (1.6).
(2019): in Germany, the gender gap in firm effects has increased, rather than having been
constant as in Italy, providing an explanation for the stall in the decline of the gender wage
gap.
Interestingly, the impact of sorting declines over time. In the first sub-interval, sorting
explains almost entirely the firm contribution to the gender pay gap (which amounts to
approximately 20 per cent), whereas very little is due to within firm differences in firm pay
policy. During the period 2010-2015, the two channels have approximately equal weights
in explaining the differences between male and female firm effects.29 Women tend to be
employed in “better” firms in more recent years, i.e. in firms with more generous pay
policy towards all employees. However, the overall gender gap in firm policy has remained
unaltered because women now pay a higher penalty with respect to their male colleagues
within the same firms, given the increased role of differences in bargaining.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the increased role of decentralised wage
setting in the Italian labour market. Historically, Italy has been characterised by a quite
strongly centralised wage setting. Collective contracts have been binding for employers and
workers: they have been signed by unions and employers’ associations at the industry level
and have provided wage floors for each job title. Firms could not opt-out. A reform in 1993
allowed for “top-up” agreements that can be negotiated at the regional or firm-level, usually
depending on firm performance or productivity. The impact of the reform on the flexibility
29Whether sorting or bargaining is the main driving force behind the firm contribution to the gender pay gap
in the fourth interval depends on the decomposition method adopted. See column (4) of Table A.3.
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Notes. The Figure shows the evolution of the gender pay gap, firm effects gap, sorting and bargaining over
time. We estimate firm effects in each of the four overlapping time intervals. Sorting and bargaining are average
values, as in equation (1.6).
of bargaining agreements has been positive, although limited (Devicienti et al., 2008). Yet,
additional room for firm-level bargaining can differentially impact men and women, if
women have on average a lower bargaining power than men, as we have extensively shown
in previous sections.
Increased female labour force participation can be another explanation. Female employ-
ment was 41.1 per cent in 1995 against a value of 50.6 per cent in 2015.30 This increase may
be associated with the entry of less skilled women in the labour market, whom firms may be
less willing to share their rents with. If so, the estimated average bargaining power of female
employees at firm level would decrease over time. At the same time, the entry of less skilled
women may have favoured a reallocation of women across firms, with more skilled women
moving to firms and/or jobs that better suited their competences, which would explain the
reduced importance of sorting.
A possible concern with the results that we find in this section is that the rising importance
of bargaining over time is the outcome of a composition effect, due to the fact that the
youngest cohort is more represented in the last subinterval with respect to the previous
periods and for this cohort bargaining explains a larger fraction of the gap in firm effects –
and thus in earnings – compared to older cohorts. If younger cohorts are more represented
in recent sub-intervals, the results that we find may be driven by the different composition of
our samples. This is, however, not the case. Indeed, Figure A.8 shows sorting and bargaining
as a percentage of the gap in firm effects in the first and last subinterval. Even though there
30Source: Istat, Labour force survey. Employment rate for age group 20-64.
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are clear differences between cohorts, the relative importance of bargaining and sorting in
determining the gap in firm effects has changed for all cohorts. As an example, sorting in
1995-2000 (panel A) accounts for approximately 95 per cent of the gap in firm effects for the
1940 cohort, against a value around 80 per cent in 2010-2015 (panel B). At the same time,
bargaining importance has increased for this cohort from values around 4 per cent (panel C)
to 20 per cent (panel D). The same holds for other cohorts (for which differences over time
are more marked). Hence, our results do not seem to reflect only an age/cohort composition
effect.
1.5 Firm-to-firm Mobility and Sorting
In this section, we investigate gendered mobility patterns in order to gain insights on the
sorting channel. We estimate a gender gap in the probability of moving to a “better” firm, i.e.
to a firm belonging to a higher quartile of the gender-specific firm effects distribution. This is
a novel measure of mobility, which takes into account the features of the origin/destination
firms and we refer to it as gender mobility gap. In estimating it, we condition on overall
mobility.31 The estimation of gender mobility gaps may seem in contrast with the random
mobility assumption required for the identification of firm effects in the AKM model, dis-
cussed in Appendix A.2. Note, however, that mobility in AKM has to be random conditional
on workers’ time-varying observable and unobservable characteristics, which we control for
by estimating firm effects conditional on age, experience, tenure, occupation, time trends
and individual fixed effects. What may threaten the estimates are firm or worker transitory
and permanent shocks that determine a change in earnings before the move and trigger
mobility. We show in Appendix A.2 that these shocks are not a threat to identification
in our context. Furthermore, mobility based on non-wage characteristics of firms is not
problematic.32 Mobility may also be determined by different risk preferences of workers
(Argaw et al., 2017), different networks of family, friends and coworkers or different effort in
on-the job search (Card et al., 2016). However, as long as mobility is related to non-wage
components, to wage components that do not change over time and are thus absorbed by
the individual fixed effect, or to time-varying wage components observable to the researcher,
it can be correlated with workers’ characteristics.
31Gender gaps in mobility are shown to be an important driver of the gender gap in wage growth (Del Bono
and Vuri, 2011; Loprest, 1992), especially early in the career (Manning and Swaffield, 2008).
32Card et al. (2013), discuss, for example, mobility determined by firm amenities, proximity to home or better
recruiting effort; Van Der Berg (1992) discusses the role of a number of non-wage amenities related to job changes,
such as fringe benefits, moving costs and adjustment costs to a new work environment. Sorkin (2018) uses
job-to-job flows to estimate the value of non-pay characteristics in earnings dispersion and find that they explain
up to 15 per cent of the variance of earnings in the United States.
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= Φ(α + γFi + δZit + δs + λt) (1.9)
where Qgj indicates the gender-specific quartile of the distribution of firm effects to which
firm j = { f1, f0} belongs. 1 [·] is an indicator function, equal to 1 if the destination firm f1
belongs to a higher quartile than the origin firm f0. Fi is a dummy for females, Zit includes
additional covariates (age and dummies for changing province, occupation and type of
contract), δs are sector fixed effects and λt are year fixed effects.
Figure A.9 in the Appendix shows mobility rates for the full sample of movers (panel A)
– i.e. the sample of all workers who change job between two consecutive years.33 The figure
shows that the mobility rate is slightly higher for men, with large differences by age classes:
young workers tend to move more often than old ones, for whom male-female differences
are close to zero. In order to abstract from casual employment and fixed-term contracts that
are not converted into open-ended contracts, we restrict our sample and retain workers that
move to a new firm between two consecutive years and, in addition, are observed in that
firm for at least the two following years. After these restrictions, we are left with a set of 5.2
million job moves. Workers can move more than once over their work career. Overall, 68 per
cent of moves in our sample refer to workers who changed job once, 28 per cent twice. Only
4 per cent of moves refer to workers who move three times or more (at most five) between
1995 and 2015. In this restricted sample – Figure A.9 (panel B) – the mobility rate of men and
women is lower, but the male-female gap is of comparable size to that in the full sample. In
particular, in the restricted sample we do not consider many moves that happen early in the
career, when workers are likely to change jobs more frequently and end up in casual jobs
or fixed-term contracts. The issue of selection of workers into mobility seems not to be of
particular concern: even if men move more often than women, in the restricted sample the
difference in mobility rate is only 0.2 percentage points.
Given that, by definition, workers employed in firms belonging to the top quartile of the
distribution cannot move to a firm belonging to a higher quartile, in the main analysis we
drop from the sample all moves originating from the top quartile. We include them, instead,
in our robustness analysis, in which we estimate whether there is a gender difference in
the probability of moving to a firm belonging to the same or to a higher quartile. With this
further restriction, we are left with a sample of 3.8 million job moves.
Results on the gender mobility gap Table 1.5 shows average marginal effects from the
estimation of equation (1.9). The first column shows the results for all types of job moves.
33We thus do not consider gaps in the work histories of individuals as mobility: these can be periods out of
the labour force, in self-employment, or in the public sector, which we are not able to identify separately.
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Female workers are 1.7 percentage points less likely to move to a better firm within sectors.34
To characterise gender mobility gaps, we distinguish mobility related to firms’ closures from
mobility related to other reasons. The INPS data record for each firm the date of opening and
closure. Following Del Bono and Vuri (2011), we define “firm” moves those happening in the
year of firm closure or in the year before it.35 These are constrained job moves. All the other
moves are classified as “individual”. This does not necessarily capture a voluntary choice of
the worker, since they can comprise also moves related to, say, occupations disappearing
due to technological change or job downgrading following childbirth. In our sample, 2.2
million moves are classified as “individual" and the remaining 1.6 million are “firm” moves.
Table 1.5 shows that the gender mobility gap is higher for “firm” moves (column 2) than
for “individual” moves (column 3): while the former difference is 3.4 percentage points, the
latter is around zero and not significant. When women are constrained to move by their firm
closure, they are less likely than men to end up in a firm with a more generous pay policy
within a given sector. This may be explained by the network of female workers being weaker
and women having worse outside options when forced to leave the firm. In each specification
we include as additional covariates a dummy for changing province, occupation and type
of contract (specifically from part-time to full-time). Each of these covariates raises the
probability of moving to a “better” firm. The effect of switching occupation is the strongest
across all moves. We also add age at the moment of the job move, which has a negative
impact on the probability of upward mobility, except for firm moves.
The exclusion of movers from the top quartile does not affect our results. Table A.4 in
the Appendix reports the estimates for an alternative model that defines the dependent
variable as mobility towards a firm in the same or a higher firm effect quartile, therefore
including workers moving from firms in the top quartile of the firm effects distribution.
Results are quantitatively similar, with women being 1.8 percentage points less likely to
move to same/higher quartile firms.
To further explore heterogeneity in gender mobility gaps, we consider their patterns by
age. Figure A.10 in the Appendix shows the probabilities for male and female workers of
moving to higher-quartile firms by age groups. Women are less likely to move to a better
firm at each age and the mobility gap is always higher for “firm” moves. It is interesting to
note that the probability for workers of both genders to move to a better firm is higher for
34We also estimate the gender gap in the probability of moving down in the firm fixed effect distribution.
In this case, we drop from the sample all moves originating from the bottom quartile of the firm fixed effect
distribution, since workers in this quartile cannot worsen their position by definition. In this case, we find that
women are more likely to move down in the firm fixed effect distribution. Results are available upon request.
35The use of the date of closure may only be a proxy of the effective moment in which firms cease their activity.
On the one hand, firms’ closures may represent changes in the structure of firms (i.e. mergers or acquisitions).
On the other hand, the date of closure may be only a formal record if the firm has effectively ceased its activity
in the past and used social benefits to keep employment relationships. To take this into account, we consider as
“firm moves" also those happening one year before the firm closure. Note though that the sign and magnitude of
the estimates presented reassure against measurement error in the firm closure date.
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Table 1.5 Probit model for job moves to a firm in a higher fixed effect quartile
(1) (2) (3)
All Firm Individual
Female -0.017*** -0.034*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Age -0.001*** 0.001** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change province 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Change occupation 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Change to full-time 0.018** -0.004 0.017
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
Observations 3,778,512 1,571,607 2,206,905
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Probability 0.385 0.374 0.392
Notes. The Table reports average marginal effects from probit regressions where the dependent variable is the
probability of moving to a firm in a higher firm effect quartile. Column (1) shows results for all moves in the
restricted sample defined in the main text. Column (2) shows results for moves happening because of firm
closure. Column (3) shows results for moves not determined by firm closure. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the firm level, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
individual moves, rather than for firm moves when the worker is young, but the decline
with age in such probability is faster for individual moves. Moreover, the gender mobility
gap tends to be lower or insignificant for older workers. The gap is 4 percentage points for
workers aged 19-25 years old, and it becomes approximately zero for workers aged 56-65.
The likelihood of moving to a higher-quartile firm might be influenced by the unobserved
ability of the worker. In Figure 1.6 we show the probabilities for male and female workers
of moving to a better firm, distinguishing between workers with “low” (left panel) versus
“high” (right panel) individual fixed effects.36 We define low individual fixed effect workers
those below the median of the distribution of fixed effects and high individual fixed effect
workers those above the median. The figure shows that high individual fixed effect workers
are more likely to move to a better firm than low fixed effect workers. Furthermore, it
shows that the gender mobility gap is present across all types of move and workers, but it
is only significant for women with low individual fixed effects, especially when moves are
associated with firm closure.
Firms offering high pay policy to female workers may be geographically concentrated
in some provinces or cities, whereas those offering high pay policy to male workers may
36The individual fixed effect captures the portable component of earnings between jobs, which is influenced –
among other factors – by individual ability.
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Fig. 1.6 Gender-specific probabilities of moving to a higher-quartile firm by worker effect


















Notes. The Figure reports the probabilities for men and women of moving to a firm in a higher gender-specific
firm effect quartile for different types of moves and workers, conditional on the controls included in equation
(1.9). Low (high) individual fixed effect workers are defined as those having a worker fixed effect – WFE – below
(above) the median of the worker fixed effect distribution. Vertical lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals.
be more geographically dispersed, providing the opportunity to improve earnings to a
potentially wider set of them. We graphically inspect the geographical distribution of
average male and female firm effects. Figure A.11 in the Appendix plots the map of average
male and female firm effects across Italian provinces. A darker colour indicates a higher
average firm fixed effect. The maps for men and women are drawn according to the same
scale and female firm effects are lower on average than male firm effects in all provinces.
However, the distribution of those effects for men and women across provinces is fairly
similar, indicating that the gender mobility gap we identify in the data cannot be explained
by a different distribution of firms with high generous pay policy across provinces. We
formally test whether the gender mobility gap is a within or between province phenomenon:
Figure A.12 in the Appendix plots the marginal effects from probit models estimated as
in equation (1.9) separately for each province (thus, excluding the dummy for change of
province). Different colours indicate the sign and significance (at 95 per cent confidence
level) of coefficients. They are negative for 95 of the 110 Italian provinces, and 54 of them
are significantly different from 0 at a 95 per cent confidence level. Hence, also within
province women tend to move to employers that offer less generous pay policy relative
to men. Note that this evidence could be consistent with women having a higher cost of
commuting relative to men (even within the smaller province scale). Interestingly, the size of
the coefficient of the female dummy is smaller in absolute terms in Southern provinces. This
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D. Low dispersion to low dispersion
Male Female
Notes. The Figure reports the probabilities for men and women of moving to a firm in a higher gender-specific
firm effect quartile for different types of moves, conditional on the controls included in equation (1.9). We define
high (low) dispersion firms those having a standard deviation of residual weekly earnings higher (lower) than
the 75th percentile of the distribution of standard deviations of residual earnings of the firms in our data (see
text for details on the derivation of residual earnings). Panel A displays the probability of moving to a firm in a
higher quartile of the firm fixed effect distribution for movements from high dispersion firms to high dispersion
firms. Panel B displays the same probability for movements from high to low dispersion firms. Panel C displays
the same probability for movements from low to high dispersion firms. Panel D displays the same probability
for movements from low to low dispersion firms. Vertical lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals.
is probably due to the fact that most of the low fixed effect firms are located in the South,
where most movements are between low quartiles of the fixed effect distribution (e.g. from
1st to 2nd quartile) and, thus, easier to make.
Last, we focus on the characteristics of firms and distinguish between those with high
and low earnings dispersion. Women may move less frequently to high-pay firms because
these firms display higher earnings dispersion, for instance because they use incentive pay
more,37 or because a larger share of earnings paid comes from overtime. If women are more
risk averse or less inclined to compete, or if they have higher cost of effort,38 they may be less
willing than men to move to higher quartile firms if these firms have a higher dispersion of
earnings. In Figure 1.7 we divide our sample of moves in four groups, defined by the level of
earnings dispersion of the origin-destination firm. We define high earnings dispersion firms
as follows. We first compute residuals from regressions of weekly earnings on a full set of
sector, occupation and full-time dummies. We then compute the firms’ standard deviation of
37Albanesi et al. (2015) show that 93 per cent of the gender gap in executive compensation in the United States
is due to differences in incentive pay.
38For instance, women may be less willing to work overtime or unconventional hours (Goldin, 2014), because
of household responsibilities.
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residual earnings across all workers and periods. High earnings dispersion firms are those
having a standard deviation of residual weekly earnings higher than the 75th percentile of
the distribution of standard deviations of residuals of the firms in our data.39 We finally
estimate the probit model (1.9) for each of the four groups of workers that move between
firms with different levels of earnings dispersion.
We find evidence that the gender mobility gap widens when movements happen from
low to high-dispersion firms (panel C), whereas it is reversed when moves are from high- to
low-dispersion firms (panel B) and individual. In other words, women tend to move less to
firms with high earnings dispersion compared to men. The magnitude of the difference is not
negligible: the gap in the probability of moving from low- to high-dispersion firms is −9.8
percentage points, whereas the move in the opposite direction (from high- to low-dispersion
firms) implies a gap in favour of women equal to 2.5 percentage points. This evidence may
be consistent with women having a lower preference for competing, or higher risk aversion
and cost of effort compared to men, which make them less prone to work in firms with high
earnings dispersion. It may also be consistent with firms characterised by a high dispersion
of earnings being less willing to hire women.
Overall, this evidence highlights that sorting comes from the lower probability of women
to move to better firms. We have shown that this gender mobility gap depends on age
and workers’ unobserved ability, it persists within provinces and it disappears when the
destination firm is characterised by low earnings dispersion. The presence of dependents
could be a further factor influencing gendered mobility patterns and sorting, since the time
cost of child-rearing disproportionately affects women (Kleven et al., 2019), reducing their
possibility to search effectively for a better job, and to end up in a firm with more generous
pay policy. Alternatively, women may value non-pecuniary benefits (such as flexible time
arrangements or firm provision of welfare services) more. As a consequence, they may be
willing to stay in or move to firms that have lower firm effects, because they are compensated
for the loss of part of their earnings potential by a better balance between family and work.40
Clearly, the mobility gap can also affect the difference in bargaining power between men
and women. If women are less likely to quit a firm and move towards one with better pay
policy, firms find it easier to extract rents from them, rather than from men. Thus, mobility
gaps can drive both sorting and differences in bargaining.
39We use residual earnings to capture differences in pay across firms that happen within sector and occupa-
tional composition of the workforce, thus reflecting differences in dispersion between firms, rather than between
sectors or occupational structures.
40Fanfani (2018) shows that there is a correlation between the availability of flexible work arrangements
(proxied by the share of part-time contracts) and the gap in firm pay policy in a sample of Italian manufacturing
firms.
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We have shown that bargaining is the most important factor explaining the impact of firm
pay policy on the gender pay gap at the top of the pay distribution, where opportunities to
bargain are potentially present or more widespread. In addition, we have established that
the role of bargaining in driving firm fixed effects has grown in importance over the two
decades considered. The contribution of bargaining to gender differences in pay signals that
for women it may be harder to contract not only on pay rises for a given job, but also for
promotions within firms, since differences in bargaining power capture both. To what extent
can changes in the firm environment influence the gender gap in bargaining power? The
measure of firm environment we focus on is the extent of gender balance at the top of the firm
hierarchy. For instance, the fact that corporate boards are male-dominated may be behind the
adoption of a more generous pay policy towards male employees or the fact that men are at
the top of the managerial pipeline. A change in the gender composition of corporate boards
may therefore modify the bargaining power of men and women, to the advantage of the latter,
if a stronger presence of women on corporate boards increases the firm’s attention towards
female workers, or limits the advantage of male workers. In addition, female workers may
be more inclined to ask for increases in pay or for promotions, whereas male workers may
have a weaker network to rely on, when the top of the corporate hierarchy is more gender
balanced. According to Azmat and Petrongolo (2014), “experimental settings suggests that
women and men may differ in traits that are potentially related to labour market success”
(p. 37). The ability to negotiate on pay is among them. However, “the causes – nature or
nurture – and the economic consequences of such differences are not entirely understood”,
although an answer to these issues is important, given the clear policy implications. Our
analysis contributes to this debate by exploiting a natural experiment, which brings about
a change in gender balance at the top of the firm governance. In particular, we focus on
a law which prescribes gender quotas in boards of listed firms in Italy. This law provides
exogenous variation in the gender composition of boards, allowing us to identify the causal
impact of a change in our measure of firm environment on the bargaining power of female
and male workers. From this angle, we also contribute to the literature which evaluates the
impact of gender quotas on worker performance (Bertrand et al., 2019; Maida and Weber,
2019), by focusing on mediating factors through which effects on workers’ outcomes can
show up.41
41Other studies examine the impact of female-led firms on labour market outcomes of female employees and
on the extent of gender gaps in earnings within the firm, without relying on exogenous variation in gender
composition of directors, e.g. Bell (2005), Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010), Flabbi et al. (2019), Gagliarducci
and Paserman (2015).
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1.6.1 The Italian Gender Quota Reform
In 2011 the Italian parliament passed the law 120/2011 (Golfo-Mosca reform) with the goal of
increasing the number of women present on board of directors and supervisory bodies of
listed companies and state-owned not listed companies, ensuring “gender balance”. The
law is temporary, since it applies only for three consecutive board renewals (approximately
9 years) and gradual: for the first of the three board mandates, the law requires that a fifth
of the seats in the board must be reserved for the least represented gender, whereas for
the second and third mandates, the quota goes up to a third.42 Firms have to comply with
the law requirements starting from the first renewal of the board after August 2012. The
reform had a phase in period between August 2011 and August 2012, i.e. from when the
law entered into force to when the requirements it prescribed became mandatory. During
this period firms could comply with the law but were not required to. After August 2012,
if a firm does not comply with the law, it first incurs in a warning from CONSOB, the
National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange. After four months since the
first warning, there is a fine of up to 200,000 Euro. If after three additional months the firm
has not changed its board to make it compliant with the law, the elected board members lose
their office.43 The policy had a clear impact on the share of women in the boards of listed
companies, as Figure 1.8 shows. Until 2011, the share of women in the board of directors
was 7.4 per cent, only 1.4 percentage points higher than the share in 2008. The first year of
implementation of the law, 2012, the share jumped to 11.3 per cent, and it kept rising until
33.3 per cent in 2017.
1.6.2 Empirical Analysis
In our modelling framework, outlined in Appendix A.1, we show that the firm fixed effect
can be rationalised in a wage equation as a rent-sharing coefficient, i.e. as the share of
surplus that a firm pays to its employees. As a consequence, the firm fixed effect can be
expressed as in equation (1.2), that is ψgj = γ
gS̄j. The ratio or the difference between female
and male gender-specific shares, γF and γM, captures female bargaining power relative
to men, directly. Figure A.13 in the Appendix shows that women have indeed a lower
bargaining power compared to men according to this definition. It plots female firm effects
against male firm effects, both averaged across percentile bins of log value added per worker
(our proxy for firm surplus S̄j). The slope of the linear fit of the relationship in Figure A.13 is
an estimate of the relative bargaining power of women, γF/γM, and equals 0.85, meaning
42Gender quotas have been extended for six additional board renewals by the 2020 Budget Law (Law 160/2019).
Moreover, the requirement for the presence of the least represented gender was raised to 40 per cent of the board
members, starting from the first board renewal in 2020.
43For a comprehensive description of the Law, see Profeta et al. (2014).
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that firms share a lower fraction of increases in value added with female employees relative
to males.
In order to estimate the causal impact of a change in the gender composition of board of
directors on bargaining power, we use data for the period 2008-2017,44 and we compare the
outcome of listed and non-listed companies. In particular, we identify the control group by
matching listed companies, treated by the reform, with a subset of non-listed corporations,
selected according to a Mahalanobis metric on the following set of firm characteristics
averaged over the pre-reform period 2008-2011: log weekly earnings, female log weekly
earnings, value added per worker, sales per worker, share of part-time workers and female
part-time workers, share of permanent workers, share of executives and female executives,
share of women above the 90th percentile of the firm distribution of weekly earnings, female
hiring rate, log of firm size and log of firm size squared, share of workers aged 35-54 and
over 55, sector dummies and region dummies.45 In addition, to reduce the risk of selection of
firms into listing or delisting due to the implementation of the reform, we focus our analysis
on firms that are continuously listed between 2011 and 2014.46
To support the validity of our research design, we test the balance of covariates between
listed and non-listed firms, before and after the matching, by comparing means of covariates
44Data for 2016 and 2017 have very recently become available and we use them for this part of the analysis in
order to evaluate the medium-run effects of the gender quota policy.
45The literature on the effects of gender quotas highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate control
group for the firms targeted by the reform (Bertrand et al., 2019; Comi et al., 2020; Ferrari et al., 2018; Maida and
Weber, 2019).
46The number of listed companies in Italy over the period 2008-2017 ranges between a minimum of 323 in
2012 to a maximum of 421 in 2017 (source: Borsa Italiana). We use information on 212 continuously listed firms in
the period 2011-2014, of which 166 have no missing balance-sheet information, and thus constitute our sample
of treated firms.
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in the treated and control groups, averaged over the period 2008-2011. Table A.5 shows the
comparison. Columns (1) to (3) report means in the unmatched and matched control groups
and in the treated group. Columns (4) and (5) report differences in means and the p-value
of the significance of the difference in the unmatched sample. Columns (6) and (7) report
the same quantities for the matched sample.47 The table shows that there are no significant
differences between treated and control firms in the pre-reform period after matching.
On the matched sample of firms, we estimate, separately by gender, worker-level regres-
sions of the form:
wijt = κ + γ
g
∆Treatj × Postt × S
pre
j + f (Treatj, Postt,S
pre
j ) + δ
gXit + ηt + θi + ε ijt (1.10)
where wijt are log real weekly earnings of worker i in firm j at time t; κ is a constant; Treatj is
a dummy equal to 1 for listed companies and equal to 0 for matched non-listed companies;
Postt is a dummy equal to 1 starting from 2012; S
pre
j is the surplus of firm j, as measured
by the log average value added per worker at firm j over the period 2008-2011 – the source
is AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk;48 f (Treatj, Postt,S
pre
j ) contains the levels and all the two-way
interactions of Treatj, Postt and S
pre
j . Xit are observable characteristics of workers: cubic
polynomials in age49 and experience, and occupation dummies. ηt and θi are year effects and
worker fixed effects, respectively. The parameter of our interest is γg∆, which measures the
change after the reform in bargaining power by gender in treated versus control firms. Note
that we depart from the model with two fixed effects in section 1.3.1 and estimate, instead,
a “reduced-form” model in which we regress log male and female weekly earnings on log
average value added per worker – controlling for worker time invariant and time-varying
characteristics – to recover a rent-sharing coefficient and, with that, measure the bargaining
power of workers.
We also estimate models for all workers, without distinguishing by gender, and including
interactions of Treatj, Postt and S
pre
j with a female dummy, in order to measure the differential
change in bargaining power of female workers relative to male workers in treated versus
control firms after the reform. Finally, we report results of an event study specification, in
which we replace the single indicator for the after reform period Postt with year dummies,
and plot the coefficients of the triple interaction with Treatj and S
pre
j by gender. In this way,
we ensure that pre-trends are absent and we measure the dynamic impact of the reform over
time.
47The p-values are computed from univariate regressions of each covariate on a treatment indicator dummy
and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
48We average value added in the period before the implementation of gender quotas, since there is evidence
that the reform affected firm productivity (Bruno et al., 2018).
49As in section 1.4, we normalise the age profile to be flat at 40 and exclude the linear term in age from the
regression.
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1.6.3 Results
Table 1.6, panel A, columns (1) to (3), reports results from the estimation of equation (1.10).
Column (1) shows results for men, column (2) for women and column (3) reports the
differential impact of the reform on women relative to men in treated versus control firms.
The coefficient in column (1) indicates that a 10 per cent increase in value added per worker
entails a 0.3 per cent reduction in male earnings in treated firms compared to control firms.
At the same time, given that there is no change in female earnings, as shown in column
(2), the relative bargaining power of female workers increases: in response to a 10 per cent
higher value added per worker, female earnings increase by 0.3 per cent relative to male
earnings in treated versus control firms after the reform. Overall, the estimates suggest that
gender quotas increased the relative bargaining power of female workers by reducing male
bargaining power.
Table 1.6, panels B and C, report results for the samples of new hires and stayers.50 We
show that there are no significant changes in bargaining power for newly hired employees,
whereas the effect on stayers is significant and of similar magnitude to that estimated on the
full sample of workers. This is in line with gender quotas changing rent sharing for workers
already employed in the firm. It is also important to stress that these changes do not happen
because the skill composition of the workforce is changing over time, being the estimates
conditional on worker fixed effects.
The results are confirmed by the event study specification, shown in Figure 1.9. In
particular, we can exclude the presence of different pre-trends for men and women: both
sets of coefficients evolve parallelly before the reform and are statistically indistinguishable
from 0. Men experience a significant drop in their bargaining power right after the reform
in the full sample (panel A) and in the stayers’ sample (panel C), whereas women do not
experience any change. There are no statistically significant changes for new hires (panel B)
for both genders.
The reduction in male bargaining power may come from male employees having a
weaker network to rely on after the reform, and therefore lower power in wage and career
negotiations. This would be consistent with detecting significant effects for stayers, but not
for new hires. Alternatively, new female board members may influence wage setting by
adopting as a fair reference point for all workers the average rent-sharing of female workers,
which is lower than that of male ones. This result is in line with Bennedsen et al. (2019), that
examine the effect of pay transparency laws on within-firm gender inequality and find that
the gender pay gap decreases in firms required to disclose pay statistics, mainly through
a reduction in male wage growth. Changes in bargaining power can be one mechanism
behind this finding.
50New hires are identified in the INPS data via the hiring date. Stayers are workers employed by the same
firm for the period 2008-2017.
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Table 1.6 Impact of gender quotas on bargaining power of workers
(1) (2) (3)
Men Women Interaction
Panel A: All workers
Change in bargaining power -0.032** -0.002 0.031***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 2,413,309 1,356,825 3,770,134
R-squared 0.954 0.928 0.946
Panel B: New hires
Change in bargaining power -0.028 0.016 0.047
(0.046) (0.036) (0.045)
Observations 142,392 87,693 230,085
R-squared 0.990 0.988 0.989
Panel C: Stayers
Change in bargaining power -0.039*** -0.005 0.035***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 1,241,290 597,450 1,838,740
R-squared 0.948 0.918 0.939
Notes. The Table shows coefficients from the estimation of equation (1.10) in columns (1) and (2) and from a
model that interacts Treatj, Postt and S
pre
j with a female dummy in column (3), where the coefficient shown is
the one on the quadruple interaction. The dependent variables are log weekly earnings of all workers (panel
A), new hires (panel B), and stayers (panel C). New hires are identified in the INPS data via the hiring date.
Stayers are workers staying in the firm for the period 2008-2017. All regressions also control for the levels and
interactions of Treatj, Postt and S
pre
j , cubic polynomials in age and experience, occupation dummies, year fixed
effects and worker fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Heterogeneous effects We perform two sets of heterogeneity analyses. First, we investi-
gate the presence of differential effects according to how large the change was in the gender
composition of the board that the reform imposed on the firm. Namely, we use the average
share of female board members in the period 2008-2011 and we include firms in a high
intensity group when the pre-reform share of women in board of directors is below 10 per
cent, and in a low intensity group when the share is above 10 per cent.51 We then estimate
equation (1.10) separately for workers employed in each of these two groups of firms. The
control group contains the full set of matched non-listed firms. Results are reported in Table
1.7, and show that the effect on the relative bargaining power of female versus male workers
is positive for workers employed in both groups of firms, but statistically significant only
51We have information on the share of women in the pre-reform period for 157, out of 166 firms. 109 firms are
classified as high intensity, and 48 as low.
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Notes. The Figure plots rent-sharing coefficients from the event-study specification explained in section 1.6.2.
Vertical lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals.
for those employed by high intensity firms (panel B), and driven by a reduction in male
bargaining power, as in the main analysis. Hence, the reform had a greater impact on the
relative bargaining power of female workers in those firms, that in the pre-reform period
had a worse gender balance in their board of directors and therefore experienced a stronger
adjustment.
We then investigate whether the impact of the reform depends on the workers’ occu-
pation.52 Table 1.8 reports the results and shows that the positive and significant effect on
the relative bargaining power of female workers is concentrated among white-collar and
executives (panels B and C), whereas the effect is negative and not significant for blue-collar
workers. Thus, the reform affects workers in highly paid occupations, for which differences
in bargaining power represent a larger share of the firm contribution to the gender pay gap,
52When estimating equation (1.10) separately by occupation, we omit occupation dummies from the covariates
included in Xit.
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Panel A: Low intensity
Change in bargaining power 0.002 0.017 0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.013)
Observations 874,834 418,356 1,293,190
R-squared 0.943 0.940 0.942
Panel B: High intensity
Change in bargaining power -0.028** -0.000 0.030***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 2,260,717 1,267,530 3,528,247
R-squared 0.954 0.928 0.947
Notes. The Table shows the estimates of the impact of gender quotas on bargaining power by intensity of
treatment at the firm level, measured by the share of female board members in the firm prior to the introduction
of gender quotas: Low intensity are firms with more than a 10 per cent share (panel A), High intensity are firms
with less than a 10 per cent share (panel B). The control group contains the full set of matched non-listed firms.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
as discussed in section 1.4.2. The result suggests that gender quotas could be an effective
policy tool to tackle differences in bargaining power between female and male workers in
the top echelons of the firm hierarchy.
Overall, the evidence that the reform affects workers’ bargaining power, especially in
high-intensity firms, is consistent with the gender gap in bargaining power being partly
institution-driven.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Thanks to a large matched employer-employee dataset on the universe of Italian workers
and private sector firms for the period 1995-2015, we investigate the contribution of firms
to the gender pay gap and find that firm effects play a significant role. Firm characteristics
account for approximately 30 per cent of the average gender pay gap, with sorting explaining
roughly 20-22 per cent of the gender pay gap and bargaining playing the dominant role at
the top of the earnings distribution.
When we study gendered mobility patterns, we find that a gender mobility gap is present,
with women displaying a lower likelihood of moving to better paying firms, compared
to men with similar characteristics, especially when they have low individual fixed effect,
1.7 Concluding Remarks 37




Change in bargaining power 0.012 -0.005 -0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Observations 596,761 241,922 838,683
R-squared 0.820 0.843 0.856
Panel B: White-collar
Change in bargaining power -0.034** -0.003 0.035***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 1,192,916 851,396 2,044,312
R-squared 0.898 0.836 0.873
Panel C: Executives
Change in bargaining power -0.013 0.006 0.021*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.012)
Observations 623,632 263,507 887,139
R-squared 0.925 0.855 0.913
Notes. The Table shows the estimates of the impact of gender quotas on bargaining power by occupation. Panel
A reports results for blue-collar workers, panel B for white-collar workers and panel C for middle managers and
executives. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
and only if the move is triggered by firm closure and if the destination firm displays high
earnings dispersion. Finally, exploiting an exogenous change in the firm environment as
measured by the gender composition at the top of the firm hierarchy, we show that the
relative bargaining power of women can be enhanced.
Our analysis contributes to the understanding of the role of firms in influencing the level
and dynamics of the gender wage gap. The importance of gender differences in firm pay
policy has increased over time as a share of the overall gender earnings gap, making the
behaviour of firms critical to any attempt of tackling the gender pay gap. Differences in
bargaining power, in particular, play an important role in explaining what happens at the
top of the pay distribution, where women advancement has been more limited. We have
also highlighted avenues for policy to affect the gender earnings gap, identifying gender
differences in upward mobility and gender balance in the corporate structure as important
factors behind sorting and bargaining.
Other mechanisms may drive differences in workplace-related inequality beyond those
analysed in this paper. For instance, gender differences in peer effects.
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The increased availability of linked employer-employee data will allow the identification
and exploration of different channels, providing a solid ground on which to build policy
recommendations to reduce obstacles to further women’s advancements in the labour
market.
Chapter 2
The Peer Effect on Future Wages in the
Workplace
Abstract We study a critical driver of wage growth: peers. Using linked employer-
employee data for Italy, we explore the peer effect on wage growth in two directions. First,
using a novel estimation method and accounting for the endogenous sorting of workers
into peer groups and firms, we estimate the impact of the average peer quality on future
wages. We find that a 10 percent rise in peer quality increases one’s wage in the next year
by 1.8 percent. The effect decreases gradually over time and becomes about 0.7 percent
after five years. Second, we delve deeper into the channels that identify the peer effect and,
using an event-study specification around mobility episodes, we study how the entry and
leave of high-quality and low-quality workers affect wages of movers and coworkers. We
find that hiring a high-quality worker is an important driver of wage growth, as well as
separating from a low-quality worker. Movers experience an immediate gain when moving
into high-quality peers. Knowledge spillover and peer pressure play an important role in
explaining the mechanisms behind our findings.1
Keywords: Peer effects, wage differentials, wage growth, linked employer-employee data
JEL codes: J24, J31, J41, L14, M52
1This chapter is based on joint work with Long Hong, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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2.1 Introduction
The literature has well documented that wages typically increase over the life cycle. However,
significant heterogeneity exists in wage growth among workers. In line with the canonical
models in Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967), wage growth reflects workers’ accumulation
of knowledge and skills on-the-job. As interaction is essential in the workplace, it is natural
that on-the-job learning is primarily the result of interaction with coworkers. Despite the
importance, little is known on the link between coworkers and wage growth from both
empirical and theoretical perspectives. If two workers have the same ability to learn, does
the worker with better coworkers experience a faster wage growth over time? How persistent
are such peer effects? How does the move of a high-quality worker in a firm contribute
to wage growth of his or her new coworkers and how are past ones affected? This paper
answers these questions.
There is a growing literature that investigates the relationship between coworkers and
wages.2 Earlier empirical evidence mainly focuses on the effect of coworkers on the con-
temporaneous wage level in a specific workplace (e.g., Mas and Moretti, 2009) or based
on laboratory experiments (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006). For example, Mas and Moretti
(2009) provide persuasive evidence in a supermarket chain that a cashier’s productivity
increases when they work alongside more productive coworkers. Nevertheless, it is unclear
to what extent these findings, based on a specific firm or laboratory experiment, apply to
more general settings and labour markets. Increased access to administrative data allowed
researchers to investigate peer effects in one or more local labour markets. For example,
Cornelissen et al. (2017) use German employer-employee matched administrative data to
study the overall impact of coworkers on contemporaneous wage levels in the Munich local
labour market. They find, surprisingly, there is only a small positive effect. However, if
knowledge transmission takes time to be reflected in wages, it would be appropriate to
consider dynamic effects. That is, the impact of coworkers could materialize on future
wage growth rather than the current wage level. Despite the potential relevance, only a
handful of papers have examined the link between coworkers and wage growth. Two related
and complementary papers, Jarosch et al. (2021) and Herkenhoff et al. (2018), both find a
substantial knowledge spillover from coworkers that facilitate wage growth, using data
from Germany and the United States, respectively.
We aim to explore the causal effect of coworkers on wages along several directions. To
do so, we use a matched employer-employee administrative dataset – the Veneto Worker
History panel –, which covers the universe of private-sector workers and firms in Veneto,
one of the largest Italian regions, from 1975 to 2001. The availability of the full employment
information for all firms in the dataset is crucial for our purposes as it allows us to track
workers and coworkers over a long period of time. We proceed in this way. First, we explore
2Throughout the paper we use the terms peer and coworker interchangeably.
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the overall impact of peer quality on one’s future wages. By incorporating a coworker
component in the canonical AKM model (Abowd et al., 1999), our econometric strategy
helps circumvent the common reflection problem (Manski, 1993) and account for workers’
endogenous sorting into peer groups and firms. We adopt the novel estimation strategy
developed by Hong and Mikkel (2020) to overcome the estimation challenge induced by the
high-dimensional fixed effects. Specifically, we exploit two sources of variation to identify
the peer effect: changes in peer quality for workers who switch peer groups, and changes in
peer quality for workers who remain with their peer group as other workers join or leave
the peer group.
Our analysis reveals that peer effects are an important and persistent driver of wage
growth. Our baseline results show that a 10 percent increase in coworker quality, as measured
by the average AKM worker effect of one’s peers, implies an increase of contemporaneous
weekly wages by 2.6 percent and next year’s wages by 1.8 percent. The effect decays over
time, but we find that it is present and significant also in future years, as we find that better
coworkers in the past increases one worker’s wage by 0.7 percent after five years. The
effect is stronger for workers moving to a new job, indicating that part of the peer effect
materializes through complementaries between knowledge acquired from different peer
groups over time or through better outside options when the worker moves into a new firm.
Moreover, peer effects are larger for younger and junior workers (with lower tenure), as
learning from peers is probably more important for them, but we do not find differences
between workers employed by firms of different size.
In the second part of the paper, we delve deeper into the mechanisms that identify the
peer effect and study mobility of workers across firms and how it affects coworkers’ wages
in the origin and destination firms. Specifically, we exploit an event study analysis around
the mobility of workers and analyse how the entry of a high-quality worker, who could
potentially transmit knowledge to her peers, changes the trajectory of peer average wages in
the destination firm. As the choice to hire a worker is not random, by simply comparing
outcomes in firms that hire to those that do not hire would likely bias our estimates upward,
as hiring choices would be correlated with firm performance and therefore average wages.
We overcome this problem by selecting a sample of firms that hire a worker in a given year
and analysing coworkers’ wages in firms hiring a high- or low-quality worker relative to
firms hiring average-quality workers: we define high-, average- and low-quality workers
by comparing the estimated AKM worker effect of the mover, from the first part of our
analysis, to that of coworkers in the firm. Besides focusing on firms hiring or separating
from a worker only, we perform ex-ante propensity score matching before mobility and
assess the absence of observable differences between treated and control firms. On top of
that, we use data for a subset of firms in our data to show that mobility decisions in the
matched sample are not correlated with leads and lags of sales and value added per worker,
reassuring on the validity of our empirical strategy. These analyses reveal that hiring a
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high-quality worker is associated with an increase of peer wages by 3.1 percent relative to
firms hiring average-quality workers three years after mobility. The effect is stronger for
coworkers belonging to the same occupation of the new hire, as one would expect that more
interaction occurs in the workplace among them. The effect is not statistically significant,
instead, for firms hiring low-quality workers.
We also examine how wages of coworkers in the origin firm are affected by the departure
of high- and low-quality workers. We find opposite results to those outlined above, as
the departure of a high-quality worker leads to a drop in wages of about 1.3 percent for
coworkers in the origin firm relative to firms separating from an average-quality worker.
On the contrary, we find that the loss of low-quality workers benefits coworkers in the firm,
whose wages increase by 2.4 percent on average in the three years after the move.
Finally, we shift the focus to movers and examine how wages of workers who move
into different peer groups evolve over time, by comparing the wage trajectories of workers
moving into high- and low-quality peer groups compared to that of matched workers
moving into average-quality peer groups. We find that workers gain from moving into
high-quality peer groups. On average their weekly wage increases by 3.9 percent relative to
workers moving into average peer groups. We find instead a null effect for workers moving
into a low-quality peer group. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance and
persistence of coworkers – and high-quality ones, especially – in shaping wage growth.
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, we improve on the existing
evidence on peer effects by studying how they evolve over time, allowing for dynamic
effects that may not be captured by research focusing only on contemporaneous effects,
either in a specific workplace (e.g., Brune et al., 2020; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Papay et al.,
2020; Sandvik et al., 2020) or in a more general labour market (e.g., Battisti, 2017; Cornelissen
et al., 2017; Lengermann, 2002). In particular, the closest papers to ours in this strand of the
literature are Cornelissen et al. (2017) and Battisti (2017). The former studies the peer effect
in the Munich local labour market and the latter in Veneto, using the same data that we use.
They both use an empirical model similar to ours and find a positive peer effect on wages,
but the magnitude is larger in Italy than in Germany. We innovate with respect to these
papers, by adopting a different estimation method, as detailed below, and by providing
evidence on how peers influence not only contemporaneous but also future wages. We
further depart from these papers by adding evidence on which mechanism plays a more
prominent role in determining the peer effect, by separating job stayers who change their
peer group as workers join or leave the firm and job switchers who change their peer group
by moving to a new firm. This brings to our second contribution to the literature, as we
exploit the richness of our data to explore the impact of mobility of workers across firms on
wage growth of movers and peers. Researchers in the past proved the importance of hiring
“good” workers for firm performance (see, e.g., Serafinelli, 2019, who examines the effects of
hiring high-quality workers on firms’ productivity in an event study framework). However,
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little is known on the trickle-down effects on coworkers. We fill this gap in the literature by
providing comprehensive evidence on the effect of hiring high-quality workers or moving
into high-quality peers on future wages of movers and peers. Third, we contribute to a
growing literature that studies the firm environment as a driver of wage growth (Arellano-
Bover and Saltiel, 2021; Gregory, 2019; Herkenhoff et al., 2018; Jarosch et al., 2021; Nix, 2020).
We pin down one mechanism, the influence of peers, that contributes to the understanding of
how firms impact workers’ wages. Finally, we apply a new method for estimating coworker
effects in an AKM wage regression that controls for non-random sorting across firms and
occupations.3 Specifically, we apply the method described in Hong and Mikkel (2020), which
derives a moment condition that allows the joint estimation of worker and peer effects.
This method improves on the iterative procedure pioneered in Arcidiacono et al. (2012),
whose accuracy and computational time for convergence is highly dependent on the chosen
tolerance level. The algorithm we use imposes minimal assumptions to ensure consistency
and allows a faster computation time.
Our findings are consistent with learning from coworkers being one important driver
of wage growth. In particular, Cornelissen et al. (2017) highlight how peer effects may
show up through peer pressure or knowledge spillover. The effect we find on future wages
– especially for movers – cannot be determined by pressure from past peers, but rather
reflects knowledge acquired from peers and accumulated in the workers’ human capital.
Our analyses cannot exclude, however, other mechanisms, such as better networks to rely
on, which may increase workers’ outside options and, therefore, their wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and provides
descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 provides results about peer effects in the AKM framework.
Section 2.4 describes the event study analysis around mobility episodes and presents the
results. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data We use social security administrative data that contains the entire working population
and private firms in the region of Veneto in Northern Italy4 – the Veneto Worker History
(VWH) dataset – from 1975 to 2001. We can observe every coworker of each worker over their
working life. The database contains three types of administrative datasets: (1) a worker-level
demographic register, (2) a firm-level record, and (3) an annual firm-worker social security
contribution register. A brief description of each follows.
3We build on AKM as it allows to avoid Manski’s reflection problem (Manski, 1993): we use a pre-determined
long-term worker characteristic (the AKM worker effect) to measure how peers impact wages and not contem-
poraneous endogenous productivity measures (such as, average wages).
4Veneto is the fifth largest region in terms of population and the third most prosperous region in terms of
GDP in Italy.
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1. The worker register tracks over 3 million workers from 1975 to 2001. It records the
entire working history of a worker in the private sector, as long as he/she worked one
day in Veneto.5 It contains basic demographic information, including birth year and
place, gender, nationality.
2. The firm register contains all private firms that employ each worker in the worker
register.6 It includes a firm’s detailed information such as national tax code, address,
start and closure dates, industry.7 This register also includes information on firms
outside of Veneto if the worker has been employed in one such firm.8
3. The last register links the firm and worker registers. A private firm has to report the
payment to its workers and the corresponding labour contract to the National Institute
of Social Security (INPS) so that the authority could calculate each worker’s social
security contribution. Therefore, the register contains accurate information on annual
earnings9 (with no top-coding), weeks worked, occupation (white-collar, blue-collar,
manager, apprentice), type of contract (fixed-term or open-ended) and type of working
schedule (full-time or part-time). Annual earnings have been inflation-adjusted to the
price level of the year 2003.
Sample selection We use all workers and firms within the Veneto region only. In other
words, we use the working population data within the Veneto labour markets. We only
use the period from 1982 to 2001 because the information on working weeks before 1982 is
not accurate (Battisti, 2017). Besides, we have a few minimal restrictions, mainly following
the standard practice in the literature. First, we keep only a worker’s primary job if he or
she works in multiple positions,10 and we restrict the working ages from 16 to 65. Also,
we exclude part-time jobs and apprentices because their wages cannot be compared to
regular full-time employment (as we have no information on working hours). Since we are
interested in coworkers, we drop single-worker firms. Following the practice of Cornelissen
5More precisely, we observe the working history before and after he/she worked in Veneto as long as it is
within Italy. Besides, around 80 percent of the workers have never worked outside Veneto.
6There are two important related points. First, the public sector is not included in this database. Second,
the firm is not at the establishment level. It might be ideal to use establishment-level data for our analysis, but
using firm-level data would not make a difference for two reasons. First, most firms, especially in our sample
period where the franchise is not typical, are single-establishment firms. Second, the firm size is typically small,
with a median size of six workers, and firms with 200 or fewer employees take up around 90 percent of the
observations.
7We also use the identified national tax code to link the data to balance sheet information from Bureau Van
Dijk-AIDA, a firm-level dataset that covers a fraction of the firms in Veneto after 1996.
8In the main analysis, we will keep firms in Veneto only, as for firms outside it we do not have complete
information on coworkers.
9The annual earnings equal full net earnings, plus all kinds of pecuniary compensation, grossed up with
labour income taxes and social security contributions on the employee.
10Specifically, if a worker has two or more employment contracts in a year, we keep the job with the highest
annual earnings or the highest number of weeks worked. We break the very few ties (less than 1 percent of the
data) by choosing randomly the primary job.
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et al. (2017) and Caldwell and Harmon (2019), we also restrict the firm size to be smaller
than 5000.11
Peer group definition We define the peer group as all the workers employed in the same
firm with the same occupation in a given year, where the occupation is given by broad
professional levels (blue-collar, white-collar and executive).12
Descriptive statistics Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample used in the
analysis. We have 17.7 million person-year observations, 2.5 million workers and 169
thousand firms. Full-time workers earn annually on average 33.3 thousand euros (in 2003
prices) and the mean weekly wage is 744 Euros. The average number of weeks worked is 42
(and the median is 52, indicating that the median worker is a full-time and full-year one).
Average age is 34.5 and the tenure is 2.5 years. As expected, firms are small, reflecting the
structure of the Italian labour market, with a mean firm size of 17 employees and a median
of 6. Similarly, the peer group size – that is, workers in the same occupation and firm – is on
average 12 and 4 at the median. The mean number of movers per firm is 4, indicating that
on average, annually, 4 workers move to other firms or to non-employment. Overall, 61%
of workers change job at least once throughout the whole period of analysis. The share of
women is 36%, reflecting the relative low female labour force participation. The majority of
worker is employed in blue-collar occupations (70%) and are on open-ended contracts (3%).
More than half of the workers are employed in manufacturing (53%).
Motivating evidence There exists considerable heterogeneity in wage profiles for workers
employed in peer groups of different quality. To see this point, we run a canonical two-way
fixed effects AKM regression (Abowd et al., 1999), i.e.
wi,t = αi + ψj + x′itγ + ϵit, (2.1)
where wi,t are log weekly wages of individual i at time t, αi are worker fixed effects, ψj are
firm fixed effects, xit contains a cubic polynomial in age and tenure, a dummy for women
and a dummy for part-time workers. ϵit is an error term. Using the estimates of αi from
equation (2.1), we compute for each worker the leave-one out average peer quality as the
11Lastly, due to the identification requirement in the AKM analysis below, we need to restrict the sample to
the largest connected set (Abowd et al., 1999), which takes up around 97 percent of the sample.
12Compared to Cornelissen et al. (2017), who use a similar definition to ours, we have a lower detail of
occupational categories, as we do not have detailed occupation codes. However, given the small average size of
firms in Veneto – especially in the period of time we focus on – we end up with peer groups that are comparable
in size to those reported in Cornelissen et al. (2017): the average peer group size in our data is 12, whereas in
their paper is 9.3.
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Mean S.D. Median
Annual earnings 33350.06 40250.33 31730
Weekly wage 744.38 1652.81 652
Weeks worked 42.41 15.24 52
Age 34.54 10.69 32
Tenure 2.45 2.58 2
Firm size 17 75 6
Movers per firm 4 26 1






Open-ended contract 0.97 0.16












Number of workers 2,531,411
Number of firms 168,613
Notes. The table reports means, standard deviations and medians of each variable in columns (1) to (3), based on
the largest connected set of workers and firms from the Veneto Worker History Panel. See text for details about
data and sample restrictions.
average worker effect of his or her coworkers in a given firm and year.13 We then show
descriptively how wage growth varies for workers joining a firm with better or worse peers,





where |N−i,t| is the number of coworkers of i in firm j.
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(B) Blue-collar, hired at age 25
Fig. 2.1 Log wage growth for workers entering the labour market in different quantiles of
the peer quality distribution, by years of tenure and occupation
Notes. The figure reports the difference between average log weekly wages in tenure years 1 to 6 and baseline
log weekly wage in tenure year 0 for workers entering the labour market in different quantiles of peer quality,
defined as the average firm-level leave-one out worker effect estimated from equation (2.1). The sample includes
workers hired at age 25. Panels (A) and (B) show results for white- and blue-collar workers, respectively.
by grouping workers into different quantiles of the peer quality distribution. The results
are reported in Figure 2.1 for white-collar and blue-collar workers in panel (A) and (B),
respectively. The figure depicts the growth in log weekly wages (i.e. the difference relative
to the entry log wage) for workers entering the firm at age 25 by tenure with the firm and by
peer quality, grouped in six discrete groups based on percentiles of its distribution: below
10, 10-25, 25-50, 50-75, 75-90 and above 90. The figure shows that there is wide heterogeneity
in wage growth for workers joining a firm in different parts of the peer quality distribution,
for both blue- and white-collar employees. Six years after joining the firm, white-collar
workers in the top decile experience 0.16 (= 0.36 − 0.20) log points larger wage growth than
a worker in the bottom decile of peer quality, whereas for blue-collar workers the additional
wage growth equals 0.12 (= 0.19 − 0.07) log points. The difference in wage growth between
workers with better and worse peers signals the contribution of the workplace environment
as a driver of wage growth. However, we can say little about the direct effect of peers on
wage growth as this descriptive analysis does not rule out sorting on productivity between
workers and firms. This evidence likely suggests that part of the differential in wage growth
is attributable to peers and part to firms. In the next section, we adopt a more formal
empirical strategy to separately measure the contribution of both to wages.
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2.3 An AKM Approach to Estimate Peer Effects
In this section, we explore the overall effect of coworkers on future wages. In particular,
we build our empirical strategy on the canonical AKM model (Abowd et al., 1999), by
incorporating the average peer quality and additional fixed effects to better deal with the
sorting of workers across firms and occupations. Besides, we briefly discuss how we adopt
the novel method developed by Hong and Mikkel (2020) for estimation. We motivate our
empirical analysis by developing a simple two-period principal-agent model, based on
Cornelissen et al. (2017) and reported in Appendix B.1.
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy
In our regression specification, we follow Cornelissen et al. (2017), who build on Abowd
et al. (1999), as expressed in equation (2.2):





αk, and M−it = {k : oj(k, t) = oj(i, t), k ̸= i}.
In equation 2.2, wi,t+h is the log weekly wage at time t + h, where h ≥ 0. αi is the worker
fixed effect, which measures the portable component of earnings and is a proxy for quality
or innate ability of a worker. α−i,t is the average coworker’s quality at time t.14 xi,t is a
set of individual time-varying characteristics, including age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, and a dummy on whether tenure is larger than ten years. ψjt, ηot, θoj are firm-year,
occupation-year, firm-occupation fixed effects. β is our parameter of interest. It describes
how contemporary coworker quality could change future wages.
2.3.2 Identification Challenges
As discussed in Arcidiacono et al. (2012), we face three challenges in the identification
of peer effects: (i) the reflection problem; (ii) the non-random sorting of workers across
peer groups; (iii) the presence of unobserved correlated shocks. The reflection problem
was first introduced by Manski (1993) who referred to it when discussing the problem of
identifying the peer effect from contemporaneous peer effort or productivity (e.g., wages).
For example, in a firm, effort of peers influences a worker’s effort, who in turn affects his
or her peers’. In the presence of such “reflection” it is difficult to identify the peer effect.
As suggested by Cornelissen et al. (2017), using long-term predetermined characteristics of
14|.| defines the modulus of the coworker vector M−it; hence, it represents the number of coworkers.
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peers solves the reflection problem as it avoids contemporaneous productivity measures
interacting with each other. For this reason, we measure peer quality with the leave one
out average AKM worker fixed effect, which we interpret as a proxy of peers’ long-term
productivity. We address the endogenous sorting of workers across peer groups and the
presence of unobserved shocks by controlling for a rich set of fixed effects. Peer quality
may be correlated with worker’s wages if high-quality workers sort into high-quality peers.
We therefore control for worker fixed effects αi in equation (2.2), so to estimate the impact
of within-individual changes in peer quality on wages. Moreover, peer quality can be
correlated with worker’s wages in the presence of sorting between high-quality workers
into high-quality firms or occupations. For this reason, we include firm-time fixed effects ψjt
that control for firm-level shocks, occupation-time fixed effects ηot that control for different
time trends in occupation-specific pay and occupation-firm fixed effects θoj that control for
the possibility that firms pay higher wages to specific occupations.15
Even in the presence of the rich set of fixed effects discussed above, the estimate of
β can still be biased if there exist unobserved background characteristics that vary at the
occupation-firm-time level (i.e. at the peer group-time level) that are correlated with changes
in peer quality observed between consecutive periods. To see this point, observe that there
are two sources of variations for the identification of β. For job switchers, peer quality
changes when they move to another firm. For job stayers, peer quality changes when other
workers join or leave the peer group.16 Both these variations entail changes in the peer group
that allow identification of β.
We can show the potential endogeneity of peer quality to unobserved time-varying
shocks as follows. First, we follow Cornelissen et al. (2017) and focus on job stayers only.
We denote with α̃−i,t the residual peer quality after controlling for time-varying observables
x′it and occupation-time effects ηot. Then, first differencing equation (2.2) removes the time-
invariant worker (αi) and firm-occupation fixed effects (θoj),17 but does not remove firm-level
time-varying effects (△ψjt): △wi,t+h = β△α̃−i,t +△ψjt +△ε it. Such effects can be removed
by exploiting variation between occupations, which experience within firm different changes
in peer quality. Assuming there are only blue- and white-collar occupations (discarding
executives, for the moment) and denoting them as o and o′, respectively, we can net out firm-
level shocks by taking a second difference across occupations. Taking firm-level averages,
we have:
15One concern with our empirical strategy is that we control for contemporaneous fixed effects even when
estimating equation (2.2) at time t + h, h > 0. As a matter of fact, using contemporaneous fixed effects has little
impact on our findings.
16Note that our definition of the peer group allows us to take into account also within-firm mobility due to
promotion, e.g. from blue-collar to white-collar or from blue- and white-collar to executive, as we define the
peer group as workers in the same firm and occupation.
17The first difference also removes any unobserved time invariant job match effect.
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= 0, i.e. if there is no correlation
between unobserved time-varying occupation-firm specific shocks and changes in peer
quality between consecutive periods, we are able to retrieve consistent estimates of β. This
condition basically requires that different occupations experience the same time shock within
firm or, in other terms, that different occupations are on parallel trends within firm before a
change in peer quality happens (akin to a standard difference-in-differences). Violations of
such parallel trend assumptions are yet possible. For example, the firm may decide to invest
in automation which complements white-collar workers and substitutes for blue-collar
workers. Assuming that skills and occupations are correlated, and therefore white-collar
workers are more skilled, this would raise peer quality and firm output (and therefore wages)
simultaneously, leading to an upward bias in the estimate of β. The opposite would be true
if a firm decides to divest in some occupation-specific technology which would decrease
peer quality and firm wages simultaneously biasing downwards the estimate of β.18
The discussion so far implicitly assumed that peer quality was an observed quantity,
which in fact is not. The following section discusses how we estimate peer quality and how
we use such estimate to measure its impact on contemporaneous and future wages.
2.3.3 Estimation of Peer Effects
There are at least two main difficulties to estimate β in Equation 2.2. The first one is that
the worker fixed effect needs to be estimated, but at the same time, the average coworker
quality is a function of the worker fixed effects. The other difficulty comes from the high
dimensionality of the fixed effects, making it hard to solve the system. The literature
has traditionally solved these issues by employing the iterative procedure pioneered by
Arcidiacono et al. (2012), who estimate peer effects by first estimating Equation 2.2 setting
β = 0 and then using the estimated worker fixed effects to compute β in following iterations.
We depart from the literature and employ instead the novel estimation method developed
by Hong and Mikkel (2020), which we now discuss in greater detail.
First, we write Equation 2.2 in matrix form:
w = Xδ + Cδβ + ε, (2.3)
where w ∈Rn is the wage. X ∈Rn×k contains all the fixed effects and time-varying individual
characteristics. C ∈ Rn×k is a coworker averaging matrix (see Appendix B.2 for details on
18One way to deal with time-varying occupation-firm shocks would be to include an occupation-firm-time
effect and therefore exploit within peer group variation to estimate β. However, as discussed in Cornelissen et al.
(2017) this would limit the identification to job stayers only. For this reason, we prefer our baseline specification,
which exploits variation coming from both stayers and movers.
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the construction of C). δ ∈ Rk is a nuisance parameter that corresponds to the coefficients
of the fixed effects. β ∈ B is our parameter of interest, where B is a compact parameter
space. Note that Cδ is equivalent to ᾱ−i,t in Equation 2.2. In addition, we make the following
assumptions:
• exogeneity, E[ε|X,C] = 0;
• homoskedasticity, E [εε′|X,C] = σ2In where σ2 > 0 is unknown;
• the designed matrix X + Cβ has full rank k for any β ∈ B.
Our parameter of interest β is estimated by solving the objective function Qn, i.e. it is the








∥w − Xδ − Cδβ∥2/n
}
(2.4)
First, Hong and Mikkel (2020) proves that β is the unique minimizer of the population
analogue to Qn under the assumptions we impose, so consistency is ensured. We derive the





)−1 R′w/n = 0, (2.5)
where
R = X + Cβ,




We solve numerically equation 2.5, by using sparse matrices and the conjugate gradient
method, which allow to speed up the computation.19
2.3.4 Results
Estimation Table 2.2 reports summary statistics from the estimation of equation 2.2 for
h = 0. The standard deviation of log weekly wages is 0.44. As typical in the literature
that studies decompositions of the variance of wages, most of the variability in wages
is accounted by variability in worker fixed effects (see Card et al., 2018, for a review).
The standard deviation of the average peer fixed effect is 0.18 and, more importantly, the
correlation between worker fixed effect and average peer fixed effect is 0.55 highlighting a
strong degree of sorting among coworkers, documented as well, for example, in Lopes de
Melo (2018). The correlation between worker fixed effect and firm-time fixed effect is slightly
19In particular, the sparse matrix helps with the standard matrix operation and memory issues, and the
conjugate gradient method could vastly improve the matrix inversion speed.
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Table 2.2 Standard deviation of wages and fixed effects and correlation between fixed effects
Statistic Value
Standard deviation log weekly wages 0.436
Standard deviation worker fixed effect 0.269
Standard deviation peer fixed effect 0.178
Standard deviation occupation-time fixed effect 0.065
Standard deviation firm-occupation fixed effect 0.103
Standard deviation firm-time fixed effect 0.137
Standard deviation change of peer fixed effect between t and t − 1 0.090
Standard deviation change of peer fixed effect between t and t − 1 for movers 0.173
Standard deviation change of peer fixed effect between t and t − 1 for stayers 0.066
Correlation worker fixed effect/peer fixed effect 0.551
Correlation worker fixed effect/firm-time fixed effect -0.041
Correlation worker fixed effect/firm-occupation fixed effect -0.001
Notes. The table reports summary statistics from the estimation of equation 2.2 for h = 0, based on the largest
connected set of workers and firms from the Veneto Worker History Panel. See text for details about data and
sample restrictions.
negative, one feature documented for the Italian labour market as a whole in Chapter 1 and
Veneto specifically in Devicienti et al. (2019). The table also reports the standard deviation
of the change in peer effects between consecutive years, as suggested by Cornelissen et al.
(2017). The identification of β in equation 2.2 rests on changes in peer quality between
subsequent years. Hence, one needs sufficient variation in peer quality to identify β. The
standard deviation of the change in the average peer fixed effect equals 0.09. We also
distinguish between movers and stayers: for the former, changes in peer quality happen
because they move into a new peer group; for the latter, changes in peer quality happen
if peers join or leave the current peer group. Not surprisingly there is larger variation in
the change in peer quality for movers than for stayers, with standard deviations of 0.17 and
0.07, respectively, as for stayers it may happen that the peer group does not change at all
between consecutive years. We corroborate this finding by plotting the density of the change
in peer quality for movers and stayers in Figure B.1, which shows the existence of a mass
around 0 for stayers (i.e. when the peer group does not change) and more variability for
movers. Anyway, even for stayers, the standard deviation of peer quality changes amounts
to approximately 38% of the overall variability in peer quality, indicating that we have
enough variation in the data to identify the peer effect.
Main estimates of the peer effect Figure 2.2 shows our baseline results. Each dot in the
graph represents the estimate β in equation (2.2) using the future wages as the dependent
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variable in each year ahead (h), where h ≥ 0.20 Vertical bars are 95 percent confidence
intervals, retrieved from bootstrapped standard errors. The figure shows that the peer effect
is large not only for the contemporaneous wage but also for the wages in the following years.
A 10 percent increase in peer quality increases the contemporaneous wage by 2.6 percent21
and next year’s wage by 1.8 percent, which is similar to the size of the return to college (Nix,
2020). The effect gradually fades out to around 0.7 percent after five years. It is consistent
with other papers that coworkers in the past three years play the most important role in
wage growth (e.g., Caldwell and Harmon, 2019; Nix, 2020).
The peer effect can be a result of different factors. As highlighted in Cornelissen et al.
(2017) peers may boost productivity and, therefore, wages by a mechanism of peer pressure,
according to which a worker increases her own effort in response to increased effort by
her coworkers. At the same time, workplace interaction is crucial for human capital accu-
mulation, as workers transmit knowledge among each other which may make them more
productive on-the-job. Our findings can be seen as a way of disentangling the two effects.
Peer pressure is a mechanism through which the peer effect materializes on contemporane-
ous wages, but cannot be persistent over time. Hence, the finding of the peer effect on future
wages may be more related to learning and knowledge transmission among coworkers –
knowledge that is then incorporated in workers’ wages through greater productivity, greater
rent extraction or better outside options – rather than peer pressure. At the same time, the
decaying pattern that we find suggests that the returns to having worked with better peers in
the past are each year smaller. This may signal that most of knowledge transmission happens
at h = 0, i.e. that the peer effect materializes mostly as a contemporaneous effect, whereas
in subsequent years h > 0 the marginal returns to additional knowledge from peers are
decreasing. This likely highlights the importance of team work as a fundamental mechanism
behind peer effects, i.e. it is by working close to his/her peers that a worker feels motivated
or pressured to exert more effort. Part of such effect percolates to future wages through
knowledge acquired on the job, which contributes to human capital accumulation. It is also
important to stress that our findings are conditional on tenure with the firm, which effec-
tively capture time-varying accumulation of firm-specific human capital beyond knowledge
acquired from peers. Finally, our finding cannot exclude network effects from interaction
with better coworkers: working with better peers may deliver better relationships with
suppliers, customers or links to other firms which increase workers’ outside options.
20Different future wages are used as outcomes in separate estimations. In the cases when h > 0, workers
who do not have wages in year t + h are excluded. Therefore, each estimate, to some extent, is estimated
on different samples. Specifically, N = 17,723,260;14,480,425;12,387,027;10,736,176;9,319,245;8,068,687 for
h = 0, ...,5. We have also conducted a robustness check using a sample restricted to workers who have been
working continuously for at least five years. The results are very similar, except that the estimates in the first
two years are slightly smaller. Besides, the decreasing pattern remains. Results are available upon request.
21This results is smaller than what found in Battisti (2017) on the same data. The difference is likely due to the
different algorithm used to compute the peer effect and to different sample selection choices.
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Fig. 2.2 Peer effect on future wages (β)
Notes. N = 17,723,260;14,480,425;12,387,027;10,736,176;9,319,245;8,068,687 for h = 0, ...,5. The figure reports
the estimates of β from equation (2.2) using the future wages as the dependent variable in each year ahead (h),
where h ≥ 0. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from bootstrapped standard errors
One concern about our finding is the effective ability of workers to bargain over their
wages, which requires some degree of wage flexibility. Italy is characterized by a two-tier
wage setting scheme, with collective contracts defining wage floors at the sector-level. At
the firm-level, workers can bargain, individually or through employees’ organizations,
top-up agreements that increase their compensation. Moreover, part of the pay that we
observe is composed of bonuses and premiums that employees receive on top of the basic
compensation established by either the collective or firm-level contract. These wage premia
are sizeable: Bartolucci et al. (2018) document that in the Veneto sample, wage premia are
about 24 percent above the basic pay at the median. Hence, wage setting in the Italian
context should be flexible enough to incorporate peer effects.
Heterogeneity We explore heterogeneous effects across different groups of workers and
firms.22 Figure 2.3A separates movers and stayers, where the former are workers that
change employer in at least one year t + h, h ≥ 0, whereas the latter are workers employed
in the same firm throughout the whole time window. The figure shows that peer effects are
more important for movers: after five years, the coefficient for them is 0.5 percent, whereas
the coefficient for stayers is 0.1 percent.23 The difference between movers and stayers can
reflect differences in the ability to learn from peers for these two types of workers or the
22We conduct the heterogeneous analysis using the pre-estimated fixed effects from the baseline regression.
23The coefficients are smaller than those in the main analysis because the sample used in this case contains
only continuing workers, that is workers observed continuously over the whole sample period.
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endogeneity of mobility to learning chances in the incumbent and poaching firm: the latter
may offer better learning and, therefore, wage prospects that the incumbent firm cannot
offer. At the same time, we have highlighted that changes in peer quality are much more
common for movers than for stayers (Figure B.1), hence movers may have better chances of
acquiring knowledge as they move into new peer groups.
Figure 2.3B shows that there are no evident differences between firms of different size.
Specifically, we divide firms among those with less than 10 employees, between 10 and
250 and more than 250. The evolution of peer effects is not dissimilar in the three groups,
indicating that peer effects are an important channel of wage growth irrespective of firm
size.24
Figure 2.3C shows how the effects differ across different tenure years. Specifically, we
assign workers at h = 0 to three discrete categories of tenure with the firm – 0-2 years, 3-5
years and 6 or more years – and explore how peer effects change for each group of workers.
The results illustrate a clear pattern that peers matter the most for low tenure workers, while
the effect decreases as one experiences more years in the same firm. The finding is consistent
with a learning process: there is more room for a new hire (a worker with low tenure) to
learn in a firm. If the new hire has better peers as she enters the firm, she will more likely
learn quicker and thus boost future wages.
A similar pattern arises when we explore the heterogeneous impacts across different age
groups, as shown in Figure 2.3D. Like the finding above, the effects are higher for younger
workers (below age 30). For older workers, the peer effect is lower in levels. The decay over
time is similar across age brackets. Again, the same logic applies here. There is greater space
for younger workers to learn as they enter the labour market. A better peer group could
help them accumulate human capital faster, thus expedite wage growth.
2.4 Mobility, Workers’ Quality and Wage Growth
As mentioned earlier, the identification of β is achieved through the following channels:
1. for job stayers, the peer quality changes when a worker enters the peer group or when
a worker leaves the peer group;
2. for job switchers, the peer quality changes as they move to another firm.
We separately study these channels, following the wage trajectories of workers and cowork-
ers around mobility episodes in our data. Specifically, we study channel 1 by setting up
a coworker-level event study around mobility of a worker and analyse the evolution of
wages of coworkers of the mover in the destination and origin firms. We distinguish three
types of movers: high-quality, low-quality and average-quality, where the quality of the
24We find the same results if, instead of looking at firm size, we focus on peer group size.
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Fig. 2.3 Heterogeneous peer effects across tenure and age brackets
Notes. The figure reports the estimates of β from equation (2.2) using the future wages as the dependent
variable in each year ahead (h), where h ≥ 0, focusing on different groups of workers. Panel (A) shows
estimates for movers and stayers (N = 4,587,715;6,096,654), panel (B) for workers in firms of different size
(N = 2,895,186;10,332,778;4,495,296 for firms size 2-9, 20-249 and 250+, respectively), panel (C) for different
tenure brackets (N = 8,997,227;4,174,367;4,551,666 for bracket 0-2, 3-5 and 6+, respectively) and panel (D) for
different age brackets (N = 7,678,846;6,733,816;3,310,598 for bracket 16-30, 31-45 and 46-65, respectively).
mover is based on a comparison of her worker fixed effect with the average peer fixed effect
of coworkers from equation 2.2. Specifically, we classify firms as hiring a high-quality or
low-quality worker if her worker fixed effect is 10 percent higher or lower, respectively,
than the average peer fixed effect of coworkers in the destination firm. We classify, instead,
firms as hiring an average-quality worker if her worker fixed effect is between −10 and +10
percent of the average peer fixed effect in the destination firm. When we focus on coworkers
in the origin firm, we use the same classification, based on the comparison between leavers
and coworkers in the origin firm.
We study channel 2 in a similar fashion. We follow the wage trajectories of workers
moving into peer group of different quality, where, again, we define a peer group as high-,
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average- or low-quality if the mean peer fixed effect of coworkers is 10 percent higher,
between −10 percent and +10 percent, or 10 percent lower than the worker fixed effect of
the mover.
We now turn to a more formal illustration of our empirical strategy.
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Coworker-level Event Study
Empirical design Figure 2.4 illustrates the definition of treatment and control groups in
the event-study. Primarily, we define the event as a worker who moves to a firm and stays
there for three years. We choose three years because we think that it takes time for the mover
to have an effect on her coworkers’ wages, especially because knowledge may need some
time to be transmitted.25 We then use as an outcome wages of coworkers of the mover (thus
excluding the mover from the sample) in either the destination or origin firm, when we
study the impact of the move on the “new” or “old” coworkers, respectively: we define
these two analyses the “hire” design and the “leave” design.
We restrict the sample firms to be observed for eight consecutive years, in which there
is no worker mobility in the four years before and three years after the event. While we
risk losing generalization by such a substantial restriction, we believe it is essential for
our analysis. First, as shown in Section 2.3.4, the coworker’s effect substantially decreases
after three years. Second, we need the pre-event period to examine the pre-event parallel
trend assumption from a methodological perspective. Finally, since learning and knowledge
spillover take time to be reflected in wages, we need a few years after the event to show the
wage trajectory after the new worker enters.
In order to measure the impact of mobility on coworkers’ wages we cannot simply
compare outcomes in firms that choose to hire a worker to those in firms that choose not
to hire any worker, as the worker flows are very likely endogenous to firm performance
and, ultimately, workers’ compensation. We overcome this issue by selecting only firms that
hire a given worker in a specific year and compare firms hiring high-quality or low-quality
workers to firms hiring average-quality workers. Similarly, when we look at the impact
of mobility on coworkers’ wages in the origin firm we select only firms that separate from
a worker in a given year. Specifically, in the first case, we define the treatment groups as
the coworkers in the firms that hire a high- or low-quality worker in period t = 0, where
high-quality and low-quality workers are defined as detailed above, i.e. as workers with
worker fixed effect that is 10 percent higher or lower than the average peer effect at the
firm. We denote the group that hires a high-quality worker as treatment 1 in Figure 2.4 and
the the group that hires a low-quality worker as treatment 2. We define the control group
as the coworkers in the firms that hire an average-quality worker, whose ability is similar
25When the event year has multiple workers entering, we exclude the firm from the analysis.
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−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 t
a high-quality worker enters/leaves αi > ᾱ−i × 1.1
No mobility No mobility
Treatment 1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 t
a similar-quality worker enters/leaves αi ∈ [0.9,1.1]× ᾱ−i
No mobility No mobility
Control firms
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 t
a low-quality worker enters/leaves αi < ᾱ−i × 0.9
No mobility No mobility
Treatment 2
Fig. 2.4 Treatment and control groups in the event-study analysis, hire and leaver design
Notes. The diagram shows the empirical design behind the coworker-level event study estimated in equation
(2.6). Treatment 1 refers to mobility of high-quality workers, whose worker effect is more than 10% larger than
the average peer effect in the origin or destination firm. Treatment 2 refers to mobility of low-quality workers,
whose worker effect is more than 10% smaller than the average peer effect in the origin or destination firm.
Control firms refer to mobility of average-quality workers, whose worker effect is between −10% and +10% of
the average peer effect in the origin or destination firm.
(within 10 percent difference) to the workers in the firm. When we analyse the effect on “old”
coworkers, we maintain the same definitions, but the reference for defining high-, similar-
and low-quality workers are peers in the origin firm.
Propensity score matching A critical issue that prevents us from identifying the effect is
that a worker’s mobility decision is not random. For example, the decision to hire a high-
quality worker might be endogenous to firm performance, which also affects a worker’s
wage growth.26 While there is no perfect remedy for this, we construct comparable firms
between the treatment and control groups through ex-ante propensity score matching. The
implicit assumption is that similar firms have similar hiring strategies, leading to a quasi-
random hiring on average, such that the only difference between firms hiring a high- or
low-quality worker rather then an average-quality worker is precisely the worker quality.27
We estimate the propensity score using a wide range of firm-level variables and some
industrial and geographic variables. Specifically, we match on the following set of covariates
26Anecdotally, a firm may decide to hire a high-quality worker because he is complementary to some
technology the firm decides to invest in. Such an investment could raise the productivity of the firm and
eventually compensate all employees with wage raises.
27Our analysis will still be biased if the decision to hire is based on firms’ unobservables which we cannot
control for. We try to minimize the risk of the presence of such bias by including firm fixed effects in the
regression analysis.
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at time t = −3: the AKM firm-time effects and AKM average worker effects estimated from
Section 2.3, the average age of employees, the share of female workers, the share of blue-
collar workers, firm size, firm age, sales, value-added,28 industry dummies, and province
dummies. We also match average weekly wages at time t = {−4,−3,−2}. Besides, we use
the single nearest neighbor matching without replacement to match the treatment groups
1 and 2 with the control group, separately. In other words, two different matched control
groups are respectively comparable to treatment groups 1 and 2. Tables B.1 and B.2 in the
Appendix report the mean differences and the p-values of the differences in the covariates we
have used for matching for the hire and leaver design, respectively, for both comparisons of
high-quality vs average-quality (columns 1-4) and low-quality vs average-quality (columns
5-8). Both tables highlight the presence of significant differences in observables between
treated and control firms before matching, which, apart for very few exceptions, disappear
in the matched samples. Moreover, we check the common support assumption by plotting
the density of the propensity score in Figure B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix for the analysis on
the entry of a worker and on the leave of a worker. In both cases, and for both treatments 1
and 2, there is a wide overlap in the propensity score densities.
Overall, when studying the entry of a worker in a firm, our sample consists of 2,164 firms
hiring a high-quality worker, matched with the same number of firms from the control group.
1,848 firms have hired a low-quality worker, and they are matched with the same number
of firms from the control group. The two matched samples consist of 285,350 and 238,046
person-year observations, respectively. When we focus on the leave of a worker from a
firm, we have 2,905 firms where a high-quality worker leaves and 2,046 where a low-quality
worker leaves, both matched with the same number of firms in the control group. The two
matched samples consist of 390,135 and 234,016 person-year observations, respectively.
Event study On the matched sample of firms, we use the following event study specifi-
cation to analyse the impact of a high- or low-quality worker’s entry or leave on past and
current coworkers’ wages.
w−i,j,t = ηt + ψj + ∑
k ̸=−1
βk(Treatj × 1{t = k}) + ϵ−i,j,t, (2.6)
where w−i,j,t is the log weekly wage of coworkers, excluding the mover, in period t and firm
j, where firm j is the firm the worker joins when in the hire design and it is the firm the
worker leaves in the leaver design. ηt and ψj are year and firm fixed effects, respectively.
ϵ−i,j,t is an error term. Treatj is a dummy variable for treated firms. The coefficients of
28Sales and valued-added variables are merged from the external balance-sheet firm-level database, AIDA.
However, there is a good portion of firms that are not covered in AIDA. To utilize the information from
balance-sheet data, we impute the missing value and create a dummy to indicate the missing observations.
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interest are βk, which measure the differential impact of hiring a high- or low-quality worker
relative to hiring an average-quality worker on wages in each period k.29
Worker-level Event Study
Empirical design In a very similar fashion we also study the impact on the wages of
movers of joining peer groups of different quality. We have highlighted in section 2.2 how
the variation in the change in peer quality experienced by movers is generally greater than
that experienced by stayers. We therefore examine how moving into a high-quality or low-
quality peer group relative to an average-quality peer group impacts on wages of the mover.
We use a very similar empirical strategy to that outlined before, but we match on workers’
characteristics, rather than firms’, such that, conditional on observables, the only difference
between movers is the peer group they end up joining. We follow movers for a total of 10
years, i.e. between 4 years before the move and 5 years after, focusing on workers moving
once and not changing employer in the 4 years before the move and in the 5 years after, as
described by the scheme in Figure 2.5. As before, we compare movers into high-quality
(treatment 1) and low-quality (treatment 2) peer groups with movers into average-quality
peer groups (control), where the comparison of own quality and peer quality is based again
on the worker and average peer fixed effect estimated in section 2.3.4.
Propensity score matching We perform ex-ante propensity score matching on the follow-
ing set of workers’ observables at time t = −3: the number of weeks worked, age, gender,
tenure, occupation (blue-collar or white-collar), the decile of the AKM worker fixed effect,
the AKM firm-time fixed effect, log firm size, sector dummies and province dummies. Be-
sides, we match workers on log weekly wages at time t = {−4,−3,−2}. As before, we use
a nearest neighbor matching without replacement (and caliper equal to 0.001). Table B.3
reports the mean difference and the p-values of the differences between treated and control
workers, separately for treated workers that move into high-quality peer groups (columns
1-4) and treated workers that move into low-quality peer-groups (columns 5-8) for both
unmatched and matched samples. The numerous differences between treated and control
workers in the unmatched samples disappear when we perform matching. Furthermore,
we keep only workers in the common support of the propensity score, which, as shown in
Figure B.4, displays a wide overlap for both groups of workers.
After performing matching we are left with a sample of 31,102 workers (15,551 in the
treatment and 15,551 in the control group) when studying movers into high-quality peer
groups, for a total of 310,220 person-year observations. When we study movers into low-
29Our unit of observation is the coworker-year pair. If we use average outcomes at the firm-year level,
excluding the new hire or the leaver, we obtain very similar results.
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−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 t
a worker moves into a high-quality peer group ᾱ−i > αi × 1.1
No mobility No mobility
Treatment 1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 t
a worker moves into a similar-quality peer group ᾱ−i ∈ [0.9,1.1]× αi
No mobility No mobility
Control workers
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 t
a worker moves into a low-quality peer group ᾱ−i < αi × 0.9
No mobility No mobility
Treatment 2
Fig. 2.5 Treatment and control groups in the event-study analysis, mover design
Notes. The diagram shows the empirical design behind the worker-level event study estimated in equation (2.7).
Treatment 1 refers to mobility into high-quality peer groups, whose average peer effect is more than 10% larger
than the worker effect of the mover. Treatment 2 refers to mobility of low-quality peer groups, whose average
peer effect is more than 10% smaller than the worker effect of the mover. Control workers refer to mobility of
workers into average-quality peer groups, whose average peer effect is between −10% and +10% of the worker
effect of the mover.
quality peer groups we have a sample of 25,556 (12,778 in the treatment and 12,778 in the
control group), for a total of 255,560 person-year observations.
Event study On the matched samples, we estimate the following event study regression:
wi,t = ηt + αi + ∑
k ̸=−1
γk(Treati × 1{t = k}) + ϵi,t, (2.7)
where wi,t is the log weekly wage of worker i in period t. ηt and αi are year and individual
fixed effects, respectively. ϵi,t is an error term. Treati is a dummy variable for treated workers
(either movers into high-quality peers or movers into low-quality peers). The coefficients of
interest are γk, which measure the differential impact of moving into a high- or low-quality
peer group relative to an average-quality peer group on wages in each period k.
2.4.2 Results
Coworker-level Event Study
When a high- or low-quality worker enters Figure 2.6 reports the event-study coefficients
βk for each k ∈ {−4, ...,+3}, for both treatment groups (coworkers in firms hiring a high-
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quality worker and coworkers in firms hiring a low-quality worker), relative to the control
group (coworkers in firms hiring an average-quality worker). The pre-event parallel trend
assumption holds as the effect before the event is small and statistically insignificant.
The post-event effects are quite different for the two treatments. Compared to firms
hiring a similar-quality worker, peers in firms, which hire a high-quality worker, see a
positive and significant effect on future wages. One year after the high-quality worker’s
entry, his or her coworkers’ wage is 1.9 percent higher than that in control firms. The effect
persists in the following years and reaches 3.1 percent after three years. In contrast, there is
no effect in period 0. In other terms, the high- quality worker’s entry does not impact the
coworkers’ wage immediately, but it takes some time for the peer effect to diffuse and be
reflected in wages. On the other hand, when a firm hires a low-quality worker, the effect on
his or her coworkers’ future wages is slightly negative, but statistically insignificant. The
knowledge spillover may play a role in explaining our findings. A high-quality worker,
when joining a new firm, would be able to transmit knowledge to his or her coworkers, and
therefore eventually drive up their wages in the following years. On the contrary, when a
low-quality worker enters, the amount of knowledge she can transmit is much more limited
and, therefore, it is less relevant for coworkers’ future wages. As already discussed, learning
from high-quality coworkers is not necessarily the only mechanism at play. The entry of a
high-quality worker could affect coworkers’ wages through alternative channels, e.g. peer
pressure(e.g., Mas and Moretti, 2009)30 or better network.31
To gather further insights into the mechanisms that determine our findings, we explore
heterogeneous effects across different peer groups. Recall that we have defined the peer
group in Section 2.3 as all the workers employed in the same firm with the same occupation.
Figure 2.7A shows the effect of a high-quality worker’s entry on his peer group and non-peer
group (i.e. on coworkers in the same and different occupation, respectively). For the peer
group, the effect is almost identical to the one in Figure 2.6: on average, the effect in the
post-event window is 1.8 percent. On the other hand, there is no significant effect for the
non-peer group, although the precision of the estimates is lower (the difference-in-differences
point estimate is 0.4 percent with a standard error of 0.7). This finding runs against the
hypothesis that network effects play a big role in determining the peer effect on wages,
as better networks should benefit all workers equally in the firm. Instead, the finding is
consistent with both knowledge spillover and peer pressure being important mechanisms
through which better peers influence workers in the workplace. Figure 2.7B shows the
same heterogeneous effects for coworkers of low-quality movers. We find a small and
non-significant negative effect for coworkers in the same peer group and a positive (but
30For instance, the high-quality worker’s coworkers may feel obliged to put more effort because of the higher
competition coming from their peers.
31A high-quality worker has generally more connection to other firms (e.g., Caldwell and Harmon, 2019),
which will help the firm expand business and, as a result, wages of all workers in the firm.




















-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Time to event (years)
high-quality worker low-quality worker
Difference-in-differences coef.
high-quality = 0.018 (0.003)
low-quality = -0.003 (0.003)
Fig. 2.6 The effect of a high-/low- quality worker’s entry on coworkers’ future wages
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6), separately for firms hiring high-quality and low-
quality workers relative to firms hiring average-quality workers. The dependent variable is the log weekly wage
of coworkers in the destination firm. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from cluster-robust
standard errors at the firm level.
still imprecise) effect for non-peers. We cannot draw many conclusions as the estimates are
hardly significant, but the positive coefficient on non-peers could signal some within-firm
organizational changes that follow the low-quality hire and allow the promotion of better
skilled workers to higher paying occupations.
We separately study the effect for high-wage and low-wage workers in Figure 2.7C and
2.7D. We define high-wage workers as those having a wage higher than the median of the
sector they belong to. Figure 2.7C reports the estimates from the entry of a high-quality
worker and shows that the benefit of working with such worker are equally shared between
high-wage and low-wage workers. On the opposite, Figure 2.7D seems to suggest different
wage trajectories for high-wage and low-wage workers as they collaborate with the new
low-quality hire. While high-wage workers do not experience any wage change, low-wage
workers experience some wage loss, although the estimates are quite imprecise and hardly
significant.
When a high- or low-quality worker leaves We estimate again equation 2.6 on the matched
sample of coworkers in firms where high-quality and low-quality workers leave compared
to coworkers in firms where an average-quality worker leaves. The outcome variable is in
this case the coworkers’ wage in the origin firm, hence we measure the impact of workers’
leaving a firm on their coworkers’ wages. Figure 2.8 reports the event-study coefficients βk
for each k ∈ {−4, ...,+3}.
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(D) Low-quality entry, high- vs low-wage
Fig. 2.7 Heterogeneous effects for peers and non-peers (top panels) and high-wage and
low-wage coworkers (bottom panels), hire design
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6) for different groups of workers. Panel (A) and (B)
compare high- and low-quality hires, respectively, to average-quality hires, distinguishing the effect for workers
belonging to the same or different peer group (i.e. to the same occupation). Panel (C) and (D) compare high-
and low-quality hires, respectively, to average-quality hires, distinguishing the effect for high- and low-wage
workers (i.e. above or below the median wage in the 2-digit sector they belong to). The dependent variable is
the log weekly wage of coworkers in the destination firm. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained
from cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level.
Our findings are somewhat symmetric with respect to those we find on the entry of
workers. When a low-quality worker leaves, coworkers’ wages increase by 2.4 percent on
average, whereas the departure of a high-quality worker depresses coworkers’ wages by
−1.3 percent. When a firm separates from a low-quality worker, the average peer quality in
a firm increases: this likely makes knowledge spillover easier in the firm, which eventually
increases future wages. On the other hand, when a high-quality worker leaves, there are
potentially two (opposite) effects. First, the leave of a high-quality worker will make the
overall peer quality smaller, thus decreasing knowledge spillover efficiency. Second, the
high-quality worker’s human capital “left” into the firm might play a persistent effect over
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Fig. 2.8 The effect of a high-/low-quality worker’s leave on coworkers’ future wages
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6), separately for firms separating from high-quality
and low-quality workers relative to firms separating from average-quality workers. The dependent variable is
the log weekly wage of coworkers in the origin firm. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from
cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level.
the next few years, which could help boost wage growth. Overall, the result suggests that
the first channel might exceed the second, resulting in an overall negative effect.
We again explore heterogeneous effects distinguishing peers and non-peers in Figure
2.9A and 2.9B, respectively for high-quality and low-quality leaves. While the departure
of a high-quality worker affects in a similar way peers and non-peers, when a low-quality
worker leaves the firm, peers seem to benefit more than non-peers, although the difference
between groups is not statistically significant: this evidence, nonetheless, suggests again that
when a low-quality worker leaves knowledge transmission may become easier, especially
among coworkers in the same peer group (i.e. in the same occupation).
When we distinguish between high-wage and low-wage workers (defined as before,
based on the median weekly wage in the sector), we do not find significant differences
between the two groups of workers when a high-quality worker leaves the firm in Figure
2.9C. On the contrary, low-wage coworkers gain more from the departure of low-quality
workers than high-wage coworkers, especially in the first two years following mobility.
If knowledge spillover becomes easier within the firm then low-wage workers may have
more to gain from it with respect to high-wage workers. At the same time, within-firm
competition for promotion may become lower after one competitor leaves, indicating that
part of the effect may reflect occupational upgrading.32
32Unfortunately, we cannot study promotions as we lack detailed information in the data on the specific job
title of each worker’s contract.
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(D) Low-quality leave, high- vs low-wage
Fig. 2.9 Heterogeneous effects for peers and non-peers (top panels) and high-wage and
low-wage coworkers (bottom panels), leave design
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6) for different groups of workers. Panel (A) and
(B) compare separations from high- and low-quality workers, respectively, to average-quality separations,
distinguishing the effect for workers belonging to the same or different peer group (i.e. to the same occupation).
Panel (C) and (D) compare high- and low-quality separations, respectively, to average-quality separations,
distinguishing the effect for high- and low-wage workers (i.e. above or below the median wage in the 2-digit
sector they belong to). The dependent variable is the log weekly wage of coworkers in the origin firm. Vertical
bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level.
Worker-level Event Study
We report in Figure 2.10 the estimates from equation (2.7), comparing the wage trajectories
of movers into high- and low-quality peers relative to movers into average-quality peers
for event period k = −4, ...,+5. The event-study analysis suggests that, before the move,
there are no significant differences in the wage trajectories between high- and low-quality
peers relative to average-quality peers. In the post-event window, estimates indicate that
moving into high-quality peers represents an important and substantial driver of wage
growth. On average, the weekly wages of such movers increase by 3.9 percent in the post-
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Fig. 2.10 The effect of moving into a high-/low-quality peer group on movers’ future wages
Notes. The figure reports estimates of γk from equation (2.7), separately for workers moving into high-quality
and low-quality peer groups relative to those moving into average-quality peer groups. The dependent variable
is the log weekly wage of the mover. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from cluster-robust
standard errors at the individual level.
event period. On the contrary, moving into low quality peers does not affect the trajectory
of wages. Moreover, the effect for movers into high-quality peers materializes on impact
and then remains approximately constant throughout the five years after mobility. This
finding highlights the importance, in terms of wage progression, of working in a high-quality
workplace. High-quality peers have a positive impact on workers’ performance (by either
transmitting knowledge, putting pressure on new entrants or establishing a better network
to rely on). Instead, there are no such effects from low-quality peers.
We explore heterogeneous effects by workers’ occupation in the year before the move.
That is, we distinguish among blue-collar and white-collar movers in Figure 2.11A and 2.11B
for movers into high-quality and low-quality peers, respectively. The positive effect of high-
quality peers is larger for white-collar workers compared to blue-collar ones: the average
difference-in-differences coefficient in the post-event window is 5.7 percent vs 3.6 percent,
although we observe an increasing trend in wages in the pre-event window for white-collar
workers (but a clear trend break, nonetheless). Interestingly, white-collar workers gain
also when moving into low-quality peer groups (Figure 2.11B), as they earn 1.8 percent
higher wages on average after mobility relative to white-collar movers into average-quality
peers. White-collar workers are probably more skilled,33 hence they can anyway gain from
moving into a new workplace, because of the ability to extract rents or because they can
33As anecdotal evidence on this point, the AKM worker fixed effect for white-collar workers is around 20 log
points higher than that for blue-collar workers.
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boost productivity of the workplace (something that is supported by the increasing trend in
the wage gain in the post-event period). The net gain for white-collar workers from moving
into high-quality peers relative to low-quality peers is anyway 3.9 percent (5.7 − 1.8).
Figure 2.11C and 2.11D report heterogeneous effect for high-wage and low-wage movers
(defined, as before, with respect to the median wage in the sector). High-quality peers
benefit particularly low-wage workers, for which knowledge transmission from better peers
is probably a more important driver of wage growth. On the contrary, they are penalized
when moving into low-quality peers. This pattern is consistent with low-wage workers
having worse human capital accumulation and outside options which materialize in lower
wage growth when moving into low-quality workplaces.
Overall, this analysis helps us understand the mechanisms that identify the peer effect in
section 2.3.4. In general, we conclude that changes in peer quality for job stayers determined
by the hire of a high-quality workers or the separation from a low-quality worker are the
most important in determining wage growth for job stayers, where the positive effects are
generally stronger for workers in the same peer group (i.e. in the same occupation) of the
new hire or the separated worker. For job switchers, moving into high-quality peer groups
contribute to raising the wage level on impact, but moving into low-quality peers does not
affect the trajectory of wages.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
Firm-level shocks One concern with our mobility design is that the entry or leave of
a worker may be correlated with firm-level shocks, even after matching on a rich set of
observables. On the one hand, the entry of a high-quality peer may be correlated with
expectations of future sale growth. On the other, the departure of a high-quality peer may
be correlated with expectations of negative shocks to firm sales. We attempt to address this
concern by, first, comparing coworkers’ wages in firms that hire (or separate from) workers of
high- or low-quality relative to firms that hire (or separate from) workers of average-quality
and, second, by matching firms on observables before mobility happens. We also inspect the
evolution of firms’ sales around mobility episodes. Due to data limitations, we only have
information on sales (and value added, as a further robustness) for a subset of our data over
the period 1996-2001.34 We re-estimate equation (2.6) in the matched sample using log sales
(value added) per worker as a dependent variable and we weight regressions by firm size.
Given the sample restrictions and the data limitations we cannot have as many pre-periods
as in the main analysis, hence we limit the period before mobility to two years. Figures B.5
and B.6 report the event study estimates for the hire and leaver designs, respectively. Both
figures show results for log sales per worker in panel (A) and log value added per worker
34Specifically, in the matched sample, we have information on 325 firms in the hire design (13,029 person-year
observations) and 338 firms (14,639 person-year observations) in the leaver design.
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(D) Low-quality peers, high- vs low-wage mover
Fig. 2.11 Heterogeneous effects for blue- and white-collar (top panels) and high-wage and
low-wage movers (bottom panels), worker-level design
Notes. The figure reports estimates of γk from equation (2.7) for different groups of workers. Panel (A) and (B)
show the effects for movers into high- and low-quality peers, respectively, relative to average-quality peers,
distinguishing movers that in the year before the move are employed as blue- or white-collar workers. show the
effects for movers into high- and low-quality peers, respectively, relative to average-quality peers, distinguishing
high- and low-wage movers (i.e. above or below the median wage in the 2-digit sector they belong to). The
dependent variable is the log weekly wage of movers. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from
cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level.
in panel (B) and indicate that, in the the subsample for which data is available, there is no
significant correlation between the quality of workers who move between firm and firm
sales or value added. Moreover, before the move we do not observe different patterns in
sale and value added evolution in different groups. This evidence, albeit descriptive and
limited to a subset of data, indicates that, after matching, the different groups of firms are
comparable in terms of their sale and value added growth. At the same time, this analysis
does not really say whether workers’ mobility is determined by expectations of sale growth,
but only that it is not correlated with realizations of firm growth. The patterns shown in
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Figures B.5 and B.6 are consistent with movers having inaccurate expectations about sales,
something that due to data limitations we are unable to capture.
Continuous treatment We replicate our analysis using a continuous treatment, rather than
dividing firms into those hiring (separating from) high-, low- or average-quality workers
and movers into those joining high-, low- or average-quality peer groups. Specifically, in the
coworker-level event study, we replace the dummy Treatj in equation (2.6) with the AKM
worker effect of the worker joining or leaving the firm, i.e. we estimate:
w−i,j,t = ηt + ψj + ∑
k ̸=−1




j × 1{t = k}) + ϵ−i,j,t, (2.8)
where α̂i is the pre-estimated worker effect of the joiner or leaver and the other variables are
defined as before. We include controls for pre-mobility firm characteristics in Xprej , interacted
with time event dummies: average weekly wages in all pre-periods, the AKM firm effect,
the average worker effect, the average age of employees, the share of female and blue-collar
employees, firm size and age measured at time −3. β̃k measure in this case the dynamic
effects on coworkers’ wages of a one percent increase in the joiner/leaver quality.
In the worker-level event study, we replace Treati in (2.7) with the average AKM peer
effect of coworkers in the destination firm. In other terms, we estimate:
wi,t = ηt + αi + ∑
k ̸=−1




i × 1{t = k}) + ϵi,t, (2.9)
where α̂−i is the average pre-estimated worker effect of coworkers in the destination firms
and the other variables are defined as before. We include controls for pre-mobility worker
characteristics in Xprei , interacted with time event dummies: weekly wage, number of weeks
worked, decile of worker fixed effect distribution, age, gender, tenure, occupation, AKM
firm effect and firm size, all measured at time −3. γ̃k measure the dynamic effects on the
mover’s wage of a one percent increase in the peer quality of the destination firm.
Results are reported in Figure B.7, which shows a very similar pattern to that reported in
the main analysis. A 10 percent increase in the quality of a new hire increases coworkers’
wage by 0.9 percent on average in the period after mobility, whereas a 10 percent increase
in the quality of separating workers does not affect coworkers’ wages in the origin firm,
although the dynamic effect shows some negative adjustment in the year following mobility.
For a mover, a 10 percent increase in the quality of peers at the destination firm increases
wages by 2 percent on average. Overall, these results confirm the findings from the event
study with discrete treatment groups.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper explores a critical driver of wage growth: coworker’s quality. We find that the
quality of coworkers plays an important role in increasing future wages. Using an innovative
estimation method in the classical AKM framework, we show that a 10 percent increase in
coworker’s quality raises the next year’s wage by 1.8 percent, which is almost equivalent to
the size of the return to working with college educated peers (Nix, 2020). The peer effect
gradually decreases in importance over time, but we find that after five years a 10 percent
increase in past peer quality still determines 0.5 percent higher wages. When exploring
heterogeneous effects, we find that the peer effect is larger for movers, workers with low
tenure and young workers, whereas we do not find differential effects for different firm sizes.
The peer effect is likely due to a combination of knowledge spillover, peer pressure and
better network opportunities. The finding that after five years a peer effect is still present
and that it is stronger for movers let use believe that knowledge acquired from past peers
plays an important role in shaping future wages.
Furthermore, the peer effect is identified, for job stayers, by changes in peer quality when
a worker enters or leaves the firm and, for job switchers, by moving into a new peer group.
We separately analyse each of these channels in the second part of the paper, by setting
up an event study analysis around mobility of workers. After carefully matching firms
in the pre-mobility period, we find that if a firm hires a high-quality worker, coworkers’
wages increase by 1.8 percent relative to coworkers’ wages in firms hiring an average-quality
worker. We do not find, instead, significant effects in firms hiring a low-quality worker. The
opposite effect is found in firms separating from a worker, as we find a positive effect for
coworkers’ wages in firms separating from low-quality workers and a moderate negative
effect for coworkers’ wages in firms separating from high-quality workers.
We also explore the wage trajectories of workers who move into peer groups of different
quality and find that moving into high-quality peers is an important driver fo wage growth,
with wages being on average 3.9 percent higher than those of workers moving into average-
quality peer groups. On the contrary, the wage trajectory is unaffected for workers moving
into low quality peers.
Overall, our findings suggest that hiring high-quality workers, separating from low-
quality workers and moving into high-quality peers generates higher wages than counterfac-
tual scenarios where peer quality does not change. This indicates that knowledge spillover,
but also pressure from better peers, are both mechanisms that may help explain why peers
matter in the workplace for wage growth.
Future research should focus on opening the black box of the mechanisms behind
the contribution of peers to workers’ wage growth. A separate analysis of the knowledge
spillover effect from the peer pressure and the network effect would help us in understanding
how interaction in the workplace benefits workers. Increased availability of administrative
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data, coupled with either structural or reduce-form models, or laboratory experiments, will
help reach a definitive answer to this question.
Chapter 3
Sorting Robots: How Automation
Shapes the Allocation of Workers
Across Firms
Abstract This chapter studies the worker-, firm- and sector-level adjustment to robots.
Combining detailed matched employer-employee data for Italy over the period 1994-2018
with robot counts by industry in the manufacturing sector, we show that automation adop-
tion expands employment opportunities and reduces labour market transitions. At the
worker level, those who are either high-skilled, white-collar, or employed in more pro-
ductive firms experience employment and earnings gains. Meanwhile at the firm-level,
sales and value added increase, while employment outcomes are highly heterogeneous
between ex-ante more and less productive firms; with the former increasing employment
of all workers, irrespective of their skill level, and the latter reducing it. These changes in
labour force composition are further inspected at the sector-level, where an event study
approach following spikes in automation adoption reveals a negative effect of automation
on labour market sorting.
Keywords: Automation, Employment, Wages, Matched Employer-Employee Data
JEL codes: J23, J30, O33
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3.1 Introduction
The impact of automation on the labour market is one of the more widely discussed topics
in the academic and policy debate. The fear is that automation can have disruptive con-
sequences on the organization of labour, leading to a surge in unemployment of workers
performing tasks that could be replaced by robots. Theoretical work on this subject (Ace-
moglu and Restrepo, 2019) highlights that there are two main economic effects of automation
on the labour market: a displacement effect and a productivity effect. The former has a
negative effect on employment and wages as workers replaced by machines are displaced
to other firms or to unemployment. The latter has a positive effect as firms become more
productive and expand output and, therefore, employment and wages. Which effect prevails
is ultimately an empirical question.
In this paper, we contribute to the large and growing strand of the literature that attempts
at giving answers to this question, by showing the worker-, firm- and sector-level adjustment
of labour markets to robots. We focus on industrial robots, defined as “an automatically
controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator” (IFR, 2020), which are mainly
deployed in the manufacturing sector. The surge of industrial robots in production processes
is evident in all economies, as the number of operational robots increased by a factor of 4.9
in the world as a whole.
We focus on Italy as a case study. Italy is an interesting country to analyse the impact
of automation for two main reasons. First, it is the second largest robot market in Europe
and the sixth worldwide. As shown in Figure 3.1, Italy experienced a growth in the number
of industrial robots per 1000 workers that is larger than the average of other European
countries and second to Germany, only. The surge in industrial robots in Italy is related to
the weight of the manufacturing sector – and of the automotive industry, in particular – in its
economy. Second, Italy has a relatively rigid labour market and high employment protection
legislation. The automation effects may be considerably different in countries with different
labour market institutions.1
We explore the impact of automation on the labour market along three lines. First, we
investigate the worker-level adjustment to robots. Specifically, we follow Dauth et al. (2021)
and, using detailed administrative linked employer-employee data, we compare the earnings,
employment and wage trajectories of workers with similar observable characteristics that
are initially employed in sectors with different automation exposure over the period 1994-
2018. We deal with endogeneity in the relationship between labour market outcomes and
automation by exploiting a standard instrumental variable strategy. We use the surge in
robot exposure across sectors in other countries as an instrument for the national surge in
1For example, the evidence has so far found negative effects of automation on employment in the United
States Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) and positive effects in European countries Dauth et al. (2018); Graetz and
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Fig. 3.1 Number of industrial robots per 1000 workers in selected countries
Notes. The figure shows the number of robots per 1000 workers exploiting data from the International Federation
of Robotics on the stock of operational robots for each country and year. Other countries is an average of the stock
of robots in Finland, France, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
robots, building upon the pioneering work of Autor et al. (2014). This analysis reveals that,
as in Germany but differently from the United States (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019), the
impact of automation on employment is positive, with more exposed workers increasing
their labour supply and experiencing lower rates of job churning, while we find no significant
effects on earnings or wages. These effects, however, are highly heterogeneous and configure
the presence of “winners” and “losers” from automation. Specifically, incumbent workers
experience increased employment and earnings levels, whereas workers displaced to other
firms – in manufacturing or outside of it – experience worse labour market outcomes.
Moreover, worker and firm types matter for the magnitude of the adjustment: blue-collar
and low-skill workers experience significant penalties, as well as workers initially employed
in less productive firms, that is, firms in the bottom tercile of the value added per worker
distribution.2 These results are confirmed if, instead of looking at employment as the main
outcome, we use the number of days spent in unemployment or short-time work, for which
we find results of opposite sign.
Second, we investigate the firm-level adjustment to robots, by using a subsample of the
data with balance-sheet information over the period 1994-2012. We focus on firms to evaluate
how robots affect firm-level employment, wages and performance and to examine, through
different lens, how automation impacts reallocation of workers with different skill levels
2Less productive firms are also less likely to automate (Koch et al., 2021), which may help explain why
employees in such firms do not benefit from automation.
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across firms with different productivity levels. Using a similar strategy to the one adopted
for the worker-level analysis, we find that firms in sectors with higher automation exposure
expand employment and labour costs and witness significant increases in value added and
sales. We then investigate how firms change their labour force composition and we find that
firms, in sectors with higher automation exposure, with low productivity levels decrease
employment of high-skilled workers who move to more productive firms, contributing
to higher assortative matching in the labour market. At the same time, more productive
firms also increase employment of low- and middle-skilled workers, highlighting how the
productivity effect of automation benefits all workers, but only in a limited subsample of
firms with high productivity levels, contributing to reducing assortativeness in the labour
market. The overall effect on labour market sorting is, therefore, ambiguous.
Finally, to further inspect the relationship between robots and sorting, we investigate
how automation changes the allocation of workers across firms by adopting an event study
strategy around automation spikes (in the spirit of Bessen et al., 2019), that is, around events
in which the number of industrial robots increases in a sector by a high margin relative to
other sectors. We investigate how such “automation shocks” translate into labour market
outcomes and specifically in how matching and sorting changes within each sector. We
measure sorting as the correlation between AKM (Abowd et al., 1999) worker effects and
measures of firm types, such as, log value added per worker and log sales per worker (as in
Bombardini et al., 2019).3 Overall, we find that there is a short-run negative and significant
effect of automation on labour market sorting and a medium-run insignificant result. This
implies that, at least under this point of view, automation does not contribute to between firm
earnings inequality, determined by high-wage workers being employed by more productive
firms (Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2018), but it contributes to between firm inequality as
there is an increasing dichotomy between low-productive and high-productive firms and to
between workers inequality in light of the differential effects for different worker types.
This paper contributes to a rapidly expanding literature on the effects of automation on
the labour market, which shows that the effects of automation on employment and wages
are highly heterogeneous and crucially depend on the context in which they materialize.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) report large negative employment and wage effects across
US local labour markets. For Europe, the evidence is far less pessimistic. The pioneering
study by Graetz and Michaels (2018) finds positive productivity effects and no employment
losses. Similar findings are also reported in Klenert et al. (2020), who additionally do not
find displacement effects for low-skilled workers. Dauth et al. (2021) and Dottori (2020) are
the most closely related papers to ours. The first one provides worker-level evidence on the
3An alternative is to measure sorting as the correlation between AKM worker and firm effects. However, as
highlighted in Bonhomme et al. (2019); Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), firm effects can be poor proxies of true firm
types and the correlation with worker effects could be severely biased due to low mobility of workers across
firms (Andrews et al., 2008). To overcome these problems we choose to use more reliable measures of firm types,
exploiting balance sheet administrative data on firms.
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effects of robots for Germany, a country that has many points in common to Italy in terms of
the structure of its labour market, which heavily depends on its manufacturing sector, and on
labour market institutions, such as wage bargaining and employment protection legislation.
The effects of automation are found to be positive on German employees, especially on
incumbent workers. The second one replicates these analyses for Italy. The conclusion of
Dottori (2020) are widely similar to those of Dauth et al. (2021) for Germany and are in
line with our results. This paper considerably extends on these two works, by providing
additional evidence on the type of firms where displaced workers end up being employed
and on the effects on unemployment, short-time work take-up and sick leaves. Moreover,
we contribute by providing evidence on the firm- and sector-level effects of automation,
exploiting rich data on balance sheets of firms, showing how the effects of automation
crucially depend on ex-ante characteristics of firms and workers and on how labour force
composition changes.
One limitation of the present analysis (and of the strand of the literature that uses the
same data source for robots adoption) is that it exploits automation variation at the sector-
level. Following the examples of Autor et al. (2014) and Dauth et al. (2021), we analyse
how different types of workers and firms within sectors are affected and, exploiting rich
administrative matched employer-employee data, which allow to follow workers’ careers
over time, we are able to track the contribution of different reallocation mechanisms to the
overall effect of automation. However, there is also a growing set of contributions in the
field that attempt to measure firm-level adoption of automation (Aghion et al., 2020; Bessen
et al., 2019; Bonfiglioli et al., 2020; Dixon et al., 2020) and how this translates into firm-level
outcomes, such as productivity and employment. The findings are contrasting and generally
highlight the presence of selection of firms into adopting automated technologies. For this
reason, we control for a rich set of firm and industry-level controls in order to alleviate the
selection effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3
analyses the worker-level adjustment to automation. Section 3.4 reports the firm-level results
on the effects of robots. Section 3.5 discusses the implications for labour market sorting,
taking a sector-level perspective. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
There are three main data sources. On the worker-firm side, we use LoSaI (Longitudinal
Sample Inps) records, a matched employer-employee dataset that contains a random sample
of the universe of workers in the Italian non-agricultural private sector. The data covers
approximately 7% of the universe of employees over the period 1985-2018. The dataset
comprises different archives. In the worker archive, we observe the entire working history
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of each individual and, specifically, we have information on annual gross earnings,4 the
number of weeks and days worked in a year, the type of contract (full-time or part-time and
permanent or temporary) and broad occupation categories (apprentice, blue-collar, white-
collar, middle manager, executive). In a separate archive, the dataset contains demographic
information on each employee, such as year of birth, gender and region of residence. Finally,
the firm archive records total firm size in discrete brackets and firm’s sector.
Using firm identifiers, we match firm records with balance sheet information from
Cerved, a dataset covering the period 1994-2012. Specifically, we retain information on
firms’ sales, value added, total assets, debts and profits. Moreover, over the same period,
the administrative data records total employment and its breakdown into employment of
blue- and white-collar workers. Additionally, we have information on total labour costs,
distinguishing again between blue- and white-collar workers.
On the automation side, data on robot adoption is provided by the International Fed-
eration of Robotics, which records the stock of industrial robots per sector in a number of
different countries over the period 1993-2018. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus
on the stock of industrial robots per sector in Italy as well as seven European countries
(Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK). The sectors included in
the IFR data mostly comprise manufacturing and are less detailed for non-manufacturing
sectors. Therefore, we will focus mostly on manufacturing, but will also include agriculture,
forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply. Table C.1
in the appendix details the sectors included in the final sample. Given that LoSaI data
contains sector information at the 2-digit level, we group sectors into 19 groups (as shown
in the third column of Table C.1), corresponding, approximately, to 2-digit sectors. We
will retain information on services to capture potential re-allocation of workers outside of
manufacturing.
3.3 Worker-level Adjustment
We begin by investigating the effects of automation on individual workers, by selecting a
cohort of employees and following their cumulative outcomes over the period 1993-2018.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Regression model We closely follow Autor et al. (2014) and Dauth et al. (2021) and focus
on the labour market outcomes of workers employed in manufacturing in 1994. We focus
specifically on workers with high-labour force attachment, described shortly, and present
results for all workers for robustness. We select workers in the data that, in 1994, are between
4The measure of earnings is gross of labour income taxes and pension contributions on the side of the
employee.
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21 and 39 years old, have at least 2 years of tenure with their firm and have worked at
least 26 weeks on average per year in the period 1990-1994. We then retain only workers
employed in a firm in manufacturing in 1994. On this sample of workers, we run the
following specification:
Yij = α + β · △r̂obotsj + γ · X′ij + δ · Z′j + ε ij (3.1)
Yij is a cumulative outcome (earnings, days worked, or average wages) over the period
1994-2018 for worker i initially employed in sector j, with j = {1, ..., 19}. △r̂obotsj is the sector-
level change in robot exposure between 1994 and 2018, instrumented with the corresponding
change in seven other European countries (Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom). Xij controls worker-level observables: birth cohort dummies, a
dummy for women, region of residence dummies, tenure dummies (0-3 years, 4-6 years, 7
years or more), terciles of conditional wages,5 and firm size dummies (brackets of workers:
1-10, 11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more employees). Zj contains sector-level controls:
dummies for broad manufacturing sectors (food, beverages and tobacco; consumer goods,
industrial goods and capital goods),6 the change in net exports from China and Eastern
Europe7 and the change in ICT exposure at the sector-level.8 The coefficient of interest is
β which measures the effects of one additional robot per 1000 workers between 1994 and
2018 on the outcome. This empirical strategy allows to compare outcomes of workers with
similar observable characteristics in the baseline year across sectors within broad industries
that experienced different changes in automation penetration and crucially controls for
other aggregate trends in technology adoption (via the inclusion of the change in ICT) and
globalization (via the change in trade exposure).
Instrument validity Our empirical strategy rests on the assumption that we are able to
identify exogenous changes in robot adoption. To do so, we use a standard instrumental
variable strategy, by predicting robot exposure based on the change in robot penetration in
other high-income countries. The validity of the instrument requires the usual conditions
of relevance and exogeneity. As to the first one, we provide extensive evidence that robot
penetration in high-income countries is highly correlated with robot penetration in Italy. The
5Conditional wages are computed as the residual of a regression in 1994 of full-time equivalent daily wages
on a dummy for female workers, a part-time dummy, quadratic polynomials in age and tenure, 20 dummies for
region of residence, dummies for firm size and sector dummies.
6These dummies group together NACE Rev. 2 sectors 10 to 12 (food, beverages and tobacco); 13 to 18 and 30
to 33 (consumer goods); 19 to 25 (industrial goods); 26 to 29 (capital goods).
7We use data on trade volumes by country and sector from the OECD to compute the change in total Italian
net exports (exports minus imports) over the period 1994-2018. We use exports to and imports from China,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan.
8We use data from the EU-KLEMS database on gross fixed capital formation in computing and communica-
tions equipment. Because of data availability, we compute the change over the period 1996-2016.
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second one requires that robot adoption in other high-income countries captures interna-
tional technology advancement in each industry that are uncorrelated with labour demand
shocks in domestic industries. This requirement fails if, for example, labour demand shocks
are correlated across countries, so that instrumental variables estimates would be biased by
correlation between robot adoption and unobserved components of labour demand. One
example of such correlation could be migration of high-skill workers in countries with higher
technological potential that boosts robot adoption through greater complementarity with
worker types. Additional concerns about instrument exogeneity are related to the possibility
that robot adoption may happen as a consequence of other labour demand shocks that shift
employment and wages and therefore technology investment decisions by firm. Examples
of such shocks are growth in imports from China and Eastern Europe or the growth in
computerization. Although there is no easy solution to properly account for such potential
biases, we report estimates controlling for a rich set of baseline covariates in each industry,
among which we include changes in import from China and Eastern Europe and in ICT
equipment.
Descriptive statistics Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the main sample of workers
with high-labour force attachment (as described before) in columns 1 and 2 and the full
sample of workers in columns 3 and 4. Panel A reports the cumulated outcomes over the
period 1994-2018. We measure cumulative earnings over the 25 years following 1994 and we
normalise them with respect to base year earnings. Hence, in the absence of earnings growth,
the average worker would have 25-fold his or her earnings in 1994. This is indeed the case
for workers in the main sample (column 1). Workers in the full sample experience slightly
larger earnings growth. The cumulative number of days worked by the average worker is
5,444 in column 1 and 5,218 in column 3, i.e. approximately 83% and 80% of the number of
working days available. The number of labour market transitions is larger for workers with
lower labour force attachment. Panel B reports descriptive statistics about the worker-, firm-
and sector-level controls included in the regressions. Panel C shows that the average worker
experiences a change in automation exposure of approximately 8.8 additional robots per
1000 workers, with a large variation between workers at the 10th or 25th percentile of the
robot exposure distribution, who experience an almost null change and workers at the 90th
or 75th percentile who experience a change of 20 and 15 additional robots per 1000 workers.
The number of workers in the main sample is 136,736.
3.3.2 Results
First stage We begin by investigating the strength of the first-stage relationship between the
endogenous change in robot exposure across Italian sectors and the change in robot exposure
across European sectors. Table C.2 in the Appendix reports the estimates under different
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics, worker-level sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main sample Extended sample
mean (sd) mean (sd)
Panel A: Outcomes, cumulated values over 1994-2018
Earnings / Base year earnings 24.62 (14.81) 29.46 (55.91)
Days 5,444.46 (2396.03) 5,218.32 (2497.85)
Average daily wage / Base year wage 1.20 (0.34) 1.20 (0.36)
Transitions 2.30 (2.24) 2.58 (2.45)
Panel B: Control variables
Female 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47)
Age 30.15 (5.10) 29.74 (5.20)
Avg. earnings, 1990-94 22,163.28 (9438.31) 20,257.59 (10197.96)
Avg. daily wage, 1990-94 79.46 (28.05) 78.29 (28.31)
North-West 0.39 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49)
North-East 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45)
Centre 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38)
South 0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38)
Tenure ≤ 3 years 0.25 (0.43) 0.40 (0.49)
Tenure 4-6 years 0.34 (0.47) 0.28 (0.45)
Tenure ≥ 7 years 0.41 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47)
Firm size ≤ 10 0.22 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43)
Firm size 11-20 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35)
Firm size 21-50 0.17 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37)
Firm size 51-100 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30)
Firm size 101-500 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38)
Firm size > 500 0.17 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37)
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27)
Consumer products 0.38 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49)
Industrial goods 0.30 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46)
Capital goods 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38)
△ net exports / wagebill in % -20.18 (120.22) -19.90 (119.86)
△ ICT equipment in Euro per worker 123.49 (184.12) 123.43 (181.77)
Panel C: Robot exposure
△ robots per 1000 worker 8.75 (13.57) 8.81 (13.46)
p10-p90 interval [0.13-19.86] [0.13-19.86]
p25-p75 interval [0.33-14.89] [0.33-14.89]
Sample size 136,736 174,405
Notes. The table reports summary statistics from the high labour force attachment worker sample used in the
main analysis (columns 1 and 2) and the full sample of workers (columns 3 and 4). Panel A reports means and
standard deviations of outcomes, cumulated over the period 1994-2018. Panel B report control variables in
the baseline year 1994. Panel C shows means, standard deviations and quantiles of the distribution of robot
exposure, measured as the change in robots per worker by sector between 1994 and 2018.
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specifications. In all specifications, the first-stage relationship is strong and statistically
significant with an F-statistic equal to 114 in column (6), which controls for worker, firm and
sector characteristics.
Overall impact of automation on workers Table 3.2 reports the estimates of equation (3.1)
using cumulative earnings over 1994-2018 under different model specifications. Panel A
reports the main sample that will be used throughout the rest of the worker-level analysis,
i.e. the high labour force attachment group. Panel B reports the estimates for the full
sample of workers. For both samples, the table also reports the p-values from the Hansen-
Sargan test, which provides evidence against the rejection of the null of valid instruments.
Column (1) reports OLS estimates of β from equation (3.1), i.e. the effect of one additional
robot per worker on cumulative earnings in percent of baseline earnings in 1994. The only
additional covariates included in this specification are birth year dummies (from 1955 to
1972). The effect is positive but not statistically significant in panel A and is higher in
magnitude and statistically significant in panel B. Column (2) reports 2SLS estimates of
the same specification. Comparing OLS and 2SLS coefficients suggests a slightly negative
bias in OLS. The 2SLS estimate, moreover, is statistically significant in both panels A and B.
Additional demographic controls (gender and region of residence) are included in column
(3). The inclusion of such controls considerably reduces the magnitude of the estimate, which
becomes insignificant in panel A and only marginally significant in panel B. The inclusion of
further employment controls (tenure dummies, log earnings in 1994 and terciles of adjusted
wages) in column (4), of industry dummies and firm size dummies in column (5), and of the
change in net exports and ICT capital in column (6) further reduces the magnitude of the
coefficient, which becomes statistically insignificant in both panels. For the remainder of the
analysis, we will use the specification of column (6) and restrict the focus to the sample used
in panel A, only.
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of equation (3.1) for cumulative earnings (which replicates
column (6) of Table 3.2), cumulative days worked, average daily wages (computed as the
ratio of cumulative earnings and cumulative days worked) and cumulative labour market
transitions (to other firms and to non-employment). Panel A reports the estimates for the
treatment period 1994-2018. The impact of robots is positive and statistically significant
on cumulative days worked: the coefficient suggests that moving from the 25th to the
75th percentile of the change in automation exposure translates into additional 111 (=
5.631 × [19.86 − 0.13]) days worked. At the same time, column (3) suggests there is no
significant effect on average daily wages, but there is a significantly lower job churning
rate (column (4)): workers initially employed in more exposed industries experience a
lower number of labour market transitions. Specifically, comparing again workers at the
25th and 75th percentile of automation adoption, the latter experiences 0.11 less transitions
(= −0.572/100 × [19.86 − 0.13]).
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Table 3.2 Robot exposure and cumulative earnings, 1993-2018: OLS and 2SLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Panel A: High labour force attachment group
△ robots per 1000 worker 6.129 7.669* 3.963 3.318 2.044 2.302
(4.031) (4.275) (2.649) (2.333) (1.938) (1.679)
Hansen-Sargan test 0.756 0.627 0.731 0.398 0.819
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 140.5 135.2 135.7 138.1 114.3
Observations 136,736 136,736 136,736 136,736 136,736 136,736
Panel B: All workers
△ robots per 1000 worker 13.038** 14.874*** 10.415*** 10.399* 4.341 3.672
(5.113) (5.519) (3.232) (5.306) (4.640) (5.020)
Hansen-Sargan test 0.754 0.757 0.386 0.349 0.356
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 128.6 121.0 121.7 127.9 111.1
Observations 174,405 174,405 174,405 174,405 174,405 174,405
Birth year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment history Yes Yes Yes
Industry and firm controls Yes Yes
△ Net exports and △ ICT Yes
Notes. The table reports coefficients from the estimation of equation (3.1). Column (1) reports OLS estimates.
Columns (2) to (6) report 2SLS estimates. Columns (1) and (2) include birth year dummies. Column (3) controls
for workers’ gender and region of residence (20 dummies). Column (4) includes tenure dummies (4-6 years,
≥ 7 years), log earnings in 1994 and terciles of adjusted wages. Column (5) includes five firm size dummies
(11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more employees) and four dummies for broad manufacturing sectors (food,
beverages and tobacco; consumer goods, industrial goods and capital goods). Column (6) further controls for
the change in net exports form China and Eastern Europe over 1994-2018 and the change in ICT capital over
1996-2016. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.3 Robot exposure and cumulative earnings, cumulative days, years with positive
earnings, earnings per year and per day, 1993-2018 and 1990-1993: 2SLS estimates









Panel A: treatment period 1994-2018
△ robots per 1000 worker 2.302 5.631*** 0.008 -0.572***
(1.679) (1.264) (0.065) (0.162)
Panel B: pre-period 1990-1994
△ robots per 1000 worker 0.113 0.298** 0.006 -0.092**
(0.071) (0.129) (0.006) (0.044)
Notes. N = 136,736. The table reports estimates of β from equation (3.1). Outcomes are cumulated values over
1994-2018 in panel A and over 1990-1994 in panel B. Columns (1) to (4) report the estimates for cumulative
earnings ×100, cumulative days, average daily wage × 100 (computed as the ratio of cumulative earnings over
cumulative days), cumulative labour market transitions ×100. All regressions include the full set of controls
from column (6) of Table 3.2. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
One concern about the estimates is the potential selection of workers into industries
with more resources to automate production processes, even after controlling for a rich set
of worker-level and firm-level observables. We test this hypothesis by running the same
regressions on outcomes cumulated over the period 1990-1994. Results are reported in
panel B. They suggest some selection for cumulative days and labour market transitions
(columns (2) and (4), respectively). In other terms, workers in more exposed industries
were increasing their labour supply and were subject to lower job churning also before the
treatment period. However, Figure 3.2 reassures against the magnitude of such “pre-trends”.
The figure plots dynamic effects for cumulative earnings, cumulative days and cumulative
labour market transitions. Specifically, the figure plots the coefficient of a regression of
cumulative outcomes up to the year reported on the x-axis, on the change in automation
exposure between 1994 and 2018, so to evaluate how the overall effect amasses over time.9
The figure shows that pre-trends in cumulative days and transitions are generally very small
and flat, whereas only starting from 1994 the figure shows a clear change in the slope of the
dynamic effects. Moreover, the figure also suggests that the effect for earnings is positive
and statistically significant before 2011, but the estimates become less precise (although
coefficients become larger) in more recent years.
Decomposition The overall effect of automation exposure on workers is the sum of the
effects for incumbent workers and job changers. The latter can be further decomposed into
the effect for movers to another firm within the same 2-digit industry in manufacturing,
9For years prior to 1994, we cumulate outcomes between 1990 and the year reported on the x-axis.




















































































































































































































Fig. 3.2 Cumulative earnings, days and labour market transitions since 1990
Notes. N = 136,736. The figure reports dynamic estimates of β from equation (3.1). Outcomes are cumulated
values between 1994 and the year reported on the x-axis for years after 1994, and between 1990 and the year on
the x-axis for years before 1994. The top figure reports the estimates for cumulative earnings ×100. The central
figure reports the estimates for cumulative days and the bottom figure reports the estimates for cumulative
labour market transitions ×100. All regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table 3.2.
Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, from cluster-robust standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2
industries.
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movers to other 2-digit industries in manufacturing, and movers in the non-manufacturing
sector. Table 3.4 reports such decomposition. Panels A, B and C use cumulative earnings,
cumulative days and average daily wages as outcomes, respectively. Column (1) shows the
overall effect, replicating results from Table 3.3. Column (2) shows the effect for workers stay-
ing at their original firm, using as dependent variables only cumulated outcomes for workers
remaining with their original employer. The table suggests that such workers experience
significant gains in terms of both earnings and days worked. Comparing the implied effect
at different points in the distribution of automation exposure, incumbent workers at th 75th
percentile experience close to 150% (7.390 × [19.86 − 0.13] = 145.8) larger cumulative earn-
ings growth and approximately one additional year of work (16.049 × [19.86 − 0.13] = 316.6)
than a worker at the 25th percentile. The effect on average daily wages is positive but
not statistically significant. The positive effect for incumbent workers is compensated by
negative effects for workers changing employer: column (3) report the effects for workers
moving to another firm within the same 2-digit industry in manufacturing. Such workers
experience both income and days losses, but only the latter are significant. This evidence
suggests the presence of displacement effects, as theorized by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019),
that produce earnings losses for workers losing their job following the rise in automation
exposure, and it configures the presence of “winners” and “losers” from technology adoption
that the aggregate effect partially hides. Column (4) of the table reports the effect for workers
moving to another employer and 2-digit industry within manufacturing, whereas column
(5) reports the estimates for workers moving to non-manufacturing. The coefficients are
negative for all outcomes in both specifications, but statistically significant only in the latter.
In particular, workers displaced to the non-manufacturing sector experience earnings, days
of work and wage losses of considerable magnitude, that are almost as large as the positive
overall effect for all workers. This evidence is similar to the one provided for Germany by
Dauth et al. (2021), but the magnitude of the effects is larger in Italy.
Table C.3 in the Appendix further decomposes the effects for workers changing employ-
ers into the effects for workers moving to larger or smaller firms than the firm of origin.
Columns (4) and (5) show that the negative effect for workers changing employer within
industry are statistically significant for workers moving to smaller firms only, but the esti-
mates are very imprecise and it is impossible to draw conclusions on differences between
different sets of coefficients. Similar differences between mobility to larger versus smaller
firms are observed for workers moving into the non-manufacturing sector, too (columns
10-11).
Heterogeneous effects by worker and firm characteristics The results presented so far
have already highlighted how the effects of automation on the labour market are highly
heterogeneous for incumbent workers relative to job changers, with the former benefiting
from increased labour supply and earnings and the latter experiencing worse labour market
3.3 Worker-level Adjustment 87
Table 3.4 Exposure to robots and earnings and employment by industry and firm, 1993-2018:
2SLS estimates





Same 2-digit industry Yes Yes No No
Same firm Yes No No No
Panel A: Cumulative earnings
△ robots per 1000 worker 2.302 7.390*** -1.968 -1.069 -2.051**
(1.679) (1.094) (1.241) (1.780) (1.034)
Panel B: Cumulative days
△ robots per 1000 worker 5.631*** 16.049*** -5.036** -1.319 -4.062**
(1.264) (2.930) (2.509) (3.372) (1.570)
Panel C: Average daily wage
△ robots per 1000 worker 0.008 0.058 -0.115 -0.027 -0.166**
(0.065) (0.039) (0.081) (0.119) (0.065)
Notes. N = 136,736. The table reports estimates of β from equation (3.1). Outcomes are cumulated values over
1994-2018. Panels A, B and C shows results for cumulative earnings, cumulative days and average daily wages,
respectively. Column (1) cumulates outcomes over all employers. Column (2) cumulates outcomes only at the
original employer in the baseline year 1994. Column (3) cumulates outcomes only at different employers in the
same 2-digit industry. Column (4) cumulates outcomes at different employers in different 2-digit industries.
Column (5) cumulates outcomes at employers outside of manufacturing. All regressions include the full set of
controls from column (6) of Table 3.2. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries,
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
outcomes from technological progress. The polarization in labour market outcomes may
depend also on worker characteristics, such as occupation and skills, and firm characteristics,
such as productivity. In this paragraph, we investigate the presence of heterogeneous effects
by exploiting the richness of the LoSaI administrative data. We analyse three dimensions
of heterogeneity. First, Figure 3.3 reports heterogeneous effects by terciles of AKM worker
fixed effects, which we use as proxies of workers’ skills.10 Specifically, we estimate on
the full sample over 1985-2018 a two-way fixed effects regression (Abowd et al., 1999)
of log daily wages on worker and firm effects, controlling for cubic polynomials in age
and tenure, occupation dummies, a part-time dummy – in levels and interacted with a
dummy for female workers – and year effects. We then classify workers into terciles of the
estimated worker effects.11 The figure shows that the benefits from automation are highly
heterogeneous across workers’ skill levels. Panel A shows that only workers in the top
10Unfortunately, the dataset does not record education level of workers. Hence, the worker fixed effect
will capture the portable component of earnings across employers, which will be correlated with ability and
education.
11The estimation of the AKM regression requires to restrict the sample to the largest connected group (Abowd
et al., 2002) of workers and firms linked by worker mobility. We use the full sample between 1985 to 2018 in
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tercile of worker effects benefit from automation exposure with all employers, while both
workers in the bottom and middle terciles experience earnings losses. Furthermore, the
figure shows that the earnings losses for the latter two worker groups are concentrated
among employers different than the original one. In contrast, high-skill workers have larger
gains if they remain with their employer, but still do not experience loss in earnings if they
relocated to other employers. Panels B and C show how the positive effects for workers in
the top tercile materialize. The cumulative number of days worked is similar across skill
group at all employers (panel B), while there is a small skill gradient for workers changing
employer. On the opposite, high-skill workers experience gains in average daily wages
of approximately 0.5 percent across all employers (i.e. approximately 9.9 percent higher
wages for a high-skill worker at the 75th percentile of the automation adoption distribution
relative to a worker at the 25th percentile). Moreover, except for workers moving out of
manufacturing, the figure suggests that high-skill workers benefit from wage increases
both at their original employer and at other employers within the same 2-digit industry or
within the manufacturing sector. Overall, this evidence suggest that earnings inequality
between high- and low-skill workers likely increases as a consequence of higher automation
exposure, as only the former experience earnings gains. One finding that the aggregate effect
would not be able to signal. The reason why high-skill workers have higher gains from
automation may be related to their higher complementarity with new technologies with
respect to low-skill workers. At the same time, they are shielded against earnings losses
when moving to different employers, likely because of better outside options relative to
other worker types.
Figure 3.4 reports heterogeneous effects by occupation in 1994. One concern about the
potential negative effects of automation in manufacturing is that it can replace manual tasks
performed by workers employed in routine occupations. Blue-collar workers are at higher
risk of being negatively affected by automation as they are more likely to perform such
routine manual tasks. In fact, the figure shows that automation has a negative overall effect
on cumulative earnings of blue-collar employees, while the effect is strongly positive and
statistically significant for white-collar workers (panel A). The negative effects for blue-collar
workers are entirely concentrated among displaced workers, while both blue- and white-
collar have positive earnings effects when staying at their origin employer. Panel B shows
that the effect on cumulative days is positive across all employers and is larger for blue-
relative to white-collar workers employed in the same firm throughout the period 1994-2018.
Blue-collar workers experience, instead, a negative and statistically significant effect on
days worked when displaced to the non-manufacturing sector. However, as highlighted
before for workers’ skill levels, differences by occupation are determined by different wage
gains for blue- and white-collar workers. While the former experience a decrease in wages
order to maximize the size of this group. Therefore, we retain observations for 131,961 workers in the baseline
year 1994 (97% of the number of workers in the main analysis).








































































Bottom tercile Middle tercile Top tercile
(C) Average daily wage
Fig. 3.3 Heterogeneous effects by terciles of AKM worker fixed effects
Notes. N = 131,96. The figure reports heterogeneous effects in the effects of robots on cumulative earnings
(panel A), cumulative days (panel B) and average daily wages (panel C) by terciles of AKM worker fixed effects.
The figures replicate the specifications in Table 3.4. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals from cluster-robust
standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries.
both when staying at their employer and when moving to different employers, for the latter
the estimates suggest an opposite result. Except for white-collar workers displaced in a
different firm within the same 2-digit industry, the other effects are positive and statistically
significant, signalling on the one hand the complementarity between workers employed in
white-collar occupations with automation in affected firms and industries and the better
employment opportunities of such workers when displaced to other employers or industries.
We further investigate an additional source of heterogeneity, related to firm productivity,
measured as value added per worker. The information on firms’ balance sheet data is
available only for a subset of observations used in the main analysis.12 However, even in
12The number of observations drops to 45,766, approximately 33% of the total number of observations used in
the main analysis (136,736).










































































(C) Average daily wage
Fig. 3.4 Heterogeneous effects by occupation
Notes. N = 136,736. The figure reports heterogeneous effects in the effects of robots on cumulative earnings
(panel A), cumulative days (panel B) and average daily wages (panel C) by occupation (blue- or white-collar).
The figures replicate the specifications in Table 3.4. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals from cluster-robust
standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries.
this restricted sample the estimated effects of automation are remarkably similar to those
in the full sample, as Table C.4 in the Appendix shows. Figure 3.5 shows heterogeneous
effects for firms in terciles of the distribution of value added per worker. Firms with higher
productivity levels are, on the one hand, more likely to automate – as the evidence for other
countries suggests (Koch et al., 2021) – and, on the other hand, they may be as a consequence
more likely to preserve employment relationships and share their rents with workers. Panel
A shows that there exists a gradient in the cumulative earnings gains across all employers
based on firms’ value added. This gradient is mainly determined by positive effects for
workers employed in firms in the middle and top tercile of the distribution who stay with
their employer and a negative (although imprecisely estimated) effect for workers employed
in bottom tercile firms. The effects on earnings are mainly determined by positive labour











































































Bottom tercile Middle tercile Top tercile
(C) Average daily wage
Fig. 3.5 Heterogeneous effects by terciles of value added per worker
Notes. N = 45,766. The figure reports heterogeneous effects in the effects of robots on cumulative earnings (panel
A), cumulative days (panel B) and average daily wages (panel C) by terciles of firms’ value added per worker.
The figures replicate the specifications in Table 3.4. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals from cluster-robust
standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries.
supply effects, as patterns for cumulative days worked closely resemble those for earnings
(panel B), rather than by increased daily wages (panel C). Hence, workers employed in
highly productive firms increase their labour supply with the firm, by working close to 20
days more in response to one additional robot per worker. This is an important signal of
the complementarity between automation and human work and, at the same time, of the
productivity effect of automation which likely creates the need for new jobs that workers
can take. However, there are striking differences between workers initially employed by
more productive and less productive firms, with the latter experiencing worse consequences
from technology adoption than the former.
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Short-time work, unemployment, sick leaves Table 3.5 investigates the effects of automa-
tion on a different set of outcomes, related to unemployment and health of employees.
Columns (1) to (3) reports the effects of automation on the cumulative days of short-time
work, unemployment and sick leaves. Short-time work programs provide subsidies for
hours reductions of workers in firms experiencing temporary shocks. The variation we am
exploiting in automation exposure is at the sector-level, which implies that within sectors
there are adopters and non-adopters. If non-adopters are “left behind” by the process of tech-
nological innovation they may experience temporary shocks before they are able to adapt to
new production processes or more permanent shocks if they eventually exit the market. In
both cases, these firms may recur to short-time work to preserve employment relationships.
The coefficient in panel A suggests a small positive effect which, however, is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Column (2) reports the effect on the cumulative days
of unemployment (computed as the number of days of unemployment benefit receipt).
The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a worker at the 75th
percentile of the automation adoption distribution experiences 23 (=−1.180× [19.86− 0.13])
days less of unemployment insurance receipt relative to a worker at the 25th percentile.
Considering that the maximum duration of unemployment benefit receipt is 8 months for
most of the years in the sample, this is a sizeable effect (approximately 9.5% of maximum
duration). Column (3) shows the effect on the cumulative number of sick leave days taken
by workers. Automation can have ex-ante positive effects on workers’ health as robots can
perform tasks that would be dangerous for workers or that would cost physical effort or
negative effects if the fear of losing the job increases stress and psychological conditions of
workers (see, e.g., Schwabe and Castellacci, 2020). The estimates suggest that neither of these
effects translates into additional leave of absence from work, as on average we estimate an
almost precise null effect on the number of sick leave days taken by workers.
We further investigate the presence of heterogeneous effects for such outcomes in Figure
3.6. Panel A shows heterogeneity by terciles of worker fixed effects. The null aggregate effect
on short-time work masks important heterogeneity by worker type. While low- and middle-
skill workers experience additional days of short-time work in response to automation
exposure (although the effect is not statistically significant at 95% level), high-skill workers
experience a lower amount of days spent in short-time work. We find a similar gradient
for the cumulative number of days receiving unemployment benefits and for the number
of days spent in sick leave. This last finding, in particular, may suggest that workers who
are more likely to suffer displacement effects from automation are also those more likely to
have worse health outcomes. This can be due by either increased stress coming from the fear
to end up in unemployment or by displacement to non-adopting firms that could use old
production processes that might be more physically intensive and may therefore increase
health risks for individuals. Results by occupation in panel B show striking differences
between blue- and white-collar employees in terms of the cumulative number of days spent
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Table 3.5 Robot exposure and cumulative days in short-time work, unemployment and sick






Panel A: treatment period 1994-2018
△ robots per 1000 worker 0.658 -1.180*** 0.003
(0.710) (0.229) (0.021)
Panel B: pre-period 1990-1994
△ robots per 1000 worker 0.305 -0.042 -0.003
(0.192) (0.046) (0.006)
Notes. N = 136,736. The table reports estimates of β from equation (3.1). Outcomes are cumulated values over
1994-2018 in panel A and over 1990-1994 in panel B. Columns (1) to (3) report the estimates for cumulative
days of short-time work, cumulative days of unemployment benefit receipt and cumulative sick leave days. All
regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table 3.2. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36
two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
in short-time work, which suggests a positive (and imprecisely estimated) effect for blue-
collar workers and a negative effect for white-collar, and of the cumulative number of days
in sick leave, which again suggests that automation negatively affects health of workers
whose employment prospects are more likely to be harmed by automation. There are,
instead, non-significant differences in terms of unemployment insurance receipt. Panel C
reports heterogeneous effects by terciles of firms’ value added per worker. Workers in more
productive firms experience a lower amount of days in short-time work, unemployment and
sick leave (although for the latter the effect is not statistically significant).
3.4 Firm-level Adjustment
This section analyses the firm-level consequences of automation, by investigating the impact
on firms’ productivity, revenues, employment and the composition of the labour force. We
use data from LoSaI records aggregated at the firm-level, matched with balance sheet data
from Cerved over the period 1994-2012.
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
The unit of observation is a firm and the outcomes are cumulated over the period 1994-2012.
For each outcome, we run the following specification
Yf j = ω + ξ · △r̂obotsj + ζ · W ′f j + θ · P′j + η f j (3.2)














































































































(C) By terciles of VA per worker
Fig. 3.6 Heterogeneous effects for cumulative days of short-time work, unemployment and
sick leave
Notes. N = 136,736. The figure reports heterogeneous effects in the effects of robots on cumulative days of
short-time work (left panel), unemployment benefit receipt (central panel) and sick leave (right panel) by terciles
of worker fixed effects (panel A), occupation (panel B) and terciles of value added per worker (panel C). All
regressions include the set of controls included in column (6) of Table 3.2. Vertical bars are 95% confidence
intervals from cluster-robust standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries.
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where Yf j are cumulated outcomes for firm f in sector j over 1994-2012. ω is a constant.
△r̂obotsj is the predicted change in robot exposure in sector j after instrumentation with
the predicted change in other European countries (as before, Finland, France, Germany,
Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom). W f j contains firm-level covariates, such
as cohort of birth of the firm, region of location, log average annual earnings and sales in
1994, and firm size dummies (1-10, 11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more employees). Pj
contains sector-level controls: dummies for broad manufacturing sectors (food, beverages
and tobacco; consumer goods; industrial goods; capital goods), the change in net exports
form China and Eastern Europe over the period 1994-2012 and the change in ICT capital
between 1996 and 2012.
Given that we only observe a sample of firms in the data, i.e. those that employ one
of the workers sampled in the main worker-level data, it is difficult to assess whether the
disappearance of a firm from the sample is due to firm closure or to the fact that workers
initially sampled in those firms stop working. Therefore, we define two samples. One that
uses the full sample of firms, which ignores this potential selection problem, and another one
that limits the observations to firms that are either observed for the whole period 1994-2012
or that have a non-missing closing date that is at most two years larger than the last year of
firm’s appearance in the dataset. We will report results for both samples, which comprise
24,578 and 19,804 observations, respectively.
It is important to highlight that estimates of ξ will be the sum of two effects: one direct
effect of firms that automate and the indirect effect of firms that do not automate but are
in sectors with high automation adoption. Hence, these effect have to be interpreted with
caution as they do not represent the direct effect for adopters, but rather the average effect
between adopters and non-adopters in sectors with relatively higher automation exposure.
Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics from the restricted and full sample in columns
1-2 and 3-4, respectively. Panel A shows the outcomes, which are slightly larger in most
cases in the restricted sample on average. Overall, in the restricted sample there is a 19.6
fold increase in the wage bill, an 18.3 fold increase in employment, an 18.9 fold increase
in value added and a 20.6 fold increase in sales. In per capita terms, value added is only
2% larger, while sales per worker grow by 12%. The firms included in the sample are in
majority born in the 1980s, located in the North of the country and with firm-size between
21 and 50 employees (panel B). Panel C shows that the average firm experiences a change in
automation exposure of approximately 6 additional robot per worker
The next paragraph discusses the results from the estimation of equation (3.2).
3.4.2 Results
Table C.5 reports the first stage regressions for the firm-level restricted and full samples
in panels A and B, respectively. In both cases the first stage F-statistic is large, signalling
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Table 3.6 Descriptive statistics, firm-level sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted sample Full sample
mean (sd) mean (sd)
Panel A: Outcomes, cumulated values over 1994-2012
Wage bill / Base year wage bill 19.66 (17.54) 17.53 (17.02)
Employment / Base year employment 18.30 (15.36) 16.38 (14.99)
Value added / Base year value added 18.85 (18.05) 16.87 (17.49)
Value added per worker 1.02 (0.34) 1.03 (0.34)
Sales / Base year sales 20.64 (20.02) 18.41 (19.37)
Sales per worker 1.12 (0.43) 1.12 (0.42)
Exit rate 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Panel B: Control variables
Cohort < 1970 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27)
Cohort 1970 0.34 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47)
Cohort 1980 0.38 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49)
Cohort 1990 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40)
North-West 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
North-East 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48)
Centre 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.34)
South 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.34)
Log avg. daily wage, 1994 9.61 (0.24) 9.59 (0.25)
Log avg. sales, 1994 15.37 (1.37) 15.24 (1.39)
Firm size ≤ 10 0.17 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40)
Firm size 11-20 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
Firm size 21-50 0.35 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47)
Firm size 51-100 0.16 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35)
Firm size 101-500 0.10 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29)
Firm size > 500 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06)
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24)
Consumer products 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
Industrial goods 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48)
Capital goods 0.17 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37)
△ net exports / wagebill in % -27.09 (211.94) -32.39 (233.06)
△ ICT equipment in Euro per worker 18.80 (165.68) 16.51 (161.92)
Panel C: Robot exposure
△ robots per 1000 worker 6.05 (12.18) 5.87 (11.97)
p10-p90 interval [0.05-7.84] [0.05-7.84]
p25-p75 interval [0.24-7.24] [0.24-7.24]
Sample size 19,804 24,578
Notes. The table reports summary statistics from the restricted (columns 1 and 2) and full (columns 3 and 4)
firm-level samples (see text for details on the definition of restricted and full samples). Panel A reports means
and standard deviations of outcomes, cumulated over the period 1994-2012. Panel B reports control variables in
the baseline year 1994. Panel C shows means, standard deviations and quantiles of the distribution of robot
exposure, measured as the change in robots per worker by sector between 1994 and 2012.
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there is no problem of weak instruments. Table 3.7 reports the estimates from equation (3.2)
under different specifications and using cumulative value added as an outcome. Column
(1) shows OLS estimates of ξ with the inclusion of firm birth cohort dummies as the only
additional controls and signals the presence of a positive and statistically significant effect of
automation adoption on value added in both restricted and full samples (panels A and B,
respectively). Column (2) reports the 2SLS estimates, which are very close to OLS results.
Additional controls are included in columns (3) to (6), such as region dummies, baseline log
annual wages and sales, industry and firm size dummies and the change in net exports and
ICT capital. Column (6) is the preferred specification that compares the outcomes of firms
with similar observable characteristics and indicates that the effect of automation adoption
at the sector level on cumulative value added is positive but statistically significant only in
the full sample. To give an idea of the economic magnitude of this estimate, comparing a
firm at the 25th percentile of the automation exposure to one at the 75th percentile, the latter
experiences 27.6% (= 3.942 × [7.24 − 0.24]) higher value added growth.
Table 3.8 shows results for different outcomes using the same specification as the one
reported in column (6) of Table 3.7. Firms in sectors more exposed to automation increase
employment by 4.3-4.9%, depending on the sample (column 1), and increase the wage bill13
(column 2). Average earnings – computed as the ratio between cumulative wage bill over
cumulative employment – do not increase. Column (4) reports results from Table 3.7 on
value added. While there is positive effect on value added, column (5) shows that firms’
productivity, measured as value added per worker does not increase. Sales (column 6)
increase by 5.1% and 6.1% in the restricted and full sample, respectively. Similarly to value
added, sales per worker do not increase (column 7) indicating that higher revenues go hand
in hand with increased employment.
Table C.6 in the Appendix reports estimates for additional outcomes. Column (1) shows
that even using balance sheet information on labour costs (rather than administrative data
on annual wages and employment) does not change the conclusion that labour costs tend to
increase in firms exposed to higher automation exposure. Columns (2) and (3) show that
firms more exposed to automation do not increase assets and debt levels (for the latter, there
is a marginally significant increase in the full sample). Profits decrease (column 4), although
the estimates are not statistically significant. There is no statistically significant effect on the
number of years with positive profits and on firm exit rate (columns 5 and 6).
Heterogeneity Figure 3.7 reports heterogeneous effects for blue- and white-collar workers.
The administrative data records average annual earnings and employment by broad occu-
pation. We therefore compute the occupation-specific wage bill as the product of earnings
and employment for each occupation. The figure shows that the increase in the wage bill
mainly stems from an increase for blue-collar workers (left panel), determined by an increase
13The wage bill is computed as the product of average annual wages with total firm size.
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Table 3.7 Robot exposure and firm cumulative value added, 1994-2012: OLS and 2SLS
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Restricted sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 6.480** 6.686** 6.646** 6.458*** 1.740 2.894
(2.664) (2.743) (2.705) (2.240) (1.689) (1.758)
Hansen-Sargan test 0.232 0.247 0.181 0.515 0.525
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 171.7 173.4 171.5 293.5 378.0
Observations 19,802 19,802 19,802 19,802 19,802 19,802
Panel B: Full sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 7.297*** 7.431*** 7.344*** 7.083*** 2.675 3.942**
(2.321) (2.401) (2.377) (1.967) (1.631) (1.666)
Hansen-Sargan test 0.228 0.241 0.195 0.559 0.425
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 161.1 162.9 161.0 283.6 365.0
Observations 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline sales and wages Yes Yes Yes
Industry and firm size dummies Yes Yes
△ Net exports and △ ICT Yes
Notes. The table reports estimates of ξ from equation (3.2). Column (1) reports OLS estimates. Columns (2) to (6)
report 2SLS estimates. Columns (1) and (2) include cohort dummies. Column (3) controls for firms’ region of
location (20 dummies). Column (4) includes log average sales and wages in 1994. Column (5) includes five firm
size dummies (11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more employees) and four dummies for broad manufacturing
sectors (food, beverages and tobacco; consumer goods, industrial goods and capital goods). Column (6) further
controls for the change in net exports form China and Eastern Europe over 1994-2012 and the change in ICT
capital over 1996-2012. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8 Robot exposure and firm outcomes, 1994-2012: OLS and 2SLS estimates















Panel A: Restricted sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 4.307** 3.745* -0.033 2.894 -0.037 5.066*** -0.009
(1.782) (1.938) (0.024) (1.758) (0.060) (1.788) (0.053)
Panel B: Full sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 4.899*** 4.589** -0.026 3.942** -0.031 6.157*** 0.005
(1.682) (1.786) (0.022) (1.666) (0.050) (1.705) (0.046)
Notes. The table reports estimates of ξ from equation (3.2). Outcomes are cumulated values over 1994-2012.
Columns (1) to (7) report the estimates for cumulative employment in percent of baseline employment in
1994, cumulative wage bill in percent of baseline wage bill in 1994, average earnings (computed as the ratio
of cumulative wage bill over cumulative employment), cumulative value added in percent of baseline value
added in 1994, value added per worker (computed as the ratio of value added over employment), cumulative
sales in percent of baseline sales in 1994, sales per worker (computed as the ratio of sales over employment). All
regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table 3.7. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36
two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
in employment (central panel). However, only white-collar workers experience earnings
increases (right panel), consistently with results from the worker-level analysis.
We further analyse how firms change their labour force composition, by investigating
how employment of low-, middle- and high-skilled workers changes in all firms and in
terciles of the value added per worker distribution in Table 3.9.14 Panel A shows results
for the full sample of workers for which we have information on workers’ skills, i.e. 22,537
firms (out of a total of 24,575 observations in the main sample). This sample restriction
does not affect the estimate on aggregate employment, which is remarkably similar to the
one reported in Table 3.8 (4.356 vs 4.307). When decomposing this effect by worker skills,
in columns (2) to (4) we find that it is especially employment of low- and middle-skilled
workers that is increasing. This results may be surprising but it is actually very similar to
the one found in the worker-level analysis, where the within-firm change in labour supply is
actually larger for less skilled workers. This result may also suggest that the productivity
effect of automation compensates the negative displacement effect in sectors that are most
14We compute the number of low-, middle- and high-skill individuals by combining worker-level data on
a sample of workers for each firm and administrative data on total employees for each firm. Specifically, we
compute the share of workers in terciles of AKM worker fixed effects employed at each firm and multiply these
shares by the total number of employees to get the number of employees in each skill group. We corroborate
this approach by using the same procedure to build estimates of the number of blue-collar and white-collar
employees, for which we have administrative counts, too. This procedure yields an across person-years average
number of blue-collar employees of 34.9 against a true value of 32.2 and an average number of white-collar
employees of 20.3 against a true value of 20.8.


























Wage bill Employment Earnings







Fig. 3.7 Robot exposure and firm-level outcomes for blue-collar and white-collar workers,
1994-2012: 2SLS estimates
Notes. The figure reports heterogeneous effects by occupation in the estimates of ξ from equation (3.2). Outcomes
are cumulated values over 1994-2012. Left panel reports the estimates for cumulative wage bill in percent of
baseline wage bill in 1994. Central panel reports the estimates for cumulative employment in percent of baseline
employment in 1994. Right panel reports the estimates for average earnings (computed as the ratio of cumulative
wage bill over cumulative employment). All regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table
3.7. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals from cluster-robust standard errors by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2
industries.
affected by automation. It must be interpreted, anyway, as a partial equilibrium effect. Panel
B decomposes these effects by firms’ productivity, as measured by terciles of value added
per worker in the baseline. Column (1) shows that the positive effect on employment is
almost entirely driven by highly productive firms (which are also more likely to be adopters,
as shown in Koch et al., 2021). Firms in the top tercile of productivity increase employment
by 12% relative to the baseline, i.e. by 85% (= 12.205 × [7.24 − 0.24]) if we compare firms at
the 25th and 75th percentile of automation exposure. When further decomposing the effect
for each tercile of firm’s productivity into terciles of workers’ skills, columns 2-4 of panel
B suggest that firms in the top tercile increase employment of all worker types, whereas
firms in the bottom and middle terciles reduce employment of high-skill workers (although
for the latter the effect is not statistically significant). This result may signal a reallocation
of high-skill workers to more productive firms, which however may not lead to increased
assortative matching in the labour market as more productive firms increase employment of
other worker types, too. Therefore, these results seem to suggest that highly productive firms
increase demand of highly skilled workers, probably displacing less skilled workers. But
the productivity effect compensates for this initial displacement as demand for all worker
types increases at more productive firms. It remains open the question of whether these
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Table 3.9 Robot exposure and firm employment by worker skills and firms’ productivity,
1994-2012: 2SLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Panel A: Full sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 4.356** 2.276* 2.103*** -0.397
(1.767) (1.215) (0.569) (0.945)
Panel B: By VA/Empl tercile
△ robots bottom tercile -2.128 1.797 -0.517 -3.111*
(3.229) (1.931) (1.267) (1.660)
△ robots middle tercile 2.640* 1.525 1.890*** -1.011
(1.467) (1.083) (0.726) (0.830)
△ robots top tercile 12.205*** 3.645*** 4.693*** 2.726**
(2.699) (1.047) (1.211) (1.339)
Observations 22,537 22,537 22,537 22,537
Notes. The table reports estimates of ξ from equation (3.2) in the sample of firms with non-missing information
about workers’ skills (see text for details). Outcomes are cumulated values over 1994-2012. Panel A reports
results for the full sample. Panel B decomposes the effect by terciles of firms’ value added per worker. Column (1)
reports the estimates for cumulative employment in percent of baseline employment in 1994, whereas columns
(2) to (4) report the estimates for cumulative employment of workers in the bottom, middle and top terciles of
worker skills. All regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table 3.7. Robust standard errors,
clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
reallocation effects increase assortative matching in the labour market, as there are two
competing forces of opposite sign: the reallocation of high-skill workers to more productive
firms (which increases sorting) and the increase in employment of low- and middle-skill
workers in more productive firms (which decreases sorting). The question is investigated in
the next section by taking a close look at the sector-level intricacies.
3.5 Sector-level Adjustment
In this section, we further analyse how the allocation of workers across firms changes by
investigating how the sector-level correlation of worker and firm types changes around
automation spikes in an event study framework.
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3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
The objective is to investigate what happens to the allocation of workers across firms in a
sector in the aftermath of automation adoption. To identify automation episodes, we follow
a strategy similar to the one used by Bessen et al. (2019) and identify automation spikes,
i.e. positive changes in the number of robots per worker in a sector in a given year that are
at least 3 times larger than the average change in other sectors in the same year. We use
the year in which such automation spike happens for a sector as the event year. Figure 3.8
provides a visual inspection of the automation spike relative to event time periods (i.e. the
difference between calendar and event years, which correspond to the years when the spikes
happen). Before the automation spike, sectors have similar changes in robot per worker. In
the event year, there is indeed a spike which then fades out after approximately three years.
We exploit variation in treatment timing – where treatment is defined as the period after the
automation spike – and run an event study analysis to understand how workers allocation
across firms is affected by automation spikes. Specifically, we compute for each sector-year
the correlation between worker fixed effects and log value added per worker or log sales per
worker, which we use as proxies of the degree of assortative matching in a given sector. We
do not use other standard measures of sorting, such as the correlation between AKM worker
and firm fixed effects for two reasons: first, as highlighted by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011),
firm fixed effects represent poor proxies of true firm types; second, as pointed by Andrews
et al. (2008); Bonhomme et al. (2019) the correlation between worker and firm effects is likely
to provide a downwardly biased estimate of the true correlation in the presence of limited
mobility bias, which is particularly worrisome in this case as we only observe a sample of
workers for each firm. Hence, we follow Bombardini et al. (2019) and use administrative
data to measure firm types rather than AKM fixed effects.
The estimation of the dynamic effects requires an event-study methodology. The stagger-
ing design and the absence of a never treated group (as all sectors at some point experience
the automation spike in the sample) raises concerns in the presence of treatment effect het-
erogeneity. In particular, as highlighted by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020); de Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfoeuille (2020); Goodman-Bacon (2018); Sun and Abraham (2020),15 treatment
effects can be severely biased if early-treated units are used as control groups for later-treated
units. To overcome this issue, we adopt a stacked dynamic differences-in-differences ap-
proach (Cengiz et al., 2019; Deshpande and Li, 2019; Vannutelli, 2020), where only yet-to-be
treated units are used as controls for already treated units. In other words, the cohort of
sectors treated in year t, uses sectors treated from t + 1 onwards as control groups, the cohort
of sectors treated in year t + 1 uses sectors treated from t + 2 onwards as control group,
and so on and so forth until the last treated cohort which acts as control group only (as it
would not have a valid yet-to-be treated unit that could act as control). This stacked design
15See Baker et al. (2021) for a review of the methods developed in the literature in recent times.
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Fig. 3.8 Change in the number of robots by event time
Notes. The figure reports the average year on year change in the number of robots per worker across sectors by
time relative to the automation spike, i.e. the year in which a sector increases the number of robots per worker
by three times more than the average change of other sectors.
allows units (sectors) to appear more than once in the data and therefore allows for the
inclusion of unit fixed effects on top of a treatment dummy (as there is variation in treatment
within units). The stacked sample consists of 1,011 observations. We therefore estimate the
following regression model:
Yjt = αj + δt + β0Treatj + ∑
k ̸=−1
βkTreatj × 1(t − E = k)
+ ∑
k ̸=−1




j × 1(t − E = k) + ι f (sjt) + ε jt
(3.3)
where Yjt is the correlation between worker fixed effects and firm type (measured with log
value added per worker or log sales per worker). αj and δt are sector and year fixed effects.
1(t − E = k) are event time dummies (where E is the event year and k are relative time
indicators). Treatj is a dummy equal to one for sectors after the automation spike. X
pre
j are
covariates measured in the year prior to the automation spike, namely average log sales per
worker, average log earnings, the share of blue-collar workers, the share of female workers,
the share of workers below age 40 and the share of firms with more than 100 employees.
f (sjt) is a quadratic polynomial in the number of sampled workers in each sector from the
original worker-level data. ε jt is an error term.
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We also report results from a static specification, where event time dummies are replaced
with one indicator for the post-treatment period:
Yjt = αj + δt + β0Treatj + βDDTreatj × Postt
+ ∑
k ̸=−1
γk × 1(t − E = k) + ηX
pre
j × Postt + ι f (sjt) + ε jt
(3.4)
where the only difference with equation (3.3) is Postt which is a dummy taking value one in
years after the automation spike.
Table 3.10 reports descriptive statistics of the sector-level data. Panel A reports descrip-
tives about the outcomes. The average correlation between worker effects and log value
added per worker is 0.36, whereas the correlation with log sales per worker is 0.32. These
values are considerably larger than the correlation between AKM worker and firm effects
which is around 0.08 (or 0.09 when grouping the fixed effects into deciles). The difference in
the measure of sorting when using firm effects or value added and sales likely signals that
AKM firm effects are poor proxies for true firm types, which likely results in a downward
bias in their correlation with worker effects. For this reason we report results only for the
correlation of worker effects with firm’s balance sheet variables, which are likely to provide
better measures of the underlying firm type (as suggested, for example, in Bombardini et al.,
2019). These outcomes must therefore used with caution (Bombardini et al., 2019; Eeckhout
and Kircher, 2011). Panel B reports descriptives about control variables. The majority of
workers are blue-collar, male and older than 40 years old. The majority of firms have more
than 100 employees. The bottom part of the table reports sample size, which is 361 in the
original sample (19 sectors over the period 1994-2012) and 1,011 in the stacked sample, where
sectors can appear more than once (as treated units or as yet to be treated units, which act as
controls).
3.5.2 Results
Figure 3.9 reports the estimates of equation (3.3) with and without the inclusion of additional
control variables. Each figure also reports the static difference-in-differences estimate from
equation (3.4) for both specifications with and without controls. Panel A reports the results
for the correlation between worker fixed effects and log value added per worker. Before the
automation spike the estimates are not significantly different from zero. After the automation
spike, the correlation decreases and such decrease is statistically significant up to the fourth
year after the spike in the specification without controls and up to the second year after
the spike in the specification with controls. A similar conclusion is reached by looking at
panel B, that reports the correlation of worker effects with log sales per worker: in this case,
the estimates are statistically significant for a shorter period of time, but the trajectory of
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Correlation worker effects and log value added per worker 0.356 (0.140)
Correlation worker effects and log sales per worker 0.320 (0.139)
Correlation worker and firm effects 0.083 (0.173)
Correlation worker and firm effect deciles 0.088 (0.147)
Panel B: Control variables
Log value added per worker 10.945 (0.427)
Log sales per worker 12.217 (0.536)
Log earnings 10.163 (0.225)
Share blue-collar 0.610 (0.158)
Share female 0.224 (0.102)
Share younger than 40 years old 0.472 (0.085)
Share firms w/ > 100 empl. 0.764 (0.116)
Original sample size 361
Stacked sample size 1,011
Notes. The table report means and standard deviations of the sector-level sample. Panel A reports the measures
of labour market sorting, i.e. the correlation between worker effects and firm types. Panel B reports summary
statistics about control variables. The bottom part of the table shows sample sizes of the original and stacked
sample, the latter being used in the estimation.
the coefficients is comparable to that shown in Panel A. The static difference-in-differences
estimates suggest a negative effect of -6.6 to -4.8 log points in panel A and of -3.8 to -3.7 log
points in panel A, i.e. between −18.5% and −13.5% and between −11.9% and −11.6% of the
average correlations across sectors, respectively. This result resolves the ambiguity of the
firm-level analysis: there is a decrease in assortative matching in the immediate aftermath of
a surge in automation exposure, confirming that firms adjust their workforce by increasing
demand of all worker types (Table 3.9). This can be a consequence of a number of different
mechanisms: frictions in the labour market that impede timely reallocation of workers across
firms, employment protection legislation that protects low-skill workers’ employment in
more productive adopting firms or the prevalence of a productivity effect that compensates
the displacement effect induced by automation. Figure C.1 in the appendix replicates the
event study using the methodology proposed by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020)
and finds very similar results to those reported in the main text, reassuring on the validity of
the stacked design.
Overall, these results suggest that there is no increase in assortativeness in the labour
market in response to automation spikes. This result is consistent with the firm-level analysis
which suggests the presence of a re-allocation effect of high-skill workers from low- to high-
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DiD coef. w/o controls:
-6.06 (1.86)
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(A) Correlation worker effect and value added
DiD coef. w/o controls:
-3.66 (2.07)
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(B) Correlation worker effect and sales
Fig. 3.9 Event study of the effect of automation spike on assortative matching in the labour
market
Notes. The figure reports the estimates of the dynamic effects βk from equation (3.3) and the static difference-
in-differences coefficient βDD from equation (3.4). The estimates are reported for two specifications: without
controls – which only includes year fixed effects and a quadratic polynomial in the number of sampled workers
in each sector from the original worker-level data as additional covariates – and with controls – which includes
the following control variables, measured in the year prior to the automation spike: average log sales per
worker, average log earnings, the share of blue-collar workers, the share of female workers, the share of workers
below age 40 and the share of firms with more than 100 employees. The shaded area and dashed lines are
95% confidence intervals from cluster-robust standard errors by 19 sectors (aggregated as in Table C.1 in the
appendix).
productivity firms. Nevertheless, the latter group of firms also increases employment of low-
and middle-skill workers.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of automation on the labour mar-
ket, by investigating the consequences of automation on workers, firms and the allocation of
workers across firms at the sector-level. The main conclusion is that the effects of automation
are on aggregate null or even positive on workers’ employment and earnings prospects
and on firms’ productivity. At the sector level, there is evidence that labour market sorting
decreases after automation spikes in the short-run. However, there is large variation in the
effects of automation across different workers and firms. Workers with lower skill levels, in
blue-collar occupations and in firms with lower productivity levels experience worse labour
market outcomes in terms of cumulative earnings, stemming from either a lower number of
days worked or lower wages. Moreover, these groups of workers are more likely to spend ad-
ditional time in unemployment, in short-time work compensation schemes and in sick leave.
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At the firm-level, we find that firms in sectors with higher automation exposure increase
employment, labour costs, revenues and value added, but do not significantly increase value
added and sales per worker. The effects are extremely heterogeneous according to firm’s
productive levels as measured by firm’s value added per worker. Firms in the first tercile of
the distribution of value added per worker decrease employment and significantly so for
high-skill workers, while firms in the middle and especially in the top of the value added
distribution increase employment. Moreover, the latter group of firms increases employment
of all worker skills. To further analyse how the allocation of workers across firms is affected
by automation, we use sector-level data on the correlation between worker fixed effects and
log value added or sales per worker to investigate how sudden increases in automation
adoption in a sector affect sorting. We find that automation, coherently with the results of
the firm-level analysis, decreases labour market sorting in the short-run.
Overall, these analyses provide evidence on the impact of automation in a country with
a strong manufacturing sector (second largest manufacturing in Europe, after Germany)
and with a relatively rigid labour market with high employment protection legislation.
The evidence on the impact of automation is so far mixed, with research finding large
negative results, especially in the US context, and others finding null to moderately positive
results, especially in Europe. This paper adds to the literature a set of findings that show
how automation has on aggregate positive effects on both employment and earnings of
workers in manufacturing. However, when exploring the effects for different worker or firm
types, there is a clear distinction between “winners” and “losers”, with workers – especially
those employed in less skill-intensive occupations – facing bigger losses from technology
adoption. More research in the future should also focus on sectors beyond manufacturing
and on firm-level decisions on whether to introduce automation, rather than relying on less
granular sector-level information. The increased availability of administrative data and on
combinations of administrative and survey information will likely provide a fertile soil on
which to build future answers to these research questions.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Modelling Framework
The model follows Card et al. (2016). We assume that log earnings of workers can be written
as:
wit = ait + γgSijt, (A.1)
where ait is an outside option for worker i at time t, Sijt is the match surplus between worker
i and firm j at time t and γg is the share of this surplus paid to worker i of gender g = M, F.1
We assume that Sijt can be written as follows:
Sijt = Sj + ϕjt + mij, (A.2)
i.e. as the sum of average surplus Sj for all employees at firm j (due to, say, market power
or brand recognition), time-varying factors ϕjt that raise or lower average surplus for all
employees, and a match specific component mij.
We also assume that the outside option ait can be written as:
ait = θi + X′itβ
g + uit, (A.3)
where θi is individual ability (and, in our specific case, returns to education as well), X′it are
time-varying observable characteristics and uit is a transitory component.
Replacing (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.1), we get:





g + ε it (A.4)
1We use j as a shorthand for J(i, t), i.e. the firm that employs worker i at time t.






ε it = γ
g (ϕjt + mij)+ uit (A.6)
Equation (A.4) is consistent with the two-way fixed effects model á la Abowd et al. (1999)
presented in equation (1.1) in the main text.
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A.2 Non Parametric Tests of Conditional Random Mobility
One important feature of Abowd et al. (1999) two-way fixed effects model is the assumption
of conditional random mobility. This is a requirement for the validity of the OLS estimation of
model (1.1), which provides consistent estimates if and only if:
E(Dε) = E(Fε) = E(Xε) = 0
where D is a (N∗ × N) matrix of dummies for the N individuals in the sample (N∗ is the
total number of person-year observations), F is a (N∗ × J) matrix of dummies for the J firms
constituting the sample, X is the (N∗ × K) matrix of regressors. ε is the matrix of errors,
where observations are stacked across individuals and time.
We focus here on the restriction imposed on the matrix of firms’ dummies. Following
Card et al. (2013), there are three main channels through which conditional random mobility
may be violated. First, workers employed at firms that are experiencing negative shocks
may decide to move to firms that are experiencing positive shocks: this generates correlation
between ϕjt and the probability that worker i is employed at firm j at time t in equation
(A.6). If this is the case, workers would experience a drop in earnings before the move, and
a sudden rise in pay after. We show in Figure A.1 that this is not the case. Specifically, we
build a sample of moves and compute mean weekly earnings associated with changes from
the first and the last quartile of firm effects.2 We see that for both women and men, shown in
panels A and B, respectively, there are no changes in the evolution of mean earnings before
or after the move.
A second threat to identification comes from the presence of match effects, if workers
decide to move because they think that joining a new firm would deliver a better match
between their personal characteristics and the firm characteristics compared to the firm of
origin. This violation implies that the match component mij in equation (A.6) is correlated
with the probability that worker i is employed at firm j at time t. In the presence of correlation,
movers would experience in any case a wage gain, irrespective of whether they move from
a high-wage to a low-wage firm, or the opposite. On the other hand, if match effects are
unimportant in determining mobility, then the earnings gain associated with moves from
low- to high-earnings firms should be roughly comparable in magnitude to the earnings loss
for moves in the opposite direction. This symmetry in gains and losses with each opposite
move is better assessed examining the magnitudes of such changes over the entire 4 year
2We identify low-wage and high-wage firms on the basis of the quartiles of the estimated firm effects. We
then assign each job mover to the corresponding quartile of the origin and destination firm. In this way we
identify sixteen cells of movers, each one corresponding to the pair origin-destination quartile (4 × 4 cells).
Within each cell, we compute the mean log real weekly earnings of movers. We just retain movers that are
continuously observed in the two years prior to the move and in the two years after, similarly to what we do in
section 1.5. Means are computed within each year. Data on the mean earnings for all the moves are reported in
Table A.6.
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(B) Male sample
period under analysis and for all possible moves, looking at the difference in earnings from
the first period considered (2 years prior to the move) to the last period (one year after).
This boils down to comparing the overall earnings change (earnings one year after minus
earnings two years before) for opposite moves.3 The comparisons are displayed, for the
female and male sample, respectively, in panels A and B of Figure A.2, where we plot the
adjusted earnings changes4 for downward movers against the adjusted earnings changes for
upward movers. In both panels opposite moves display the expected degree of symmetry,
that is, they are in all cases of opposite sign. Moreover, all scatter points cluster very close
to the 45 degrees line, meaning that each symmetric move, both upward and downward,
generates an earnings change of a similar magnitude. Therefore, we deem symmetry a
reasonable assumption.
As an additional check, panels A and B of Figure A.3 report the earnings evolution for
the movers within the same quartile in the origin and destination firms. If it is true that there
are no match effects in mobility, then these movements should be characterised by almost
no earnings gains. This is indeed the case: both panels show that the earnings evolution
is basically flat for within-quartile movements. This is clearly inconsistent with specific
worker-firm match gains related to job changes.
A last threat to the identification of firm effects comes from individual transitory shocks,
that generate correlation between the transitory component uit in equation (A.6) and the
probability that worker i is employed at firm j at time t. If workers are experiencing an
increase in their earnings before the move because of some productivity premium associated
to a transitory change in their characteristics or to some of their skills showing up after an
accumulation period, then they might move to other firms that reward these characteristics
3Opposite moves are those from quartile k to quartile j, and the other way around.
4Adjusted earnings changes equal raw earnings changes minus the earnings change for within-quartile
movers: that is, we subtract the change for movers from quartile q to quartile q from the raw change for movers
from quartile q to quartile q′, with q ̸= q′.
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(B) Male sample
more, with a larger gain from the move compared to that obtained in the origin firm. On the
other hand, if the transitory shock is negative, workers might experience an earnings decline
in their origin firm and therefore move to firms that would limit such decline, because better
suited to reward their characteristics. We can refer again to Figure A.1, where, if mobility is
driven by individuals recognising their higher (lower) productivity we should see unusual
earnings growth before the move for people moving towards the top and unusual earnings
decrease for people moving in the opposite direction. Nothing like that happens in the data.
Both pictures show no trend before the movements.
As a final check, we follow again Card et al. (2013) and examine residuals from model
(1.1) for different groups of individual effects in different groups of firm effects. Namely,
we define deciles of both person and firm effects and compute the mean estimated AKM
residuals in each of the 100 cells defined by the combination of worker and firm deciles. If
our model is incorrectly specified, because, for instance, it is missing some important match
component between specific individuals and firms, we would expect to find high mean
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residuals in those cells that are most threatened by misspecification. Figure A.4 plots the
mean residuals for each of the person-firm cells for females and males in panels A and B,
respectively. For both samples the deviations are really small in magnitude and exceed 1 log
point only in one case (the cell defined by the first decile of both person and firm effects).
Overall, we find no evidence against the conditional random mobility assumption in both
the male and female samples.
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A.3 Alternative Normalisation of Firm Effects
The magnitude of the bargaining channel depends on the specific constant chosen to nor-
malise male and female firm effects. In the main text, we follow Card et al. (2016) and set to
zero the average firm effect in the food and accommodation sector.
We adopt here a different normalisation approach and check that our results do not
change. Specifically, we assume that firm effects represent a rent-sharing component – that
is, the fraction of firm’s surplus shared with employees – embedded in the determination
of earnings (as in equation 1.2). Thus, we merge INPS data with balance sheet information
from AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk and visually inspect the relationship between firm effects and
firm’s average surplus. We measure the latter with average log value added per worker over
the longest period available for each firm.5 Figure A.5 plots the relationship between male
and female firm effects against average log value added per worker.6 The relationship is
clearly positive and, as value added increases, female firm effects increase less than male
firm effects. Moreover, the relationship is rather flat in the first 10 percentiles of value added
and only after this threshold it starts to be increasing.7 Hence, we choose to normalise firm
effects with respect to the average firm effect of firms in the first decile of the distribution of
log value added per worker.
We decompose firm effects as in equations (1.4) and (1.5). Results are reported in Table A.1.
With this alternative normalisation, the firm contribution to the gender pay gap increases.
The difference in firm effects accounts for 38 per cent of the gap in weekly earnings, a 7.3
percentage points rise with respect to our preferred normalisation in the main text. Though
sorting still dominates, the increase in bargaining explains the larger impact of firm effects,8
which accounts for as much as 17 per cent of the gender pay gap. Besides this, the main
conclusions do not change. This alternative normalisation shows that our estimate of the
bargaining channel in the main text can be interpreted as a lower bound. However, we
prefer the normalisation with respect to the food and accommodation sector because we
have information on sectors for all firms in our sample, whereas we lose around 20 per
cent of person-year observations in the normalisation based on log value added per worker.
Since the main conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged, we choose to keep as many
observations as possible in the normalisation procedure.
5The coverage of balance sheet data in AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk is limited in the 1990s and early 2000s. The use
of average value added allows us to impute average quantities to missing values. For some firms we have no
information on value added. Overall, out of the 183,062,088 person-year observations in the dual connected
sample, we have missing balance-sheet information for 39,986,670 person-year observations.
6We arbitrarily normalise firm effects with respect to the largest firm in the dual connected sample in terms
of number of employees in a year. To improve readability, we average firm effects into percentile bins of log
value added per worker.
7The threshold equals approximately a log value added per worker of 3.
8Estimates of sorting are unaffected by the specific normalisation chosen.
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Log value added per worker
Male firm effects
Female firm effects
Table A.1 Gender pay gap, firm effects, sorting and bargaining with alternative normalisation
(1) (2)
Log points Percent of the gender pay
gap
Gender pay gap 0.213
Male firm effect across males 0.246
Female firm effect across females 0.166
Firm effects gap 0.081 38.0%
Decomposition:
Sorting
Using male coefficients 0.049 22.8%
Using female coefficients 0.044 20.6%
Bargaining
Using male distribution 0.037 17.4%
Using female distribution 0.032 15.2%
Observations 183,062,102
Notes. The Table reports results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of equations (1.4) and (1.5). Firm effects
are normalised with respect to the average firm effects in the group of firms in the first decile of the distribution
of average log value added per worker. Column (1) shows results for all workers. Column (2) shows the ratio
between the quantities reported in column (1) and the gender pay gap.
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A.4 Decomposition by occupations and sectors
Occupations Table A.2 reports decompositions of the gender pay gap and firm effects gap
for subsamples defined by different occupations. The gender pay gap is small for apprentices
(4.1 log points) – for whom salaries are usually low, irrespective of gender – and for middle
managers (12.3 log points), whereas it is higher for blue-collar workers (22.7), white-collar
workers (27.1) and executives (23.4). 39.4 per cent of the gender pay gap for blue-collar
workers (column 2) can be explained by firm components, mainly due to sorting of women
into low-pay firms (roughly 31 per cent of the gender pay gap). A similar result holds for
white-collar workers (column 3): the gap in firm effects accounts for 26 per cent of the gender
gap in earnings, mainly due to sorting (18-21 per cent) rather than bargaining (5-8 per cent).
Since the large majority of workers in our data is either classified as blue- or white-collar
(roughly 91 per cent of men and 95 per cent of women), it comes as no surprise that, on
average in the entire sample, we find that sorting is the main factor driving firm-related
gender inequality (see Table 1.4). For apprentices and middle managers (columns 1 and
4), 49 per cent and 19.5 per cent of the gender pay gap, respectively, can be explained by
differences in pay premia. This difference is mainly due to a lack of bargaining power of
women compared to men: this channel accounts for at least 33 per cent of the gender pay gap
for apprentices and at least 22 per cent for middle managers. Interestingly, sorting plays a
negative role for the latter category of workers, meaning that men in this specific occupation
are employed at low-pay firms compared to women. As to executives (column 5), the gap in
firm effects accounts for almost a quarter of the gender pay gap. The relative importance of
sorting and bargaining depends on the type of decomposition chosen.
Sectors We investigate the role of sectors in Figure A.6, which shows the sectorial decompo-
sition of the gender pay gap and the gap in firm effects along with the estimated bargaining
and sorting effects. We recall that sectors are coded according to Ateco 2007 sectoral codes,
which is the Italian version of the sectoral codes defined by the European Union (Nace Rev.
2).9 Overall, the gender gap in earnings is the highest in ICT and finance. This is in line with
evidence for other countries (Denk, 2015). Firm effects increase the gender pay gap in all
sectors, except construction, accommodation and food, and in the residual category “other
services”. Sorting is the main driver behind the firm contribution to the gender pay gap in
manufacturing, construction, science, administration and health.10 In finance and ICT, on
the contrary, differences in bargaining power explain a larger share of the firm effects gap
relative to sorting.
9We exclude sectors that comprise less than 1 per cent of the total person-year observations.
10In particular, it is likely that the results on manufacturing and trade sectors are behind the dominance of
sorting in the overall dataset, since they employ more than 50 per cent of all person-year observations in the
data.
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Table A.2 Decomposition by occupation









Gender pay gap 0.041 0.227 0.271 0.123 0.234
Male firm effects across males 0.035 0.074 0.167 0.275 0.222
Female firm effects across females 0.014 -0.015 0.097 0.251 0.165
Firm effects gap 0.020 0.089 0.070 0.024 0.058
% of gender pay gap 49.0% 39.4% 25.9% 19.5% 24.6%
Decomposition:
Sorting
Using male coefficients 0.007 0.071 0.057 -0.004 0.047
% of gender pay gap 16.6% 31.1% 20.9% -3.1% 20.3%
Using female coefficients 0.003 0.070 0.049 -0.009 0.026
% of gender pay gap 7.9% 30.7% 18.2% -7.2% 11.2%
Bargaining
Using male distribution 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.033 0.031
% of gender pay gap 41.1% 8.7% 7.7% 26.7% 13.5%
Using female distribution 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.028 0.010
% of gender pay gap 32.5% 8.3% 5.0% 22.6% 4.3%
Observations 4.2 100.3 69.7 6.5 2.4
Notes. The Table reports results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of equations (1.4) and (1.5). Firm effects
are normalised with respect to the average gender-specific firm effects in the food and accommodation sector.
Columns (1) to (5) report results for subsamples defined by occupation categories: apprentice, blue-collar,
white-collar, middle manager and executive. The number of observations is expressed in millions.
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Fig. A.6 Decomposition by sector
Notes. The Figure reports the gender pay gap, the firm effects gap, sorting and bargaining, by sector.
Sectors are defined according to Nace Rev. 2 sectoral codes and ordered according to the gap in firm
effects (highest to smallest). We exclude sectors that employ less than 1 per cent of the total person-
year observations. The sectors reported in the figure represent 95 per cent of the total person-year
observations between 1995 and 2015. Sorting and bargaining are average values, as in equation (1.6).
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Notes. The Figure plots the coefficients on the male dummy in a quantile regression in four different specifications:
without controls (“Raw”); controlling for observable characteristics of workers, i.e. cubic polynomials in age,
experience and tenure, a dummy for full-time contract, the number of weeks worked, occupation and province
of work fixed effects (“Including controls”); controlling for observable characteristics and, additionally, for sector
fixed effects (“Including sector effects”); controlling for observable characteristics and, additionally, for firm
fixed effects (“Including firm effects”). Fixed effect quantile regressions are estimated in two steps, following
Canay (2011). The first step consists in running an OLS regression of weekly earnings on observables and fixed
effects. The second step consists in running a canonical conditional quantile regression, where the dependent
variable is the residual of earnings from fixed effects computed in the first step.
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Notes. The Figure plots sorting (panels A and B) and bargaining (panels C and D) as a percentage of the gender
pay gap, averaged by age and cohort, from firm effects estimated over the periods 1995-2000 and 2010-2015. The
horizontal axis reports age by cohort cells, defined as the mean age for each cohort across the period of time
considered. Sorting and bargaining are average values, as in equation (1.6).
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Notes. The Figure plots the mobility rate of men and women in the full (panel A) and restricted (panel B) sample
of moves. The mobility rate is defined as the share of workers changing employer between two consecutive years.
The full sample considers all moves. The restricted sample is used in section 1.5 and retains only moves such
that the worker stays in the destination firm for at least two years after the move. All differences are statistically
significant at 1 per cent level.
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Notes. The Figure plots the probabilities for men and women of moving to a firm in a higher firm effect quartile
for different types of moves and age groups, conditional on the controls included in equation (1.9). Vertical lines
are 95 per cent confidence intervals.
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Notes. The Figure plots average male (left panel) and female (right panel) firm effects across Italian provinces.
Darker colours indicate higher firm effects. Both graphs are drawn according to the same scale of firm effects.
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Fig. A.12 Gender mobility gap within province
Negative and significant
Negative and not significant
Positive and not significant
Positive and significant
Notes. The Figure plots with different colours the marginal effect of the female dummy in a probit regression as
in equation (1.9), estimated for each Italian province. Red (blue) areas denote provinces where the coefficient on
the female dummy is negative (positive). Dark (light) areas indicate significant (not significant) coefficients at 95
per cent confidence level.
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Notes. The Figure plots female against male firm effects averaged across percentile bins of log value added per
worker. The slope of the linear fit is 0.85.
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Table A.3 Gender pay gap, firm effects, sorting and bargaining over time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
Gender pay gap 0.257 0.234 0.206 0.175
Male firm effects across males 0.087 0.088 0.099 0.100
Female firm effects across females 0.035 0.033 0.047 0.046
Firm effects gap 0.052 0.055 0.053 0.053
% of gender pay gap 20.3% 23.4% 25.6% 30.4%
Decomposition:
Sorting
Using male coefficients 0.049 0.045 0.038 0.036
% of gender pay gap 19.2% 19.3% 18.6% 20.4%
Using female coefficients 0.051 0.043 0.032 0.024
% of gender pay gap 19.8% 18.4% 15.5% 13.7%
Bargaining
Using male distribution 0.001 0.012 0.021 0.029
% of gender pay gap 0.5% 5.0% 10.0% 16.7%
Using female distribution 0.003 0.010 0.014 0.018
% of gender pay gap 1.1% 4.2% 7.0% 10.0%
Notes. The Table reports results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of equations (1.4) and (1.5) in four
overlapping time intervals, indicated in the column headers. Firm effects are estimated separately in each time
interval and normalised with respect to the average firm effects in the food and accommodation sector in each
period.
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Table A.4 Probit model for job moves to a firm in same or higher fixed effect quartile
(1) (2) (3)
All Firm Individual
Female -0.018*** -0.031*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change province -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.029***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Change occupation -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Change to full-time -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.025**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.013)
Observations 5,216,076 2,259,559 2,956,517
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Probability 0.809 0.839 0.787
Notes. The Table reports average marginal effects from probit regressions where the dependent variable is the
probability of moving to a firm in the same or higher firm effect quartile. Column (1) shows results for all moves
in the restricted sample defined in the main text. Column (2) shows results for moves happening because of firm
closure. Column (3) shows results for moves not determined by firm closure. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the firm level, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.5 Balance of covariates, before and after matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Control Control Treated Difference P-value Difference P-value
Open-ended contract 0.902 0.939 0.934 0.032 0.000 -0.005 0.614
Part-time 0.094 0.068 0.064 -0.030 0.000 -0.004 0.695
Part-time female 0.212 0.154 0.143 -0.069 0.000 -0.011 0.445
Female hiring rate 0.082 0.068 0.078 -0.004 0.641 0.010 0.442
Age group 35-54 0.645 0.669 0.657 0.011 0.239 -0.012 0.360
Age group 55+ 0.102 0.094 0.100 -0.002 0.797 0.006 0.453
Log weekly earnings 6.307 6.588 6.637 0.329 0.000 0.049 0.253
Female log weekly earnings 6.227 6.450 6.473 0.246 0.000 0.023 0.547
Blue-collar 0.444 0.251 0.208 -0.236 0.000 -0.042 0.173
White-collar 0.471 0.532 0.537 0.066 0.000 0.005 0.832
Executives 0.023 0.084 0.103 0.080 0.000 0.018 0.348
Female executives 0.010 0.041 0.050 0.040 0.001 0.009 0.608
Middle managers 0.037 0.118 0.136 0.099 0.000 0.018 0.214
Log value added per worker 5.685 6.438 6.641 0.957 0.000 0.203 0.133
Log sales per worker 7.072 7.564 7.736 0.664 0.000 0.172 0.103
Log firm size 3.617 5.428 5.637 2.020 0.000 0.209 0.351
Industry 0.481 0.476 0.464 -0.017 0.669 -0.012 0.834
Construction 0.047 0.024 0.048 0.001 0.951 0.024 0.216
Trade, transports, accom. 0.276 0.145 0.108 -0.167 0.000 -0.036 0.330
Information & comm. 0.032 0.084 0.090 0.058 0.010 0.006 0.847
Finance & insurance 0.032 0.175 0.139 0.106 0.000 -0.036 0.390
Real estate 0.023 0.006 0.018 -0.005 0.613 0.012 0.249
Prof. and admin. services 0.072 0.078 0.090 0.018 0.421 0.012 0.695
Arts, entertainment & other 0.017 0.012 0.030 0.013 0.323 0.018 0.209
North 0.689 0.765 0.711 0.022 0.531 -0.054 0.298
Centre 0.182 0.169 0.229 0.047 0.154 0.060 0.197
South 0.153 0.072 0.084 -0.069 0.002 0.012 0.716
N. firms 16,040 154 166
Notes. The Table reports the means of covariates in control and treated groups before and after matching.
Column (1) to (3) report means for the unmatched control group, the matched control group and the treated
group, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report the difference in means and the relative p-value between control
and treated group in the unmatched sample. Columns (6) and (7) report the same quantities for the matched
sample. P-values are obtained from univariate regressions of each covariate on the treatment indicator.
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Table A.6 Mean log earnings and frequencies of movers across firm effect quartiles
Mean Log Real Weekly Earnings 4 Year Change
Moves Frequency -2 -1 0 +1 Raw Adjusted
Panel A: Females
1 to 1 292,608 5.670 5.701 5.697 5.712 0.042 0.000
1 to 2 128,899 5.728 5.763 5.865 5.891 0.164 0.121
1 to 3 60,332 5.714 5.747 5.959 5.995 0.280 0.238
1 to 4 32,348 5.722 5.767 6.098 6.148 0.425 0.383
2 to 1 130,627 5.833 5.871 5.748 5.760 -0.074 -0.108
2 to 2 233,076 5.890 5.919 5.908 5.925 0.035 0.000
2 to 3 140,290 5.942 5.975 6.011 6.038 0.096 0.062
2 to 4 65,269 6.005 6.051 6.162 6.206 0.201 0.167
3 to 1 56,456 5.926 5.979 5.742 5.756 -0.169 -0.212
3 to 2 138,182 5.972 6.010 5.937 5.950 -0.022 -0.065
3 to 3 250,809 6.037 6.064 6.062 6.080 0.043 0.000
3 to 4 153,209 6.138 6.176 6.224 6.257 0.118 0.075
4 to 1 24,302 6.049 6.118 5.737 5.743 -0.306 -0.371
4 to 2 48,828 6.084 6.140 5.968 5.984 -0.100 -0.164
4 to 3 115,656 6.139 6.181 6.117 6.134 -0.004 -0.069
4 to 4 418,917 6.417 6.438 6.459 6.481 0.065 0.000
Panel B: Males
1 to 1 478,503 5.792 5.819 5.805 5.828 0.036 0.000
1 to 2 219,074 5.882 5.911 6.017 6.051 0.169 0.133
1 to 3 114,802 5.888 5.920 6.130 6.171 0.283 0.247
1 to 4 66,192 5.910 5.950 6.276 6.335 0.425 0.389
2 to 1 190,543 5.991 6.022 5.880 5.905 -0.086 -0.130
2 to 2 384,889 6.072 6.100 6.092 6.116 0.044 0.000
2 to 3 291,559 6.161 6.183 6.230 6.257 0.097 0.053
2 to 4 138,133 6.207 6.252 6.361 6.414 0.207 0.163
3 to 1 85,678 6.095 6.127 5.892 5.914 -0.181 -0.240
3 to 2 219,818 6.182 6.207 6.150 6.170 -0.012 -0.070
3 to 3 455,806 6.271 6.291 6.310 6.330 0.059 0.000
3 to 4 306,877 6.416 6.441 6.499 6.535 0.119 0.060
4 to 1 36,610 6.225 6.265 5.901 5.922 -0.303 -0.376
4 to 2 74,026 6.291 6.322 6.182 6.207 -0.084 -0.156
4 to 3 175,613 6.392 6.422 6.389 6.413 0.021 -0.052
4 to 4 802,088 6.629 6.645 6.676 6.702 0.073 0.000
Notes. The Table reports the frequency of female (panel A) and male (panel B) workers’ moves between firm
effect quartiles and the mean weekly earnings of the movers during the period between two years prior to the
move and one year after. The last two columns report the overall change in earnings between the last and first
period. The column labelled Raw is the simple difference between period “+1” and period “-2”. The column
labelled Adjusted subtracts the change for movers from quartile q to quartile q from the raw change for movers
from quartile q to quartile q′, with q ̸= q′.
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B.1 Theoretical prediction by a principal-agent model
We motivate our empirical analysis by developing a simple two-period principal-agent
model, based on Cornelissen et al. (2017). Peer effects affect the worker’s future productivity
and future wages through knowledge spillover or learning.
Basic Model
There are two periods in the model. In each period, a firm hires N workers. In the theoretical
model, we do not consider the endogenous sorting of workers into firms, which our empirical
analysis takes into account. Moreover, we assume that the same workers stay in the firm for
both periods. Each worker i chooses their efforts to produce output and the firm can only
observe the outputs to reward the worker with a wage contract. To simplify the model, we
follow the literature and use a linear wage contract, which the firm chooses.
Worker’s problem
Each worker is endowed with ability a, which is invariant over time.
Production function. The production function in each period is as follows.
q1 = a + e1 + L1(e1, ā−i) + ε1, (B.1)
q2 = a + e2 + L2(e1, ā−i) + δL1(e1, ā−i) + ε2, (B.2)
where qt, t = {1,2}, is the output observed to the firm, et is the effort and εt is a random
productivity shock with zero mean. Both et and εt are unobserved to the firm. During each
period, a worker could also learn from coworkers. Learning, denoted by Lt, depends on
worker effort and peer quality. The latter is measured by the peers’ average ability. Learning
is not only concurrent – it also affects future productivity with a depreciation rate δ. For
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simplification, we assume that the learning function follows a straightforward expression
below.
Lt(et, ā−i) = etλā−i.
If there is no learning within the firm, i.e., λ = 0, then the model reduces to a simplified
two-period principal-agent model, as in Rogerson (1985).
Cost function. The effort will induce some disutility characterized by a standard quadratic
cost function
c(et) = ke2t ,
as it is increasingly costly for a worker to use additional effort.
Utility function. We make to simplifying assumptions: (i) the period utility of a worker





where the wage contract w(.) is determined by the firm, as detailed in the next paragraph.
Firm’s problem
Assume the firm has a linear contract:
w1 = α + βq1,
w2 = α + βq2 + θq1.
The firm chooses β to reward the concurrently observed outputs from the worker, and choose
θ to reward the first-period effort. In other words, the firm chooses the slopes β and θ to
maximize profits, given the incentive constraint (IC) and individual rationality (IR) hold.
The optimal solution and its implications
Since we have not specified the cardinality of α, it is handy to manipulate α so that the IC
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where all terms are positive. Therefore, ∂E[w2]∂a−i is positive. Thus, the model suggests that an
increase in coworkers’ quality could lead to wage growth in the future.1
B.2 Construction of C
Denote i for each row of the observation, where we suppress the notation of i, t to i. First,















































where th auxiliary matrix 0 makes the dimension of C the same as X.
A simple example
As a simple example on how we construct C, suppose we have the following data, where
there are only five workers and two peer groups. The first column and second column of the









1The above analysis uses linearity as a simplifying assumption, which does not seems to be realistic. We
might prove the finding by relaxing the linearity assumptions. Nevertheless, our numeric simulation finds the
results still hold if we use non-linear wage contracts and utility functions.
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We first construct an averaging matrix C̃ below to detect who is each worker’s peer and what
weight they are assigned when calculating the average peer quality. One might read C̃ as
follows. The first row of C̃ says: 1 is not a coworker of himself, 2 is her coworker, and 3, 4, 5
are not her coworkers. The third row says, 1 and 2 are not 3’s coworkers, 3 is not a coworker




0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5
0 0 0.5 0 0.5
0 0 0.5 0.5 0

To make sure C and X have the same dimension, we add an auxiliary matrix 0 to C̃ as a final
component of C. That is, C = [C̃,0].
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Fig. B.1 Density of the change in peer fixed effect between consecutive years for movers and
stayers.
Notes. The figure shows the density of changes in peer quality between consecutive years for movers and stayers.
The peer quality is measured as the leave-one out average of AKM worker effects at the peer group level, i.e.
ᾱ−i,t =
1
|M−it | ∑k∈M−it αk, where |M−it| is the number of peers of worker i.
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(B) Treatment 2 vs Control group
Fig. B.2 Propensity score density, hire design
Notes. The figure reports the propensity score density for firms hiring high-quality (treatment 1) and average-
quality (control) workers in panel (A) and for firms hiring low-quality (treatment 1) and average-quality (control)
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(B) Treatment 2 vs Control group
Fig. B.3 Propensity score density, leaver design
Notes. The figure reports the propensity score density for firms separating from high-quality (treatment 1) and
average-quality (control) workers in panel (A) and for firms hiring low-quality (treatment 1) and average-quality
(control) workers in panel (B).













0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity score
Treated workers Control workers













0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity score
Treated workers Control workers
(B) Treatment 2 vs Control group
Fig. B.4 Propensity score density, mover design
Notes. The figure reports the propensity score density for workers moving into high-quality (treatment 1) and
average-quality (control) peer groups in panel (A) and for workers moving into low-quality (treatment 1) and
average-quality (control) peer groups in panel (B).
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(B) Value added per worker
Fig. B.5 Log value added per worker and log sales per worker around mobility, hire design
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6), separately for firms hiring high-quality and
low-quality workers relative to firms hiring average-quality workers. The dependent variable is log sales per
worker in panel (A) and log value added per worker in panel (B). Regressions are weighted by firm size. Vertical


















-2 -1 0 1 2 3
low-quality worker high-quality worker
















-2 -1 0 1 2 3
low-quality worker high-quality worker
(B) Value added per worker
Fig. B.6 Log value added per worker and log sales per worker around mobility, leaver design
Notes. The figure reports estimates of βk from equation (2.6), separately for firms separating from high-quality
and low-quality workers relative to firms separating from average-quality workers. The dependent variable is
log sales per worker in panel (A) and log value added per worker in panel (B). Regressions are weighted by firm
size. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, obtained from cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level.
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Time to event (years)
Hire Leaver Mover
Difference-in-differences coef.
Mover = .207 (.007)
Hire = .093 (.017)
Leaver = -.001 (.009)
Fig. B.7 Event study, continuous treatment
Notes. The figure reports estimates of β̃k, i.e. the dynamic effects of a 1 percent increase in the quality of a new
hire or a separation on coworkers’ wages in the origin (Hire) and destination firms (Leave) from equation (2.8),
and the estimates of γ̃k, i.e. the dynamic effects of a 1 percent increase in the quality of the peer group a mover
joins (Mover), from equation (2.9). Vertical bars are 95 percent confidence intervals, obtained from cluster-robust
standard errors at the firm (for β̃k) and individual (for γ̃k) level.
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Table B.1 Balance test of covariates, before and after matching, hiring design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High-quality mover Low-quality mover
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value
Mean wage -4 -21.574 0.000*** -5.932 0.141 7.136 0.124 1.291 0.785
Mean wage -3 -21.511 0.000*** -5.905 0.156 7.951 0.093* 4.570 0.342
Mean wage -2 -21.050 0.000*** -5.580 0.165 10.742 0.026** 4.523 0.356
AKM worker effect -0.088 0.000*** -0.006 0.178 -0.000 0.955 0.006 0.273
AKM firm effect -0.001 0.721 -0.006 0.155 -0.025 0.000*** -0.001 0.791
Employees’ mean age 3.512 0.000*** -0.177 0.399 0.659 0.000*** -0.165 0.456
Share female 0.006 0.534 0.003 0.811 0.028 0.007*** -0.011 0.383
Share blue-collar 0.014 0.145 -0.007 0.513 -0.049 0.000*** 0.011 0.400
Firm size 0.293 0.136 -0.069 0.770 0.236 0.233 0.106 0.642
Firm age 0.492 0.000*** -0.107 0.512 0.280 0.047** -0.021 0.905
Value added 332.034 0.645 -425.186 0.631 -1.2e+03 0.138 -75.134 0.938
Revenues 94.932 0.895 -420.232 0.634 517.826 0.501 -11.555 0.990
Manufacturing -0.104 0.000*** 0.012 0.425 -0.041 0.002*** 0.018 0.263
Construction 0.055 0.000*** -0.006 0.548 0.002 0.823 0.008 0.382
Wholesale -0.020 0.030** 0.001 0.904 -0.038 0.000*** -0.001 0.927
Accommodation 0.018 0.000*** -0.004 0.519 0.008 0.074* -0.004 0.462
Transports 0.001 0.771 -0.003 0.574 -0.007 0.125 -0.003 0.630
Finance -0.012 0.000*** 0.001 0.733 0.001 0.809 -0.003 0.633
Services -0.010 0.058* -0.002 0.783 -0.010 0.100* -0.005 0.459
Health 0.038 0.000*** 0.010 0.062* 0.047 0.000*** -0.009 0.171
Domestic 0.003 0.289 -0.000 0.897 0.005 0.128 0.001 0.784
Other 0.031 0.000*** -0.010 0.237 0.032 0.000*** -0.003 0.751
Belluno 0.019 0.001*** 0.002 0.746 0.001 0.882 -0.004 0.590
Padua -0.023 0.016** 0.005 0.692 -0.001 0.934 0.006 0.617
Rovigo -0.002 0.722 0.000 0.940 -0.006 0.275 0.005 0.389
Treviso -0.003 0.766 0.004 0.723 -0.010 0.335 0.006 0.609
Venice -0.004 0.686 -0.012 0.254 0.004 0.657 -0.015 0.212
Vicenza -0.008 0.433 0.003 0.820 -0.003 0.784 -0.002 0.903
Verona 0.020 0.036** -0.002 0.875 0.015 0.152 0.002 0.861
N. treated 2517 2164 2015 1848
N. control 4636 2164 4636 1848
Notes. The table reports a balance test of covariates used for matching in the analysis of the effect of a new hire
on coworkers’ wages. Columns (1) to (4) report the average difference and the p-value of the difference for each
variable in the unmatched (columns 1-2) and matched (column 3-4) samples comparing firms hiring a high-
quality worker to those hiring an average-quality worker. Columns (5) to (8) report the average difference and
the p-value of the difference for each variable in the unmatched (columns 5-6) and matched (column 7-8) samples
comparing firms hiring a low-quality worker to those hiring an average-quality worker. Heteroskedasticity
robust p-values are obtained from univariate regressions of each covariate on a dummy for firms hiring
high-quality workers (in columns 2 and 4) or low-quality workers (in columns 6 and 8). Significance levels:
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table B.2 Balance test of covariates, before and after matching, leaver design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High-quality mover Low-quality mover
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value
Mean wage -4 -2.060 0.509 -4.895 0.163 -1.729 0.676 -0.362 0.940
Mean wage -3 -1.298 0.682 -3.758 0.292 -0.208 0.960 -1.934 0.688
Mean wage -2 0.039 0.990 -4.018 0.256 4.700 0.285 -1.859 0.693
AKM worker effect -0.036 0.000*** -0.004 0.327 -0.036 0.000*** -0.002 0.708
AKM firm effect 0.000 0.940 -0.004 0.264 -0.008 0.061* -0.002 0.735
Employees’ mean age 2.109 0.000*** -0.040 0.811 1.972 0.000*** 0.202 0.352
Share female -0.006 0.470 0.009 0.365 0.048 0.000*** -0.017 0.183
Share blue-collar 0.005 0.539 -0.002 0.840 -0.093 0.000*** 0.015 0.260
Firm size 0.642 0.000*** -0.046 0.828 -0.149 0.519 -0.385 0.087*
Firm age 0.124 0.309 -0.072 0.616 0.006 0.965 -0.037 0.836
Value added 39.360 0.952 782.142 0.303 709.148 0.354 209.679 0.825
Revenues -290.164 0.657 176.462 0.816 363.910 0.627 177.693 0.851
Manufacturing -0.057 0.000*** -0.002 0.895 -0.105 0.000*** 0.014 0.392
Construction 0.045 0.000*** 0.003 0.682 0.013 0.091* 0.014 0.139
Wholesale -0.022 0.007*** -0.001 0.915 -0.027 0.004*** -0.006 0.596
Accommodation 0.017 0.000*** -0.002 0.701 0.003 0.528 0.001 0.860
Transports 0.003 0.462 -0.003 0.557 -0.001 0.796 0.002 0.762
Finance -0.008 0.016** 0.004 0.250 0.003 0.502 -0.007 0.237
Services -0.025 0.000*** -0.001 0.880 0.004 0.504 -0.007 0.399
Health 0.017 0.000*** 0.005 0.231 0.055 0.000*** -0.003 0.676
Domestic 0.006 0.037** -0.001 0.846 0.009 0.014** -0.002 0.634
Other 0.023 0.000*** -0.003 0.628 0.046 0.000*** -0.006 0.535
Belluno 0.013 0.009*** -0.003 0.644 0.010 0.079* -0.002 0.827
Padua -0.023 0.008*** -0.001 0.892 -0.018 0.070* -0.002 0.868
Rovigo 0.006 0.200 0.000 0.949 0.004 0.439 0.005 0.411
Treviso -0.019 0.029** 0.011 0.250 -0.004 0.708 0.008 0.526
Venice 0.020 0.015** 0.001 0.915 0.002 0.808 -0.001 0.964
Vicenza -0.003 0.785 -0.008 0.447 -0.008 0.429 0.010 0.467
Verona 0.006 0.489 -0.000 0.972 0.014 0.148 -0.019 0.139
N. treated 3065 2905 2046 1885
N. control 5374 2905 5374 1885
Notes. The table reports a balance test of covariates used for matching in the analysis of the effect of a separation
on coworkers’ wages. Columns (1) to (4) report the average difference and the p-value of the difference for
each variable in the unmatched (columns 1-2) and matched (column 3-4) samples comparing firms separating
from a high-quality worker to those separating from an average-quality worker. Columns (5) to (8) report
the average difference and the p-value of the difference for each variable in the unmatched (columns 5-6) and
matched (column 7-8) samples comparing firms separating from a low-quality worker to those separating from
an average-quality worker. Heteroskedasticity robust p-values are obtained from univariate regressions of each
covariate on a dummy for firms separating from high-quality workers (in columns 2 and 4) or low-quality
workers (in columns 6 and 8). Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table B.3 Balance test of covariates, before and after matching, mover design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High-quality peers Low-quality peers
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value Diff. P-value
Wage -4 -0.070 0.000*** 0.007 0.513 0.201 0.000*** -0.009 0.658
Wage -3 -0.076 0.000*** 0.008 0.490 0.216 0.000*** -0.011 0.578
Wage -2 -0.081 0.000*** 0.007 0.567 0.229 0.000*** -0.009 0.681
Weeks worked -0.420 0.004*** 0.105 0.321 0.196 0.017** 0.085 0.618
AKM worker effect decile -2.682 0.000*** -0.033 0.712 2.881 0.000*** 0.094 0.279
Age 6.504 0.000*** -0.303 0.425 0.360 0.407 -0.523 0.068*
Female 0.091 0.000*** 0.002 0.957 -0.125 0.000*** -0.023 0.182
Tenure -0.114 0.038** 0.091 0.074* -0.012 0.760 0.070 0.328
Blue-collar 0.049 0.001*** 0.008 0.658 -0.261 0.000*** 0.031 0.209
AKM firm effect -0.005 0.341 0.002 0.680 -0.003 0.477 0.007 0.231
Log firm size 0.260 0.002*** 0.002 0.973 0.319 0.000*** 0.033 0.759
Manufacturing 0.015 0.358 0.001 0.964 -0.027 0.052* -0.019 0.490
Construction 0.004 0.361 0.001 0.867 0.005 0.238 -0.002 0.800
Wholesale -0.007 0.528 -0.003 0.790 -0.004 0.539 0.012 0.410
Accommodation -0.000 0.683 0.001 0.259 0.001 0.216 -0.001 0.443
Transports -0.002 0.706 0.001 0.818 -0.005 0.175 -0.002 0.455
Finance -0.018 0.235 0.004 0.649 0.010 0.197 0.018 0.161
Services -0.002 0.605 0.000 0.836 0.002 0.533 -0.002 0.784
Health 0.003 0.267 -0.001 0.409 0.008 0.232 -0.002 0.680
Domestic 0.003 0.148 -0.001 0.286 0.003 0.408 -0.001 0.839
Other 0.003 0.411 -0.003 0.745 0.009 0.147 -0.001 0.945
Belluno 0.001 0.667 0.002 0.512 0.005 0.085* 0.001 0.668
Padua -0.009 0.429 -0.001 0.963 -0.011 0.078* 0.011 0.571
Rovigo -0.003 0.408 0.000 0.979 -0.009 0.031** -0.003 0.494
Treviso 0.000 0.995 0.001 0.936 0.004 0.501 -0.006 0.641
Venice -0.008 0.510 0.001 0.956 -0.005 0.595 -0.000 0.986
Vicenza 0.018 0.073* -0.004 0.756 0.019 0.078* -0.001 0.974
Verona 0.001 0.830 0.001 0.879 -0.002 0.704 -0.003 0.757
N. treated 26194 15511 22547 12778
N. control 46007 15511 46007 12778
Notes. The table reports a balance test of covariates used for matching in the analysis of the effect on worker’s
wages of moving into peer groups of different quality. Columns (1) to (4) report the average difference and the
p-value of the difference for each variable in the unmatched (columns 1-2) and matched (column 3-4) samples
comparing workers moving into high-quality peers to those moving into average-quality peers. Columns (5) to
(8) report the average difference and the p-value of the difference for each variable in the unmatched (columns
5-6) and matched (column 7-8) samples comparing workers moving into low-quality peers to those moving
into average-quality peers. Heteroskedasticity robust p-values are obtained from univariate regressions of each
covariate on a dummy for workers moving into high-quality peers (in columns 2 and 4) or low-quality peers (in
columns 6 and 8). Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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C.1 Additional Figures and Tables
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(B) Correlation worker effect and sales
Fig. C.1 Event study of the effect of automation spike on assortative matching in the labour
market, de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020) methodology
Notes. The figure reports event study estimates, following the methodology proposed by de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille (2020), of the effects of automation spikes on labour market sorting, measured as the correlation
between AKM worker fixed effects and log value added per worker in panel A and with log sales per worker in
panel B. The regressions include non-parametric controls, measured in the year prior to the automation spike,
for average log sales per worker, average log earnings, the share of blue-collar workers, the share of female
workers, the share of workers below age 40 and the share of firms with more than 100 employees. The shaded
areas are 95% confidence intervals from bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.1 Sectors included in IFR data
Sector Nace Group
Agriculture, forestry, fishing A-B 1
Mining and quarrying C 2
Food and beverages 10, 11, 12 3
Textiles 13, 14, 15 4
Wood and furniture 16 5
Paper 17, 18 6
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 19 7
Other chemical products n.e.c. 20, 21 8
Rubber and plastic products (non-automotive) 22 9
Chemical products, unspecified 229 9
Glass, ceramics, stone, mineral products (non-automotive) 23 10
Basic metals 24 11
Metal products (non-automotive) 25 12
Electronic components/devices 260 13
Semiconductors, LCD, LED 261 13
Computers and peripheral equipment 262 13
Info communication equipment, domestic and prof. 263 13
Medical, precision, optical instruments 265 13
Household/domestic appliances 275 14
Electrical machinery n.e.c. (non-automotive) 271 14
Electrical/electronics unspecified 279 14
Industrial machinery 28 15
Metal, unspecified 289 15
Automotive 29 16
Other vehicles 30 17
All other manufacturing branches 91 18
Electricity, gas, water supply E 19
Notes. The table reports the sectors included in IFR data, together with their classification in Nace Rev. 2 and
how the sectors have been grouped for the purpose of the present paper.
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Table C.2 First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: High labour force attachment group
△ robots Germany -0.288 -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.276*** -0.358***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.088) (0.101)
△ robots Spain -0.156 -0.146 -0.143 0.512 0.341
(0.560) (0.558) (0.556) (0.680) (0.570)
△ robots Finland -0.575 -0.511 -0.444 5.291 1.731
(3.800) (3.795) (3.790) (4.450) (3.573)
△ robots France 2.100 2.112*** 2.113*** 1.393*** 1.392***
(0.492) (0.490) (0.488) (0.406) (0.409)
△ robots Norway -3.066 -3.163 -3.213 11.783 5.542
(6.030) (6.037) (6.013) (7.959) (6.798)
△ robots Sweden 4.393 4.374*** 4.347*** 1.471 4.069***
(1.436) (1.431) (1.428) (1.750) (1.346)
△ robots United Kingdom 0.983 0.962 0.959 0.627 1.378**
(0.745) (0.745) (0.744) (0.649) (0.675)
F-statistic of excluded instruments 140.5 135.2 135.7 138.1 114.3
Observations 136,736 136,736 136,736 136,736 136,736
Panel B: All workers
△ robots Germany -0.288** -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.277*** -0.364***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.088) (0.104)
△ robots Spain -0.159** -0.147 -0.149 0.545 0.372
(0.579) (0.576) (0.575) (0.701) (0.590)
△ robots Finland -0.379** -0.320 -0.289 5.658 2.009
(3.990) (3.982) (3.975) (4.737) (3.827)
△ robots France 2.120** 2.133*** 2.134*** 1.399*** 1.385***
(0.505) (0.502) (0.501) (0.410) (0.420)
△ robots Norway -3.559** -3.680 -3.754 11.625 5.289
(5.942) (5.964) (5.944) (7.894) (6.692)
△ robots Sweden 4.355** 4.337*** 4.323*** 1.341 4.040***
(1.500) (1.493) (1.490) (1.840) (1.413)
△ robots United Kingdom 0.965** 0.942 0.942 0.588 1.392*
(0.787) (0.789) (0.787) (0.689) (0.710)
F-statistic of excluded instruments 128.6 121.0 121.7 127.9 111.1
Observations 174,405 174,405 174,405 174,405 174,405
Birth year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment history Yes Yes Yes
Industry and firm controls Yes Yes
△ Net exports and △ ICT Yes
Notes. The table reports the estimates from the first stage regression of the change in robots per 1000 worker in the Italian
labour market on the corresponding change in other seven European countries between 1994 and 2018. Panel A focuses on the
main high labour force attachment sample used in the analysis. Panel B shows results for the full sample of workers. Column
(1) includes birth year dummies. Column (2) controls for workers’ gender and region of residence (20 dummies). Column
(3) includes tenure dummies (4-6 years, ≥ 7 years), log earnings in 1994 and terciles of adjusted wages. Column (4) includes
five firm size dummies (11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more employees) and four dummies for broad manufacturing
sectors (food, beverages and tobacco; consumer goods, industrial goods and capital goods). Column (5) further controls for
the change in net exports form China and Eastern Europe over 1994-2018 and the change in ICT capital over 1996-2016. The
table further reports the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) first stage F-statistic of excluded instruments. Robust standard errors,
clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4 Exposure to robots and earnings and employment by industry, firm, 1993-2018:
2SLS estimates, sample with non-missing balance sheet information





Same 2-digit industry Yes Yes No No
Same firm Yes No No No
Panel A: Cumulative earnings
△ robots per 1000 worker 2.910* 5.875*** -1.822 0.161 -1.305
(1.515) (1.295) (1.133) (2.247) (0.955)
Panel B: Cumulative days
△ robots per 1000 worker 5.906*** 12.526*** -4.394** 0.972 -3.198*
(1.530) (3.523) (2.184) (4.170) (1.698)
Panel C: Average daily wage
△ robots per 1000 worker 0.032 0.042* -0.087 0.036 -0.109
(0.052) (0.024) (0.085) (0.151) (0.081)
Notes. N = 45,766. The table replicates Table 3.4 using observations with non-missing information on firms’ value
added. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5 First stage firms, 1994-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Restricted sample
△ robots Germany -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 0.219* 0.194
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.126) (0.122)
△ robots Spain -2.589* -2.596*** -2.592*** -3.308*** -3.148***
(0.363) (0.362) (0.363) (0.397) (0.409)
△ robots Finland -0.529* -0.511 -0.492 -1.670 -2.987*
(0.960) (0.951) (0.960) (1.525) (1.469)
△ robots France 4.227* 4.237*** 4.235*** 4.247*** 4.037***
(0.494) (0.490) (0.490) (0.533) (0.592)
△ robots Norway -13.214* -13.434** -13.482** -17.239*** -23.570**
(5.529) (5.478) (5.478) (5.988) (9.137)
△ robots Sweden 4.457* 4.457*** 4.458*** 3.916*** 5.068***
(0.469) (0.465) (0.466) (0.546) (1.118)
△ robots United Kingdom -1.685* -1.702** -1.703** -2.610*** -2.397***
(0.713) (0.708) (0.708) (0.613) (0.666)
F-statistic of excluded instruments 171.7 173.4 171.5 293.5 378.0
Observations 19,802 19,802 19,802 19,802 19,802
Panel B: Full sample
△ robots Germany -0.006** -0.005 -0.005 0.221* 0.193
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.125) (0.124)
△ robots Spain -2.563** -2.570*** -2.565*** -3.305*** -3.143***
(0.377) (0.375) (0.377) (0.406) (0.422)
△ robots Finland -0.492** -0.470 -0.448 -1.715 -3.009**
(0.943) (0.933) (0.940) (1.522) (1.459)
△ robots France 4.199** 4.211*** 4.209*** 4.225*** 4.027***
(0.509) (0.505) (0.505) (0.531) (0.591)
△ robots Norway -13.329** -13.573** -13.625** -17.144*** -23.386**
(5.445) (5.390) (5.383) (5.894) (9.227)
△ robots Sweden 4.425** 4.427*** 4.427*** 3.894*** 5.041***
(0.470) (0.466) (0.467) (0.537) (1.145)
△ robots United Kingdom -1.657** -1.678** -1.679** -2.585*** -2.366***
(0.705) (0.699) (0.699) (0.621) (0.682)
F-statistic of excluded instruments 161.1 162.9 161.0 283.6 365.0
Observations 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline sales and wages Yes Yes Yes
Industry and firm size dummies Yes Yes
△ Net exports and △ ICT Yes
Notes. The table reports the estimates from the first stage regression of the change in robots per 1000 worker in the Italian
labour market on the corresponding change in other seven European countries between 1994 and 2012. Panel A focuses on
the restricted sample (see text for definitions) used in the firm-level analysis. Panel B shows results for the full sample of firms.
Column (1) includes cohort dummies. Column (2) controls for firms’ region of location (20 dummies). Column (3) includes
log average sales and wages in 1994. Column (4) includes five firm size dummies (11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 500 or more
employees) and four dummies for broad manufacturing sectors (food, beverages and tobacco; consumer goods, industrial
goods and capital goods). Column (5) further controls for the change in net exports form China and Eastern Europe over
1994-2012 and the change in ICT capital over 1996-2012. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) first-stage F-statistic of excluded
instruments is reported in both panel A and B. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.6 Robot exposure and firm outcomes, 1994-2012: OLS and 2SLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labour
costs





Panel A: Restricted sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 4.527** -1.413 1.441 -4.805 1.179 -0.038
(2.040) (4.340) (1.224) (17.756) (1.092) (0.056)
Observations 19,771 19,763 19,802 19,684 19,802 19,802
Panel B: Full sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 5.529*** 1.643 2.916* -9.053 1.349 -0.038
(1.907) (4.238) (1.580) (13.518) (1.034) (0.048)
Observations 24,530 24,517 24,575 24,397 24,575 24,575
Notes. The table reports estimates of ξ from equation (3.2). Outcomes are cumulated values over 1994-2012.
Columns (1) to (6) report the estimates for cumulative labour costs (from balance sheet data), cumulative assets,
cumulative debts, cumulative profits – all in percent of their baseline levels in 1994 –, years with positive profits
and the exit rate of firms. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. All regressions include the full set of controls from
column (6) of Table 3.7. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7 Robot exposure and firm employment by worker skills and firms’ productivity,
1994-2012: 2SLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Panel A: Restricted sample
△ robots per 1000 worker 4.008** 2.027 2.152*** -0.505
(1.840) (1.358) (0.601) (1.016)
Panel B: By VA/Empl tercile
△ robots bottom tercile -3.188 1.255 -0.696 -3.323**
(2.960) (2.265) (1.386) (1.635)
△ robots middle tercile 1.862 1.176 1.666** -1.105
(1.577) (1.158) (0.713) (0.906)
△ robots top tercile 12.777*** 3.741*** 5.184*** 2.619*
(2.448) (1.007) (1.074) (1.350)
Observations 18,564 18,564 18,564 18,564
Notes. The table reports estimates of ξ from equation (3.2) in the restricted sample, focusing on firms with non-
missing information about workers’ skills (see text for details). Outcomes are cumulated values over 1994-2012.
Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B decomposes the effect by terciles of firms’ value added per
worker. Column (1) reports the estimates for cumulative employment in percent of baseline employment in
1994, whereas columns (2) to (4) report the estimates for cumulative employment of workers in the bottom,
middle and top terciles of worker skills. All regressions include the full set of controls from column (6) of Table
3.7. Robust standard errors, clustered by 36 two-digit NACE Rev.2 industries, in parentheses. Significance levels:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
